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My interest in poverty and poverty relief did not begin as an academic study, but more as a visceral 
concern about a reality of the human condition that called for further attention. Growing up, I knew my 
father had been raised in extreme poverty at the end of the Great Depression. After he was born, he was 
taken home to the tent in which his parents raised their large family through the harsh Utah winters and 
blistering summers until they moved into an abandoned box car, before eventually building a home, 
partially out of scrap wood. Fortunately, and largely thanks to his hard work and determination to 
provide a better future for his own family, I never knew first-hand the poverty he was raised in. Like 
virtually everyone who reads this dissertation and unlike most of the world’s population throughout 
human history, by mere chance I was born into a family in a time and place where shelter, food, 
healthcare, and an education were available to us—not to mention clean water, electricity, basic security 
and protections, and so forth. When I was in high school, I began volunteering at a homeless shelter in 
Salt Lake City, Utah; it was there that I first confronted the reality of extreme poverty face to face. The 
first real epiphany came with the realization that many of the people I met there had found themselves 
waiting in line for a room at a family homeless shelter by and large because of circumstances beyond 
their own control. Even in an affluent nation, homelessness and poverty is the lot of many people from a 
variety of backgrounds and for a variety of reasons; it seemed it could happen to anyone.  
The prevalence and threat of poverty only became clearer and more striking as I conducted research with 
two microcredit organizations, the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and Katalysis Partnership in California, 
as part of an internship while studying international development management in graduate school. While 
I had come to identify the poverty I had witnessed in the U.S. as an indication of an institutional failure 
of sorts, I had not seen it at the systemic level of impoverished nations or regions. Global poverty 
pointed to failure at a massive level. I was aware of some of the different approaches to conceptualizing 
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the problem of global poverty, as well as leading theories and strategies of poverty alleviation. These did 
not, however, prepare me to confront the soul-crushing conditions of the world’s poorest in rural 
Bangladesh. That experience led me to think of global poverty primarily as an indication of a collective 
moral failure. There is much to be done, but due to its far-reaching nature, to some degree poverty must 
be addressed at a global level through collective efforts. My intention with this dissertation is to help 
facilitate a better understanding of poverty and ways of conceptualizing poverty and poverty relief by 
examining it through the lens of a widely known but relatively unexamined perspective and that by 
doing so this might also help engender a greater compassion toward those who suffer, especially in 
motivating us all genuinely to strive to help those that we are in a position to help. 
My thanks first go to Prof. Perry Schmidt-Leukel for agreeing to supervise my research in spite of my 
initial lack of training in the field of religious studies. Having come from a ‘more practical’ approach to 
studying poverty and international development, I had not previously studied religion at the graduate 
level. Nevertheless, Perry immediately recognized the value in research on the topic of poverty relief 
and Buddhist ethics, and encouraged me to pursue it from the earliest stages of applying to the 
university, through reading and commenting on my dissertation chapters—and even remaining willing 
to do so after he accepted a post at another university and was no longer bound to. Secondly, I need to 
thank Julie Clague, who also supervised my research from beginning to end. Julie’s expertise in the 
confluence of religion, social ethics, and international development, and her constant encouragement 
and support throughout the writing process were essential to my completing this dissertation. If the 
project wouldn’t have begun without Perry, it wouldn’t have concluded without Julie. 
Thanks also to Blaine Johnson, with whom I worked on Paramita Group/Human Security International, 
whose interests in bringing innovative development strategies to Tibetan and Burmese refugee camps 
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first introduced me to many of the issues in Buddhist thought and poverty studies that I discuss in this 
dissertation.  
And certainly, above all, thanks to my family for their support. My wife Camille happily moved our 
little family around the world, made a new home for us, and gave birth to our youngest child through our 
own very real trials of indebtedness and poverty in graduate studies. Without her encouragement, I may 
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Hunger is the worst disease, conditioned things the worst suffering. 
Knowing this as it really is, the wise realize Nibbana, the highest bliss. 
- Dhp 203 
 
Namo Buddhaya! 
May all beings be free from 
suffering and the causes of suffering. 
Namo Buddhaya! 
May all beings be free from 
disease and the causes of disease. 
Namo Buddhaya! 
May all beings be free from 
hunger and the causes of hunger. 
Namo Buddhaya! 
May all beings be free from violence and the causes of violence. 
-Dzogchen Peace Prayer 
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Introduction 
Poverty is a perennial concern of individuals, communities, and governments throughout the 
world. In our current age of globalization it has come to occupy space as a major ethical concern 
at an international and global level. No doubt this is due to the startling reality that nearly 3 
billion people currently live in poverty.
1
 As Thomas Pogge notes, this severe poverty has dire 
consequences: 
799 million human beings are undernourished, 1 billion lack access to safe water, 2.4 
billion lack access to basic sanitation, and 876 million adults are illiterate. More than 880 
million lack access to basic health services. Approximately 1 billion have no adequate 
shelter and 2 billion no electricity. “Two out of five children in the developing world are 
stunted, one in three is underweight, and one in ten is wasted.” Some 250 million children 
between 5 and 14 do wage work outside their household—often under harsh or cruel 
conditions: as soldiers, prostitutes, or domestic servants, or in agriculture, construction, 
textile or carpet production. “Worldwide, 34,000 children under age five die daily from 
hunger and preventable diseases.” Roughly one third of all human deaths, some 50,000 
daily are due to poverty-related causes easily preventable through better nutrition, safe 
                                                             
1
  Chen and Ravallion, 2008: 20-24; UNDP, 2007: 25. This is the estimated number 
living on less than $2.50 a day. 
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drinking water, vaccines, cheap rehydration packs and antibiotics.
2
 
The recent global economic recession further highlights the precarious situation in which many 
find themselves—so many living day after day in extreme poverty, and many more living on the 
very brink, just one crisis, drought, or illness away from being added to the masses in extreme 
poverty. And actually, if poverty levels are more subjectively measured by citizen’s own 
standards, an estimated 81-88% of the world’s population live below the poverty level.3  
Ironically, even while the real numbers of people living in extreme poverty has climbed with the 
upsurge in the world’s population, technological advances and increases in global production has 
also led to unprecedented rises in global wealth and consumption. Wealth and consumption 
levels are important to note as they highlight a glaring global income and wealth disparity. Peter 
Singer notes: 
We live in a unique moment. The proportion of people unable to meet their basic physical 
needs is smaller today than it has been at any time in recent history, and perhaps at any 
time since humans first came into existence. At the same time, when we take a long-term 
perspective that sees beyond the fluctuation of the economic cycle, the proportion of 
                                                             
2
   Pogge, 2000: 253. The United Nations Human Development Report indicates that 
some 10 Million children die before age 5 each year, mostly due to malnutrition and 
starvation. See UNDP, 2007: 25. 
3
   Pritchett, 2006: 6-15. Here Pritchett considers the views of the poorest in rich countries 
and the richest in poor countries to determine what they consider the poverty line. In 
conclusion, he assumes a poverty line of $10 a day, much higher than UNDP 
standards. 
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people with far more than they need is unprecedented. Most important, rich and poor are 
now linked in ways they never were before. Moving images, in real time, of people on 
the edge of survival are beamed into our living rooms. Not only do we know a lot about 
the desperately poor, but we also have much more to offer them in terms of better health 




This gap between the income or amassed wealth of the world’s wealthiest and poorest is a 
helpful way of conceptualizing both the problem of inequality and the possibility of a solution or 
an end to global extreme poverty. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
explains that if the world were a single country, the average income would be the equivalent of 
$5,533, with the median income at $1,700 in 2000.
5
 The report also includes a breakdown of 
global income by population: 
The gap between median and average income points to a concentration of income at the 
top end of the distribution: 80% of the world’s population had an income less than the 
average. Meanwhile, the average income of the top 20% of the world’s population is 
about 50 times the average income of the bottom 20%. Global income distribution 
resembles a champagne glass [see figure 1 below]. At the top, where the glass is widest, 
the richest 20% of the population hold three-quarters of world income. At the bottom of 
the stem, where the glass is narrowest, the poorest 40% hold 5% of world income and the 
poorest 20% hold just 1.5%. The poorest 40% roughly corresponds to the 2 billion people 
                                                             
4
  Singer, 2009, xii. 
5
  UNDP, 2005: 36. 
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Figure 1: World Income Distributed by Percentiles of the Population, 2000.
7
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the global income inequality is also paralleled by a corresponding 
inequality in the consumption of the world’s resources. Along with the improvements in 
technology and increases in wealth has followed an increase in consumption. It has been 
estimated that, if everyone in the world were to match the level of consumption of those living in 
the West, the resources of 10 planet earths would be required.
8
 This over-consumption of the 
world’s resources points to another disparity. According to World Bank data, in 2005, 76.5% of 
                                                             
6
  Ibid. 
7
  Ibid. 
8
  Maguire, 2012: 441. 
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the private household consumption of the world’s resources was done by the top 20% of the 
world’s income earners, compared to only 1.5% consumption among the bottom 20%.9 When 
viewed in terms of global population by quintiles, the levels of consumption mirror very closely 
the income distribution shown above in figure 1. In both cases we see a structure in which the 
world’s wealthiest 20% both own and consume just over 75% of the world’s income and 
resources, while the bottom 20% by comparison have a share of approximately 1.5%. 
Although many developed countries consistently report what are unprecedented levels of wealth 
in the whole of human history, the effects of severe poverty remain a problem even within their 
own borders—how much more so the numerous impoverished countries whose citizens daily 
face widespread starvation and disease with little hope of relief. Perhaps most alarming, while 
economic growth and prosperity has increased significantly in many countries in recent decades, 
and despite the targeted poverty alleviation efforts by local and international bodies, both public 
and private, poverty seems to persist and has even increased in many of the targeted areas.
10
  
Although, global poverty is already at a disconcerting level, and global income inequalities 
continue to raise concerns despite anti-poverty efforts, we should not conclude that poverty is 
simply an inevitable aspect of human existence or that nothing can be done to effectively 
alleviate the suffering of the poor, let alone to actually end extreme poverty. We can infer from 
                                                             
9
   World Bank, 2008: 4. 
10
  Odekon, 2006: viii. Poverty rates have dropped significantly over the last 30 years in 
some regions as national economies expanded, but other regions saw only marginal 
improvements in poverty reduction, while in the case of countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, poverty actually significantly increased. See, UNDP, 2005: 33-39. 
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the UNDP data above that there are enough resources, but these resources are not equally 
available to all of the world’s population. Pogge addresses common criticisms of the notion that 
poverty relief efforts are a moral duty, including this notion of the futility of such efforts, and 
concludes: 
When the income of the top sixth of humankind is seventy times the income of the 
bottom half, when a third of all human deaths are due to poverty-related causes, and 
when aggregate global income is continuously rising, it would be ludicrous to claim that 
reducing poverty is demonstrably impossible. We do not perhaps know offhand what is 
the best way to proceed. But we are not exactly clueless either and would learn much 
more in the course of making a serious and concerted effort. Clearly, our deficiency here 
is not expertise, but a sense of moral responsibility and, based thereon, the political will 
to fund basic development and to push reforms in our global economic order. 
If Pogge is correct—and I think that he is—a primary obstacle to effective poverty relief efforts 
that must be overcome would seem to involve conceptualizing poverty in a way that engenders 
that sense of individual and collective moral responsibility, and the corresponding political will, 
to begin more concerted efforts to reduce, and eventually eliminate, extreme poverty. Beyond the 
debates about which strategy would theoretically be the most effective, most efficient, or would 
best fit the prevailing political ideology—foreign aid, microfinance, education, improved 
sanitation and health care, property rights and increasing democratic governance—the actual 
work of alleviating global poverty remains. As Pogge notes, many of these issues will sort 
themselves out as serious and concerted efforts are undertaken. A diversity of approaches will 
likely be required to match the diverse needs and conditions of different geographic areas, rather 
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than one ‘silver bullet’ solution. The first great obstacle then is developing the political will and 
sense of moral responsibility required for decisive action. 
It is not only recently that poverty has become an issue of major concern for so many people. To 
be sure, poverty has always been a concern of individuals and communities throughout history; 
as Sharon Vaughn puts it, “the number of people who live in poverty has always far exceeded the 
number who do not. As a result, governments as well as individuals continually grapple with 
defining who the poor are, why they are poor, and what, if anything should be done to alleviate 
poverty.”11 Aside from the existential gravity of these questions for a community and its 
members’ well-being, they also cut directly to the very sense of identity and the world-view of 
the community; the manner in which a given community responds to these questions will 
considerably influence their foundational theories of social ethics, as well as notions of justice, 
and equality.   
In recent decades poverty has become established as a topic of study in various fields within 
academia as diverse as economics, public administration and policy, international development 
studies, anthropology and sociology, philosophy and ethics, and political science. Poverty relief 
has also become a focus of much attention in the political arena, particularly as many world 
leaders have made commitments to the Millennium Development Goal of halving world poverty 
by 2015.
12
 In addition to the government agencies, non-governmental organizations such as 
charities and religious groups are also involved in poverty relief efforts in one way or another, 
from large scale development programs to small grassroots projects. Perhaps religious groups 
                                                             
11
  Vaughan, 2008: 1. 
12
  www.endpoverty2015.org 
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have always of necessity been concerned with poverty within their communities, but the concern 
for distant communities, as in addressing world poverty, is much more common and much more 
pressing now.  
Consequently, there has been an increase in cooperation between religious groups and 
governmental and nongovernmental international development groups in recent years. Former 
President of the World Bank, James D. Wolfensohn, notes, “If development is to succeed, 
development policies must truly be integral in scope. Religion, therefore, cannot be excluded 
from the debate.”13 He observes that because religion is a dimension of life that permeates 
whatever believers do, it affects their opinions on everything, including savings, investment, and 
a host of economic decisions, including many issues that are particularly essential to 
development projects, such as health, schooling, and gender equality. Gerrie Ter Haar similarly 
reports that many development organizations have come to realize that religion can be either an 
important driver of change or a brake to progress.
14
 But, as he notes, some development 
specialists remain sceptical of the role of religion in development, seeing it as an obstacle to 
material progress by opposing a rational view of the world and promoting cultural attributes 
opposed to development.
15
 However, others, much like Wolfensohn above, are more open to 
cooperation, recognizing that theological beliefs can have a significant influence on the way that 
billions of individuals behave. As Ter Haar puts it: 
Given that religion is an integral part of the lives of billions of people, it can be 
                                                             
13
  Ter Haar, 2011: xviii 
14
  Ter Haar, 2011: xvii- xviii. 
15
  Ter Haar, 2011: 5. 
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considered a human resource of significant importance. Since it is widely accepted in 
policy circles that development, if it is to be effective and lasting, should build on 
people’s own resources, it makes sense to include their religious or spiritual resources 
and not material and intellectual ones only.
16
 
These religious or spiritual resources include what is often called social capital, referring to the 
support of relationships, access to certain goods or services, and other intangible resources that 
are available specifically through social activities and participation within a given community, 
but they also include the teachings that motivate action and form the foundation for moral or 
ethical views. 
As is also the case with other major world religions whose teachings must relate to the actual 
lived experiences of their adherents, Buddhist teachings address the moral dimensions of poverty 
and, as this dissertation will demonstrate, these teachings make important contributions to 
discussions relating to global poverty and the moral obligation to alleviate it. For example, since 
the late 1960s, a movement among Buddhists to more actively engage with political and social 
issues like poverty, human rights, and environmental protection has arisen and continually 
increased in prominence. Despite the recurrent characterizations of Buddhism as asocial or 
unconcerned with society or social problems, these Engaged Buddhists draw upon their tradition, 
citing key Buddhist teachings as the foundation for their social and political activism. At 
approximately the same time that the Engaged Buddhist movement got underway in responding 
to social and political concerns, scholarship in the area of Buddhist ethics also began.
17
 Despite 
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the central role of morality in Buddhist practice, and accompanying lists of acceptable or 
unacceptable behavior in Buddhist texts, the Buddhist tradition as a whole has remained nearly 
silent in regard to the type of study of ethics known today in the West, with no clear ethical 
system or overt ethical principles outlined in Buddhist texts for addressing particular ethical 
concerns or dilemmas. Over the last few decades, however, scholars have referred to the 
overabundance of teachings on morality and practical examples given in Buddhist scriptures as 
the data from which to formulate general guiding ethical principles to apply to particular 
contemporary problems such as human rights, war and peace, ecology, abortion, suicide or 
cloning.
18
 There remains, however, a significant gap in literature related to the wealth of 
passages in authoritative scriptural texts that deal with Buddhist concepts of poverty or the social 
and economic ethics regarding poverty relief in Buddhist economic ethics.   
By virtually any measure, little has been written by Buddhists throughout the history of the 
Buddhist tradition, or by contemporary Buddhist scholars, directly addressing the Buddhist 
conception of extreme poverty, its causes, effects, and the proper manner that it should be dealt 
with by individuals, communities, and governments. Over the last few decades, Buddhist 
activists have begun to directly address these issues, but their writings have often been polemics 
against contemporary political or economic structures, or apologetics encouraging activism 
within their community, rather than more academic scholarly treatments of Buddhist texts and 
doctrines relating to these issues. Perhaps partially as a result of this, over the past twenty years, 
these writings and the entire Socially Engaged Buddhist movement came under scrutiny. 
Numerous scholars questioned whether the movement is continuous with the Buddhist tradition 
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as a whole, or whether they have in fact developed something other than Buddhism, perhaps, for 
example, through a syncretisation with Western political thought based on the Abrahamic 
religion’s notions of justice.19 This can be seen as a continuation of a much larger debate that has 
been a part of Buddhist studies in the West since its inception concerning the nature of Buddhist 
social ethics—does the Buddhist tradition encourage a concern for engaging with, or improving 
society, or merely in withdrawing from it and transcending it? 
In this dissertation I will broadly address the issues of poverty and poverty relief in Buddhist 
social and economic ethics from early Buddhism to the contemporary Socially Engaged Buddhist 
movement. I begin with an outline of the key Buddhist doctrines essential for understanding the 
Buddhist concepts of poverty and poverty relief, and which serve as the foundational principles 
for Buddhist analyses of the issues related to these concepts. I will then consider the discussion 
among scholars concerning Buddhist social ethics. Since Western scholars first began writing on 
the Buddhist tradition, a main line of inquiry has concerned how Buddhism teaches that monks 
and lay followers should relate to society, particularly in the political and economic realms. 
Some have argued that Buddhists are or ought to be virtually unconcerned with material or social 
issues, only in transcending them, while others argue that teachings concerning what are 
considered the appropriate social, political, and economic relationships and duties have been 
present throughout the whole of Buddhist history. 
Moving then from addressing Buddhist social ethics, I will outline the major passages in key 
Buddhist scripture related to economic principles, and proceed to discuss scholarly approaches to 
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formulating a Buddhist economic theory. The notion of Buddhist economics includes the general 
attitudes toward wealth and is largely based on the teaching of Right Livelihood, as contained in 
the Noble Eightfold Path. I will there address the questions of how Buddhist thought applies in 
the economic realm, and what specific teachings directly deal with economic matters.   
After discussing Buddhist economics, I will address the particular teachings found in Buddhist 
scriptures concerning notions of poverty, particularly its causes and effects, and duties regarding 
poverty relief. These scriptural passages will then serve as the foundation for an analysis of 
Buddhist concepts of poverty and poverty relief as they compare to common modern Western 
approaches to these concepts. This will be followed by examples of poverty relief efforts which 
put these teachings into practice from Buddhist history and the contemporary Socially Engaged 
Buddhist movement.   
To state it plainly, the goal of this dissertation is to identify in key Buddhist scriptures and texts 
the teachings related to poverty and poverty relief in the Buddhist tradition, including general 
conceptions of poverty, normative principles related to the moral responsibility toward poverty 
relief, Buddhist economic principles and historical examples of the application of these. These 
teachings and historical examples provide evidence that some concern for material poverty has 
been apparent from the earliest accounts of Buddhist history. This entails demonstrating that 
some negative form of material poverty has been distinguished from the common positive 
portrayals of voluntary poverty or simplicity in Buddhist teachings, and that this negative form 
of poverty carries with it a duty to relieve it in some manner. Such teachings amount to at the 
very least a basic social or economic ethic and point towards a general Buddhist approach to 
social theory and economics. While I do not intend to defend the ‘orthodoxy’ of any particular 
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engaged Buddhists or even the movement as a whole, I do aim to demonstrate that the teachings  
we find in some of the earliest texts would suggest that Buddhist followers and scholars who 
attempt to apply Buddhist teachings to economic analysis and poverty relief are not necessarily 
breaking with their tradition in doing so, but may in fact simply exemplify a current of thought 
that has existed within the tradition for millennia. 
Moreover, these teachings can make important contributions to current discussions of poverty 
and poverty relief, far from merely arcane adages, the notions of poverty presented and the moral 
responsibility to relieve poverty found in Buddhist scriptures and texts are remarkably relevant to 
current discussions. And, while these teachings are gleaned from authoritative Buddhist texts, the 
message they convey is not only for Buddhists. While there is clear value in presenting the these 
notions and principles in a language that will resonate with the many Buddhist followers 
throughout the world, one need not be Buddhist to recognize the relevance or power of the 
notions conveyed concerning the human condition and the nature of the phenomenon of poverty. 
Because the study of Buddhist ethics as a branch of Buddhist studies is a relatively recent 
development, it is in a sense treading on new ground to address the ethical principles related to 
contemporary issues like global poverty. To augment the difficulty, the Buddhist tradition is 
itself widely diverse with numerous and varying texts and doctrines seen as central and essential 
by varying schools within Buddhism. Nevertheless, as leading Buddhist Ethics scholars Peter 
Harvey and Damien Keown note, this diversity need not prevent defining certain general 
doctrines and principles that are accepted by virtually all Buddhist schools, particularly when 
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discussing the area of ethics or morality which is a focus of this dissertation.
20
 We can speak of 
Buddhist ethics just as well as of a Buddhist tradition, while recognizing that some Buddhists 
may have diverging opinions on certain particulars.   
Keown has outlined a set of six general governing principles for establishing continuity with the 
Buddhist tradition or overall Buddhist perspective.
21
 First, the view or principle under 
consideration will derive authority from canonical sources. Second, it will have further support 
in non-canonical or commentarial literature. Third, it will not be contradicted by the canonical or 
non-canonical sources. Fourth, there will be evidence that it is in line with the views of a 
majority of Buddhist schools. Fifth, it has a broad cultural base. And, sixth, it has been a 
consistently held view over time. Of course, these principles are not rigid or strict essential 
requirements that must all be met before something can be considered Buddhist, but the greater 
the number of these criteria that are met, the greater the likelihood that something will be widely 
accepted among the diverse Buddhist communities and that it can be considered in keeping with 
what we can call the Buddhist tradition. By relying on Buddhist scriptures and historical 
examples throughout both time and space in the tradition, I aim to demonstrate that a concern for 
the relief of material poverty is consistent with the teachings and goals of this Buddhist tradition. 
In this dissertation, I rely heavily on the teachings on poverty and poverty relief that are found in 
the Pāli Canon, although I also rely on various later Mahāyāna sūtras. The Pāli Canon is 
traditionally divided into three categories, called the Tipiţaka (Sanskrit: Tripiţaka), meaning the 
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‘Three Baskets’: the Vinaya Piţaka, the Sutta Piţaka, and the Abhidhamma Piţaka.22 These are a 
collection of the oral tradition of the teachings of the Buddha from his forty five year ministry 
passed down from the Buddha to his followers, written down in the first century BCE.
23
 Vinaya 
Piţaka texts, the ‘Basket of the Discipline of Renunciates’, is the main source of the rules 
governing the behavior of the monastic community. The Sutta Piţaka, the ‘Basket of Discourses 
of the Buddha’, contains the collection of the Buddha’s teachings on a wide variety of topics. 
The Abhidhamma Piţaka, ‘The Basket of Higher Teachings’, contains systematized and 
philosophical renditions of the Buddha’s teachings. Comprising the oldest and most complete of 
the surviving early canons in the Buddhist tradition, these Pāli texts are widely considered the 
most authoritative historical sources of the teachings and practices of the living Buddha and his 
early followers, and the ultimate authority on the Buddha’s teachings for the Theravāda school. 
While the Pāli Canon is an important source of the Buddha’s teachings and present an important 
perspective on early Buddhism, or what can be called Classical Buddhism, not all schools of 
Buddhism equally consider the Pāli Canon to be the ultimate authority on the Buddha’s 
teachings. Hsiao-Lan Hu Notes: 
Theravādins generally consider the Pāli Canon to be the authentic teachings of the 
Buddha and remain suspicious of many of the texts preserved in the Mahāyāna and 
Vajrayāna collections. Mahāyānists and Vajrayānists, on the other hand, generally do not 
question the legitimacy of the Pāli Canon, even though they may consider their respective 
tradition to be the ultimate form of Buddhism and may consider the Pāli Canon a product 
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of the Buddha’s “skillful means” that caters to people of lesser capacities. That is, 
Buddhists across traditions recognize early Buddhist literature as the basic and 
foundational texts of Buddhism, and more often than not they “see themselves as directly 
in the line of that early Buddhism.”24 
And so, in order to provide a more rich and robust perspective on Buddhist views, in addition to 
the Pāli canonical sources, I augment the following analysis of poverty with references to 
Mahāyāna sūtras which, although generally of a later date than many of the Pāli texts, are 
considered to be more authoritative scriptures by Buddhists outside of the Theravāda tradition. 
However, the vast number of Mahāyāna sūtras, many of which have yet to be translated into the 
English language, complicates any comprehensive treatment of the Mahāyāna scriptures. 
Furthermore, unlike the Pāli Canon, which contains relatively few explicit teachings on material 
poverty as deprivation and poverty relief, the Mahāyāna sūtras frequently refer to poverty in this 
sense, the suffering it causes, and the duty of the bodhisattva to relieve or alleviate that suffering. 
I therefore must focus my discussion on major Mahāyāna sūtras which convey teachings that are 
typical or common to Mahāyāna views. I also refer to semi-canonical sources such as the Jātaka 
tales, which contain tales of the Buddha’s previous lives, and histories which although perhaps 
not widely considered scripture are nonetheless revered, and establish that certain views and 
practices were commonly held at early periods. Because there is relatively little variance in the 
various vinayas, or monastic codes, throughout the Buddhist tradition, and these have remained 
extremely influential in governing the practices and behavior of the monks and nuns, references 
to poverty relief in the vinaya sources may offer evidence of particular views and practices 
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broadly throughout time and geography across the various Buddhist schools. By identifying 
these teachings in Theravāda and Mahāyāna teachings, I intend to outline Buddhist perspectives 
on issues of poverty and poverty relief in the hope that this will aid not only in establishing 
Buddhist perspectives on the issues, as well as contemporary and historical practices, but also in 
generating more clear and insightful analyses and critiques of contemporary solutions to global 
poverty outside of the Buddhist tradition. 
As a brief note on terminology and diacritics, I have chosen to use the Pāli form when 
introducing key terms throughout this dissertation with the Sanskrit form in parentheses when 
they seem helpful. When dealing specifically with Mahāyāna doctrines and texts I use the 
Sanskrit forms and place the Pāli form in parenthesis. I hope this avoids confusion in reading 
passages that often refer to the same doctrine or concept, but use different forms depending on 
the original language of the text. When using terms that have become common in English, I have 
removed the diacritics and italics for ease in reading and use the form that is most widely 
recognized in English. Thus, for example, I write nirvana instead of nirvāňa or nibbāna, and 





 M o n s o n  P a g e  | 18 
 
 
Part I.  Doctrinal Foundations of Buddhist Social & Economic Ethics 
Early studies of Buddhism in the West, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, typically 
envisioned a philosophy focused on individual liberation from this world through exercises in 
mental cultivation, as exemplified in the writings of the father of the sociology of religion, Max 
Weber.
25
 Weber’s perspective on Buddhism shaped Buddhist studies in the West to a high 
degree for generations and remains influential today in discussions of Buddhist social ethics.
26
 
Consequentially, many Westerners have often assumed that the Buddhist tradition is wholly 
unconcerned with temporal or material affairs, let alone with relieving or eliminating poverty. 
However, there are in fact strong principles leading to a Buddhist social ethic evident in Buddhist 
teachings, and despite the relative scarcity of overt references to destitution or to poverty relief 
efforts, the concept of material poverty is in fact also well developed in Buddhist canonical texts, 
demonstrating a high level of concern for the conditions of the poor.  
Upon examination of references to poverty and wealth in various Buddhist scriptures, ranging 
from the early Pāli canonical materials through numerous later Mahāyāna texts, certain common 
principles emerge which indicate typical Buddhist perceptions of poverty and wealth, and which 
can be drawn upon to form a foundation for Buddhist social and economic ethics concerning 
poverty and poverty relief. A clear understanding of the concepts of poverty and poverty relief in 
the Buddhist tradition, however, first requires an understanding of certain key doctrines that not 
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only shape the Buddhist worldview, but also serve as the essential toolset for Buddhist analyses 
of these concepts. Part I of this dissertation will provide a basic doctrinal background necessary 
for approaching poverty and poverty relief in Buddhist social and economic ethics by outlining 
the major teachings of the Buddhist tradition. Details of the specific teachings on poverty and 
poverty relief found in particular Pāli Canonical passages and various Mahāyāna texts will then 
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1. Doctrinal Context for Buddhist Concepts of Poverty & Poverty Relief  
One critical point to be made at the outset concerning Buddhist doctrines is that Buddhism has 
never been a homogenous movement or a unified phenomenon.
27
 While, of course, there must be 
some unifying aspects that make it possible to identify a Buddhist tradition, and there must be at 
least some basic characteristic similarities among the various schools for them even to make up 
what can be called a tradition, there is also a notable diversity.
28
 Great diversity is often noted in 
both teachings and practices among the various schools of Buddhism, but diversity within 
particular schools is evident as well and should also be recognized. According to Bailey and 
Mabbett, since its earliest history, Buddhism “has always meant different things to different 
people”, and in light of the various ways that Buddhist monks, lay followers, and rulers interact 
with each other—as well as with the non-Buddhists in their society—as they practice their 
religion, it should be seen as “a dynamic process dependent upon, and perhaps shaping, the 
societies within which it develops.”29 As such, they contend that it should be conceded that there 
are several different Buddhisms operative within any one Buddhist culture.
30
 And, if a dialogic 
community with diverse concerns and approaches to teachings and practice was already evident 
in early Buddhism as it arose within Indian culture, how much more diverse have its teachings 
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and practices become as it spread into other regions and confronted other cultures throughout the 
world. 
Disagreements over what the Buddha actually taught, what his teachings meant, and how they 
are to be applied in practice have not only distinguished the various schools within Buddhism 
from one another in modern times, but such disagreements seem to have existed from even the 
earliest times in Buddhist history. The Buddhist teachings first developed in northern India near 
the fifth century BCE, but gradually spread throughout the rest of India.
31
 As the Buddhist 
teachings spread to new areas, the number of schools or groups, known as nikāyas, within 
Buddhism also increased.
32
 Although in this early period the distinctions between nikāyas seem 
to have centered on the rules for monks within the saṅgha, the monastic community, the schools 
within the Buddhist tradition have since become differentiated by doctrinal positions as well. 
Theravāda Buddhism, the ‘Way of the Elders’, survives today as a modernized version of one of 
the only remaining early nikāyas, generally referred to as Śravakayāna. Largely based on then 
extra-canonical texts, Mahāyāna Buddhism began spreading as a spiritual movement within 
various nikāyas as early as the first century BCE.33 Over the following few centuries, it came to 
be seen as a separate group, or groups, within Buddhism, with its adherents claiming to have the 
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true teachings of the Buddha and the superior path to enlightenment. However, it is also 
important to recognize the diversity within Mahāyāna Buddhism; it has been suggested that the 
term Mahāyānas be used in order to accentuate the diversity that exists in the various texts and 
practices that have become popular among Mahāyānist groups from their earliest history.34 As 
distinct Mahāyāna schools emerged and fully developed, such as Vajrāyāna or Tibetan, Zen or 
Chan, and Pure Land Buddhism, this diversity only became more pronounced and established. 
The diversity of beliefs and practices continued to increase after the Buddha’s death as 
Buddhism eventually spread widely throughout Central, South and Southeast, and East Asia and 
all but vanished from India. More recently Buddhism has spread throughout the US, Europe, and 
is now found in virtually every region of the world. With the introduction of Buddhism into each 
of these new regions, Buddhism transformed local beliefs and customs and was also transformed 
by them to varying degrees. Vajrāyāna or Tibetan Buddhism, for example, developed in part as a 
mixture of Tantrism and scholasticism as Buddhism encountered the local Bon religion in Tibet; 
and, as Buddhism encountered Daoism and Confucianism in China in approximately the sixth 
century CE, Chan or Zen Buddhism developed which then took its current form much later in 
medieval Japan.
35
 Even the Theravāda tradition, which remains the only school traceable to early 
Buddhist origins, has undergone notable transformations into the modernized version existing 
today. Thus, the temptation may arise to pinpoint what should be considered the orthodox or 
traditional Buddhist view, but considering the diversity of beliefs and practices throughout the 
history of the tradition, the final word on the matter would be determined to a large extent by 
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who you ask. Western scholarship on Buddhism initially tended towards defining the Buddhist 
tradition in terms of early Buddhism within India and the Theravāda tradition in Sri Lanka and 
Southeast Asia, often to the neglect of the significant transformations that occurred within the 
tradition as Buddhism left India and spread to other regions.
36
 It is important to recognize the 
diversity within the history of the Buddhist tradition broadly when outlining the basic Buddhist 
teachings that come to bear on social ethics, but this will become an essential point in later 
chapters, particularly when discussing the continuity of the contemporary Socially Engaged 
Buddhist movement with the Buddhist tradition.  
Notwithstanding the noted diversity in Buddhist thought, there are some foundational teachings 
that are widely accepted by virtually all schools of Buddhism to some degree, although 
disagreements may remain concerning the emphasis or priority placed on some of them. These 
teachings seem to be some of the first taught by the Buddha after his awakening, and have 
remained at the core of the Buddhist message during the course of its various transformations 
throughout time and place. Some of these most basic Buddhist doctrines are closely related to 
issues of poverty and economy and will be discussed here, such as karma (Pāli: kamma), 
suffering, liberation, interdependence, generosity, and compassion. The doctrines of rebirth and 
karma establish the most basic framework for the Buddhist worldview, making it essential for an 
understanding of the Buddhist perspective on poverty and particularly the causes of poverty. The 
Four Noble Truths, which the Buddha taught in his first discourse after his enlightenment, and 
the teaching on interdependent co-arising deal further with many of the other essential concepts 
and therefore offer a helpful approach to outlining these key teachings. 
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1.1. The Nature of Existence: Saņsāra 
1.1.1. Three Marks of Existence 
Saņsāra, meaning ‘wandering’, refers to the beginningless cycle of birth, death, and rebirth 
which characterizes worldly existence. Accepted by virtually all dominant Indian religions at the 
time, this notion of a cycle of rebirths had already become a widely accepted Indian worldview 
by the time of the Buddha.  In Buddhist thought, saņsāra is characterized by three fundamental 
qualities: dukkha (Sanskrit: duḥkha), meaning suffering or dissatisfaction; anicca (Sanskrit: 
anitya), meaning impermanence; and, anattā (Sanskrit: anātman), meaning non-self or the 
absence of independent or unchanging selfhood.
37
 Together these three marks or qualities 
characterize the realm of saņsāra to which all sentient beings are bound.  
Dukkha refers to all types of suffering experienced in life: “birth is suffering, aging is suffering, 
illness is suffering, death is suffering; union with what is displeasing is suffering; separation 
from what is pleasing is suffering; not to get what one wants is suffering….”38 However, in 
addition to the pain and grief typically associated with suffering, dukkha equally refers to 
experiences typically considered delightful or pleasurable.
39
 Because even the most pleasurable 
emotions and experiences are by nature shallow, fleeting and impermanent, they too inevitably 
result in dissatisfaction. Thus, dukkha refers to all forms of suffering, anxiety, uneasiness or 
dissatisfaction. 
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Anicca refers to the impermanent or transitory nature of everything in the universe. In Buddhist 
thought, the world is in a constant state of change in which energies, physical matter, mental 
states, and consciousness flow, bringing some things into existence as others pass out of 
existence. Although this teaching is often viewed in the negative light of the dissatisfaction that 
results from this impermanence, it nonetheless also contains a certain positive element. As 
Harvey notes, a clear impact of this teaching on ethics is that it allows for improvement within 
any being, preventing the perspective that anyone is hopelessly stuck in any negative situation, or 
simply is a bad person, a thief, or one might add given our topic, a poor person.
40
 This is closely 
related to the next mark of saņsāric existence, anattā, which refers to the absence of selfhood or 
an unchanging and independent essence.   
The simple meaning of the anattā teaching is that there is nothing in living beings, or more 
generally in the world, that never changes.
41
 This distinctively Buddhist teaching contrasts 
sharply with the two dominant religious groups in India at the time the Buddha; the brahmins 
taught that the individual self (Sanskrit: ātman) was in essence one with the universal and eternal 
self (Sanskrit: brahman), and the Jains taught that the individual self or life (Sanskrit: jīva) 
continued on through cycles of rebirth until it was finally freed from the cycle.
42
 According to 
the Buddha, however, there is no independent, permanent, or unchanging self or soul within any 
individual and likewise no other fixed or static entities or phenomena within the realm of 
saņsāra that are not subject to the process of change, or anicca. Rather, that which is often 
                                                             
40
  Harvey, 2000: 34. 
41
  Gombrich, 2009: 8-11. 
42
  Gombrich, 2009: 60-74.  
 M o n s o n  P a g e  | 26 
 
mistaken for a permanent self is merely a flow or vortex of changing conditioned states, 
including such things as thoughts, feelings, consciousness, a material physical body and will.
43
 
This teaching also has a significant implication on ethics, and in fact can serve as a support for 
ethical behavior. Harvey notes, that the non-self teaching “undermines the attachment to self– 
that ‘I ’am a positive, self-identical entity that should be gratiﬁed, and should be able to brush 
aside others if they get in ‘my’ way – which is the basis of lack of respect for others. It undercuts 
selﬁshness by undercutting the very notion of a substantial self.”44 Self-interest, in the sense of a 
selfish or self-interested concern for one’s own good before other’s is in direct opposition to the 
non-self teaching, and ought to be dissolved to include the broader interest of all beings as they 
are all by nature inter-related and inter-dependent. Likewise, suffering also ought to be viewed 
on a universal or collective level instead of solely on an individual one. Thus, anicca teaches that 
everything is subject to change, and anattā teaches that there are in fact no static or independent 
entities going through that change process, but rather only conditioned phenomena arising in and 
out of existence.   
These three marks of existence together characterize the realm of saņsāra to which all sentient 
beings are bound in a continuous cycle of death and rebirth until final liberation is reached in 
what is in many ways its polar opposite, nirvana (Pāli: nibbāna). Though it is said to be 
impossible to fully conceptualize, nirvana is said to be ultimately blissful, unchanging, and not-
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 Nirvana is most frequently described metaphorically as an extinguishing or 
cooling of the fires of craving, greed, hatred, and delusion- the very conditions leading to 
suffering and rebirth.
46
 Attaining this release from the realm of saņsāra and entering nirvana is 
the ultimate goal in the Buddhist tradition. 
1.2.  Karma and Rebirth 
1.2.1.  Karma as Cosmic Justice 
The doctrine of karma is of supreme importance within the Buddhist tradition, acting as a sort of 
universal law of justice by linking moral conduct to the varied states of all past, present, and 
future births. This connecting link between moral conduct and the various blissful or unpleasant 
states provides a clear motivation for Buddhist followers to behave ethically. Similar to both the 
Brāhmaṇical and Jain traditions, the Buddha identified karma, meaning ‘action’, as the principle 
or law of justice that ensures that actions always produce corresponding beneficial or detrimental 
results for the doer. However, whereas the brahmins generally took karma to refer to ritual 
actions or performances, the Jains and Buddhists ethicized karma by applying the term 
specifically to moral or ethical actions instead of ritual.
47
 The Buddha did so even more fully 
than the Jains by declaring karma to be intention or volition rather than strictly outward action
48
: 
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Monks, I say that determinate thought is action [karma].  When one determines, one acts 
by deed, word or thought… There is action that is experience in hell, in a beast’s 
womb… in the deva-world….  It may either arise here now or at another time or on the 
way ….49 
In addition to this distinctive claim that karma is intention (determinate thought), this passage 
further asserts that good or bad karmic results manifest at various times. Thus, not all of the good 
or bad karmic results of any particular act may be evident immediately, but the law of karma 
guarantees that they will become manifest in some form in the present or some future life. 
Indeed, much karma only ripens and manifests after this life, thereupon determining the realm of 
existence into which one is reborn.   
1.2.2. Paţicca-Samuppāda 
One of the key Buddhist teachings is referred to as conditioned origination, dependent arising, or 
interdependent co-arising (Pāli: paţicca-samuppāda; Sanskrit: pratītya-samutpāda). Hu argues 
that it is the central teaching of the Buddha that strings all of his teachings together, stating 
“interdependent co-arising is the core, the summary, and the logic of the Buddhist Dhamma.”50 
By way of comparison to the centrality of the better-known Four Noble Truths, she adds, “The 
Four Noble Truths are undeniably central in the Buddhist Dhamma, but the reasoning behind the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
action (with a clear focus on the act), but does not allow for good karma as did the 
Buddha. To attain a better rebirth then, one would simply try to eliminate bad karma. 
49
  AN 6: 63 (Hare, 1934: 294). 
50
  Hu, 2011: 19. 
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Four Noble Truths, behind the arising and cessation of dukkha, is interdependent co-arising.”51 
As Hu notes, some of the Buddha’s closest and wisest early disciples, Sāriputta and Ānanda, 
acknowledge that the one seemingly simple teaching on interdependent co-arising contained the 
heart of all of the Buddha’s teachings.52 
According to the paţicca-samuppāda teaching, suffering and rebirth arise from the preceding 
conditions of craving, attachment, and ignorance.
53
 Speaking more generally, interdependent co-
arising refers to the principle that all phenomena in the natural world, or in saņsāra, arise as a 
result of a host of other necessary conditions; as we find it in the Majjhima Nikāya: “when this 
exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does 
not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases.”54 Phenomena arise as a result of complex 
conditions and processes that all interact and are interdependent, rather than independent 
substantial permanently-existing entities, and rather than resulting from a direct linear notion of 
causation.  
A late and often cited description in the Buddhist tradition of the complexity of these conditions 
of interdependence is the example of Indra’s Net found in the Avataṃsaka Sūtra.55 The 
interdependence of natural phenomena is compared to a web of jewels, in which the jewels at 
each intersection reflect all other jewels; when closely examined, each jewel reflects all of the 
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  Hu, 2011: 20.  
52
  Hu, 2011: 19; See MN 28: 28 (Ñāňamoli, 1995: 283) and SN 12: 24 (Bodhi, 2000:  
558-559) respectively. 
53
  Schmidt-Leukel, 2006b: 46-48; Ud 1: 1-4 (Ireland, 1997: 13-16). 
54
  MN 115: 11 (Ñāňamoli, 1995: 927); See also, SN 12: 17 (Bodhi, 2000: 547-548). 
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  AS 30 (Cleary, 1993: 889-905). 
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other jewels—an infinite number of jewels reflected within each and every jewel. In a similar 
and incalculable way, phenomena in the world of saņsāra form a complex web of causation and 
interdependence. Commenting on this metaphor and how it is used in the Huayan (Huayen) 
tradition, David Loy states, “In this cosmos each phenomenon is at the same time the effect of 
the whole and the cause of the whole, the totality being a vast, inﬁnite body of members, each 
sustaining and deﬁning all the others.”56 Hu similarly notes, “As Indra’s Net stretches inﬁnitely 
in all directions, so is the scope of the repercussions of any action. And as the shape and color of 
one jewel at one node of Indra’s Net are reﬂected by all other jewels on the Net, and then will be 
reﬂected back and seen in its reﬂections of other jewels, so are a person’s thinking, feeling, and 
behavioral patterns reﬂected in others’ patterns and further reﬂected back on oneself.”57 
In a more particular sense, the chain of conditioned arising identifies those conditions that lead 
specifically to the arising of suffering and rebirth. Ignorance or delusion is the first condition in 
this chain, leading through eleven other conditions, some of which may occur simultaneously: 
volitional activities, consciousness, name and form, the sixfold sense bases, contact, feeling, 
craving, grasping or clinging, being or existence, birth, and finally ageing and death 
accompanied by the “whole mass of suffering.”58 When the conditions that lead to suffering are 
removed, the arising of suffering is also prevented. 
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  Loy, 2003a: 183. 
57
  Hu, 2011: 92. 
58
  Ud 1: 1-2 (Ireland, 1997: 13-16); SN 12: 2 (Bodhi, 2000: 534). 
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In Buddhist thought, karma has a prevailing psychological meaning, focusing first and foremost 
on the intention or volition that motivates one to act.
59
 Intention or volition is seen as the 
immediate impulse behind an action; actions in time shape one’s consciousness and, thus, one’s 
very nature; this ultimately determines the state of one’s rebirth. ‘Unskillful’ intentions and 
deeds—those rooted in the three unskillful mūlas of greed, hatred, and delusion—generate 
negative karmic results and inevitably lead toward rebirth in a lower realm such as an animal 
realm or a hell.
60
 ‘Skillful’ volition and actions—those that have root in the three skillful mūlas,  
namely non-greed or generosity, non-hatred or loving-kindness, and non-delusion or wisdom—
generate positive karmic results, which lead to rebirth once again as a human or into a higher 




The most common way to generate positive karmic results, what is often called ‘making merit’, 
is through the practice of dāna. Dāna is the central Buddhist virtue of giving or generosity and is 
seen as the most basic act to weaken and counteract the three unskillful mūlas, particularly greed, 
and to secure a desirable rebirth and eventual release from saņsāra. Consequently, an immediate 
goal for Buddhist practitioners is to generate the positive karmic results that will ensure a 
pleasant rebirth in one of the higher realms, although the ultimate goal is to cease generating 
karma entirely in the attainment of the release from the cycle of rebirths.   
                                                             
59
   Schmidt-Leukel, 2006b: 45. 
60
   AN 10: 210-219 (Woodward, 1936: 197-200); AN 6: 39 (Hare, 1934: 239). Lance 
Cousins argues that ‘skillful/unskillful’, rather than ‘good/bad’, are the appropriate 
terms in Cousins, 1996: 143-148. 
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   AN 10: 210-219 (Woodward, 1936: 197-200); AN 6: 39 (Hare, 1934: 239). 
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1.3. The Four Noble Truths: Suffering and Liberation 
The Buddha summarized the whole of his teachings with the assertion: "formerly … and also 
now, I make known just suffering and the cessation of suffering."
62
 Providing the basic 
framework for Buddhist teachings on suffering and liberation, The Four Noble Truths are often 
cited as the Buddha’s most central teachings in early Buddhism and the Theravāda tradition, and, 
more broadly, serve as a foundation for the later Mahāyāna tradition as well.63 The Four Noble 
Truths assert that: (1) the experience of life is dukkha (Sanskrit: duųkha), which refers to 
dissatisfaction or suffering; (2) dukkha is caused by craving (Pāli: taṇhā, Sanskrit: tṛṣṇā) or 
grasping (upādāna); however, (3) it can be transcended by removing this craving or thirst; and, 
(4) the Noble Eightfold Path constitutes the path leading to transcendence or nirvana.
64
 These 
teachings of the Buddha place suffering, in its multiplicity of forms, and liberation from all 
forms of suffering at the center of the Buddha’s message; these teachings on suffering and 
liberation are likewise central to an understanding of the Buddhist conceptions of poverty and 
poverty relief. 
1.3.1.   Suffering 
The first Noble Truth declares:  
                                                             
62
  SN 22: 86 (Bodhi, 2000: 938); also, MN 22: 38 (Ñāňamoli, 1995: 234); 
63
  Harvey, 2000: 47-72. 
64
  See SN 56: 11 (Bodhi, 2000: 1844-1845). 
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Now this, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of suffering: birth is suffering, aging is suffering, 
illness is suffering, death is suffering; union with what is displeasing is suffering; 
separation from what is pleasing is suffering; not to get what one wants is suffering; in 
brief, the five aggregates subject to clinging are suffering.
65
 
The term dukkha refers to all types of suffering and dissatisfaction experienced in life.  However, 
in addition to the pain and grief that is typically associated with suffering, dukkha also refers to 
experiences that are typically considered desirable, delightful, or pleasurable.
66
  
Dukkha can be divided into three types or categories: dukkha-dukkhatā, vipariňāma-dukkhatā, 
and saṅkhāra-dukkhatā.67 Dukkha-dukkhatā includes the physical and mental pain or discomfort 
that is generally associated with the term suffering. Vipariňāma-dukkhatā is suffering that arises 
from impermanence, and includes the fear of death and other fears and dissatisfactions that are 
associated with the fleeting or impermanent nature of our existence and experience. Saṅkhāra-
dukkhatā refers to suffering caused by conditioned states that cause the ongoing flow of rebirth. 
This type of dukkha generally refers to all forms of anxiety or other dissatisfaction related to the 
ego or misguided notions of the self; this results from attachment to one of the five khandhas 
(Sanskrit: skandha) or aggregates that are the focus of grasping and wrongly taken to be a 
permanent, autonomous self. The five khandhas or aggregates include form or matter (rūpa); 
sensation or feeling (vedanā); perception or cognition (Sanskrit: samjñā, Pāli: saññā); mental 
formations or volitions (Sanskrit: saņskāra, Pāli: saṅkhāra); and, consciousness (Sanskrit: 
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  SN 56: 11 (Bodhi, 2000: 1844). 
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  See SN 22: 22 (Bodhi, 2000: 872); AN 6: 23, 63 (Hare, 1934: 221-222, 291). 
67
  Loy, 2003: 19-22; See also SN 38: 14 (Bodhi, 2000: 1299). 
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vijñāna, Pāli: viññāṇa).68 Thus, the Buddhist term dukkha reflects a broad and systemic problem 
that permeates all aspects of life. 
1.3.2.   The Origin of Suffering 
The second Noble Truth declares: 
Now this, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of the origin of suffering: It is this craving which 
leads to renewed existence, accompanied by delight and lust, seeking delight here and 




Here the Buddha identifies taṇhā (Sanskrit: tṛṣṇā), meaning craving or thirst, as the cause of 
dukkha and the reason for continual rebirth in saņsāra. According to the paţicca-samuppāda 
teaching, craving is a preceding condition for upādāna, meaning attachment or clinging- the 
direct opposite of dāna, meaning generosity or giving. Attachment manifests itself in the three 
unskillful mūlas- greed, hatred, or delusion- and is evident in strong or subtle forms.70 Once a 
person has destroyed the unskilful mūlas and is free of them, a person has thereby become an 
Arahat and is free of the cycle of rebirths. Both taṇhā and upādāna are conditioned by and result 
from the first condition in the chain of interdependent co-arising, spiritual ignorance- 
erroneously believing that things of this saņsāric world can bring ultimate or lasting satisfaction. 
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  See SN 22: 55 (Bodhi, 2000: 892-893);  
69
  SN 56: 11 (Bodhi, 2000: 1844). 
70
  Schmidt-Leukel, 2006b: 45; Also, see AN 3: 33 (Woodward, 1932: 117-119 ); AN 6: 
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Because everything is subject to anicca and anattā, any clinging or attachment is inevitably vain 
and demonstrates ignorance to the true nature of reality which must be overcome in order to 
attain enlightenment.  
However, not all forms of desire are discouraged.
 
Schmidt-Leukel points out the distinction 
between the “noble” and the “ignoble search” in Buddhist teachings to demonstrate that taňhā 
does not refer to all forms of human desire.
71
 The Majjhima Nikāya explicitly makes the 
distinction: 
And what is the ignoble search? Here someone being himself subject to birth seeks what 
is also subject to birth; being himself subject to ageing, he seeks what is also subject to 
ageing; being himself subject to sickness, he seeks what is also subject to sickness; being 
himself subject to death, he seeks what is also subject to death; being himself subject to 
sorrow, he seeks what is also subject to sorrow; being himself subject to defilement, 
seeks what is also subject to defilement. 
[…] 
And what is the noble search? Here someone being subject to birth, having understood 
the danger in what is subject to birth, seeks unborn supreme security from bondage, 
Nibbāna; being himself subject to ageing, having understood the danger in what is subject 
to ageing, he seeks the unageing supreme security from bondage, Nibbāna;….[and so 
on…]. This is the noble search.72 
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Thus, any “right effort” or desire directed toward what is noble, such as the pursuit of nirvana, is 
free from the criticism directed at craving of that which is “ignoble.” However, eventually even 
the striving or desire for nirvana must necessarily vanish, as the ultimate goal is finally reached, 
thus bringing an end to all striving and attachment, in a final state of absolute peace and 
satisfaction.
73
 All thirst or craving is overcome by the insights that attachment is vain because 
“nothing is fit to be clung to” since it cannot bring any lasting satisfaction, and that there is an 
ultimate bliss and satisfaction or happiness to be found in nirvana that transcends anything found 
in the saņsāric realm.74 While, for many followers, producing skillful or meritorious karma to 
affect a good rebirth is the immediate goal, ultimately it is held that all should strive for the final 
liberation that comes once all thoughts, intentions, and deeds are free from greed, hatred, and 
ignorance, and no further karma is produced.
75
 
1.3.3.   The Cessation of Suffering 
The third Noble Truth asserts the possibility that suffering can be overcome: 
                                                             
73
  SN 51: 15 (Bodhi, 2000: 1732-1733). 
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  AN 7: 58, 75: 10-22 (Ñāňamoli, 1995: 610-614). For further positive descriptions and 
images of the ultimate bliss of nirvana found in the Pāli Canon, see Collins, 2010: 61-
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Now this, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of the cessation of suffering: It is the remainderless 
fading away and cessation of that same craving, the giving up and relinquishing of it, 
freedom from it, nonreliance on it.
76
 
The Four Noble Truths evince the focus on overcoming dukkha as the central concern and 
preoccupation of the Buddha’s teachings. Often juxtaposed with dukkha is sukha, meaning 
happiness, well-being, or bliss. Sukha refers to a range of happiness, from sensual pleasures to 
the more rarefied bliss associated with meditative absorption.
77
 Thus, the Buddhist goal is not 
merely a negative one, in removing suffering, but includes a positive aspect of attaining blissful 
states. What is more, the Buddha taught that sukha is one of the key and final criteria for 
determining the truthfulness of his teachings; if well-being and happiness are produced when the 
teachings are put into practice, then they should be accepted and followed.
78
 
In accordance with the previously mentioned chain of interdependent co-arising, the liberation 
from saņsāra occurs with the cessation of the preceding conditions that lead to rebirth. Nirvana 
refers to the complete liberation from rebirth and suffering, as well as their causes—ignorance, 
craving, and attachment—which the Buddha attained upon his enlightenment. Although nirvana 
is a term that has become widely recognized in the West in recent decades, its meaning remains 
unclear to many. Because nirvana is in every way other than what we conceive in this state of 
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  SN 56: 11 (Bodhi, 2000: 1844). 
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  For example, AN 4: 62 (Nyanaponika, 1999: 99-100) refers to the happiness of 
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saņsāra, it eludes any extensive conception by unenlightened beings and represents the ultimate 
reality that can only be known by one who attains it. For this reason, nirvana is often described in 
only negative terms; the Buddha described his enlightenment: 
When I knew and saw thus, my mind was liberated from the taint of sensual desire, from 
the taint of being, and from the taint of ignorance.  When it was liberated there came the 
knowledge: ‘It is liberated.’ I directly knew: ‘Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been 
lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more coming to any state of 
being.’79 
1.3.4. The Noble Eightfold Path 
The fourth Noble Truth outlines basic elements of a path that leads to liberation from all types of 
dukkha and the realm of saņsāra: the ariya aţţhaṅgika magga, meaning the Noble Eightfold 
Path, the Ennobling Eightfold Path, or the Eightfold Path of the Noble Ones.   
Now this, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of the way leading to the cessation of suffering: It 
is this Noble Eightfold Path; that is right view, right intention, right speech, right action, 
right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration.
80
   
The Noble Eightfold Path is composed of eight factors that are frequently divided into three 
broad divisions: sīla (morality), consisting of Right Speech, Right Action, and Right Livelihood; 
samādhi (meditation or concentration), consisting of Right Effort, Right Mindfulness, and Right 
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Concentration; and, paññā (wisdom), consisting of Right View and Right Intention.81 These 
elements in the path constitute a technique for developing insight into the true nature of reality 
and the removal or extinguishing of greed, hatred, and delusion. The elements of the path are not 
steps that are followed sequentially, but rather represent areas of endeavor in a holistic approach 
to gradually attaining a level of completion or perfection of the specific virtues of an enlightened 
being simultaneously.
82
  In this way, these three divisions of the eightfold path are inter-related 
and inter-dependent. Cultivating any one area of morality, meditation, or wisdom aids in further 
cultivation of the others, and is not complete without the cultivation of the others.  
1.4. The Role of Ethics in the Buddhist Path 
Buddhist ethics may have only relatively recently become a field of academic study, but the 
central role of sīla in the Eightfold Path, with its focus on action, speech, and livelihood, attests 
to the fact that ethics or morality has always played an important role in Buddhist practice. Just 
as a focus on suffering and the cessation of suffering is the heart of Buddhist doctrine, so is it at 
the heart of Buddhist ethics. Thus, the chief concern of Buddhist ethics is behavior that reduces, 
alleviates, or eliminates both the suffering experienced by oneself and by others.
83
 As, the 
Mahādukkhakkhanda Sutta indicates, thirst and attachment are not only the roots of all suffering 
that one experiences personally, but they are also the roots of the suffering that one inflicts upon 
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 Extinguishing thirst and releasing attachment within oneself reduces both the suffering 
experienced by oneself as well as by others. The Ambalaţţhikārāhulovāda Sutta, which contains 
the advice of the Buddha to his son Rāhula, advises to consider with every action “Would this 
action that I wish to do … lead to my own affliction, or to the affliction of others, or to the 
affliction of both? Is it an unwholesome … action with painful consequences, with painful 
results?”85 And, it should be noted here that action refers to bodily, verbal and mental activities.86 
With this attention to the effects of all forms of one’s inner and outer actions on oneself and 
others, inner ethical discipline is related to outward action and social inter-action. This is one of 
the guiding principles of the śīla division of the eightfold path, and must be a part of any 
formulation of a Buddhist ethical system. 
The laity and the monastic saṅgha are both required to live by sets of precepts based on the śīla 
division of the eightfold path. Sīla is commonly considered a preparation for the other two 
divisions on the path, paññā and samādhi.87 However, Keown notes that while it is quite 
commonly done, it is incorrect to consider morality (sīla) as only a step toward salvific insight or 
knowledge (paññā), which then supersedes or transcends it, rendering it useless as one 
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 Rather both sīla and paññā are necessary for the attainment of nirvana.89 
Walpola Rahula also holds this view: 
According to Buddhism for a man to be perfect there are two qualities he should develop 
equally: compassion (karuňā) on one side and wisdom (paññā) on the other. Here 
compassion represents love, charity, kindness, tolerance, and such noble qualities on the 
emotional side, or qualities of the heart, while wisdom would stand for the intellectual 
side or qualities of the mind. …To be perfect one has to develop both equally. That is the 




Thus, moral, skillful, or karmically meritorious behavior is not merely a step on the path to 
enlightenment which is then transcended as one gains the necessary insight, but is in fact an 
essential aspect of the complete level of perfection that is nirvana.
91
  
However, because paññā is largely seen to develop through the more advanced and disciplined 
practices of meditation or samādhi, which require more free time each day than the average lay 
follower has typically been able to afford, sīla commonly becomes the focus of lay practice. For 
the laity, Right Speech essentially consists of refraining from lying, hurtful language, or other 
misrepresentation. The lay precepts based on Right Action include refraining from killing or 
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causing harm, stealing, sexual immorality, and avoiding intoxicants. Right Livelihood serves as 
the foundation for lay Buddhist economic activities by outlining ethical principles about how one 
should go about obtaining and using wealth. These principles include prohibitions on modes of 
production and wealth acquisition that violate the other ethical principles outlined in Right 
Speech and Right Action. For example, selling drugs, killing animals, and prostitution are 
expressly forbidden. Right Livelihood and other Buddhist teachings concerning business 
principles and economic ethics will be dealt with more fully in the chapter on Buddhist 
economics.  
The saṅgha has a lengthier list of monastic precepts which also prohibits inappropriate eating 
and sleeping habits and personal possession of almost all material goods in addition to more 
demanding requirements than the basic lay precepts.
92
 Monks are only to eat what is given to 
them as alms food, and are not to eat after noon; they are not to sleep on soft or high beds; and, 
are not to personally own any material goods beyond a short list of several acceptable personal 
possessions such as a robe and alms bowl. These monastic ethical precepts are also seen as 
central to monastic practice in preparing one for the further mental and spiritual development 
that comes through paññā and samādhi.  Thus, morality or ethics is the foundation for both lay 
and monastic practice, as well as an essential aspect in the attainment of nirvana.
93
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Several scholars have drawn comparisons between Buddhist ethics and the influential major 
moral theories in the Western philosophical tradition as an aid in conceptualizing the nature of 
Buddhist ethics; most agree on some combination of Utilitarianism, Kantianism or Deontology, 
and Aristotelianism.
94
 The Buddhist focus on reducing suffering for oneself and others has a 
clear association with the Utilitarian goal of maximizing collective happiness and minimizing 
suffering as much as possible. Similarly, the Noble Eightfold Path and the corresponding 
Mahāyāna pāramitās all exhibit a clear concern for cultivating certain virtues as essential factors 
for overcoming unwholesome states and ultimately attaining nirvana. As I have noted, the 
intention (karma) leading one to inner or outer actions is of key importance in Buddhist thought 
for attaining a virtuous character and human perfection. These characteristics of Buddhist ethics 
have much in common with Aristotelian or Virtue Theory. Additionally, Buddhist ethics shares 
certain commonalities with Deontological ethics, like Kantianism, inasmuch as a good will 
seems to be the source of goodness or good behavior and other people are to be respected as 
autonomous agents who have their own goals and ends for their own reasons, and should 
therefore not be used as means to another’s end. 
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Harvey holds that there are certain commonalities such as these between Utilitarianism or 
Consequentialism, Kantianism or Deontology, as well as Aristotelian or Virtue Theory; but, he 
concludes that:  
Overall, the rich ﬁeld of Buddhist ethics would be narrowed by wholly collapsing it into 
any single one of the Kantian, Aristotelian or Utilitarian models, though Buddhism agrees 
with each in respectively acknowledging the importance of (1) a good motivating will 
[Kantianism], (2) cultivation of character [Aristotelianism], and (3) the reduction of 
suﬀering in others and oneself [Utilitarianism]. This is because the ﬁrst two of these are 
seen as crucial causes of the third of them, while aiming at the third, in a way which does 
not ignore aspects of the full karmic situation, is a key feature of the ﬁrst two.95 
Hu similarly determines that a combination of these approaches with additional insights is 
evident in Buddhist ethics: 
[I]n the rubric of Buddhist ethics, an action is worth undertaking not just because it is 
supposed to be virtuous, or just because it is considered good by others, or just because it 
brings pleasant results for the self, or just because it brings pleasant results for others. 
Rather, an action is worth undertaking when all of these considerations are combined. 
Being “wholesome” involves comprehensively considering things from all angles in the 
web of interconditionality, including one’s own motivations, the various perspectives of 
the people involved, and the reverberations of the action in its particular context.
96
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Here again, Hu points to the teaching of interdependent co-arising as key to understanding 
Buddhist thought. In addition to the other concerns typical of Western moral theories, she notes 
that one must also be aware of the web of causal connections to recognize the causes and effects 
of the various actions and states, and be free from entanglement in egoistic attachments.
97
 
1.5. The Path of the Arahat 
Perfecting each of the eight factors or aģgas of this ‘Middle Way’ path, leads one to 
enlightenment and liberation from saņsāra in nirvana. The gradual realization of these truths 
leads one through a series of succeeding stages of spiritual development with increasing levels of 
virtue, wisdom, and insight in degrees of liberation from all forms of greed, hatred, and 
delusion.
98
 In the Theravāda tradition, as in the other early Buddhist schools collectively referred 
to as Śravakayāna, the first stage one reaches on this path is that of the sotāpanna, or the ‘stream 
enterer’, who will attain enlightenment in no more than seven more rebirths in human or 
heavenly realms. The sakadāgāmin, or ‘once returner’, will be reborn as a human no more than 
one time before attaining enlightenment. The anāgāmin, or ‘non-returner’, will be reborn in a 
heavenly realm where he will attain enlightenment. And, finally, the arahat, or ‘the worthy one’, 
has already attained enlightenment and liberation from saņsāra in this life and will enter fully 
into nirvana at death. Attaining the level of arahat by fully realizing the Dhamma taught by the 
Buddha is the goal for followers of the Theravāda tradition. Upon fully realizing the Dhamma, 
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the arahats then follow the example set by the Buddha in teaching the Dhamma to others for 
their remaining years. 
1.6.  The Mahāyāna Bodhisattva Ideal 
As a later critical response to the Śravakayāna and Theravādin goal of arahatship, Mahāyāna 
Buddhism focuses on the bodhisattva, a being on the path to perfect Buddhahood. The goal here 
is not to attain enlightenment or liberation only, but also further to become a Buddha who brings 
the Dhamma to a world that has lost its truths, with the express purpose of benefiting the 
countless other beings immeasurably. Although Theravāda Buddhism also recognizes 
bodhisattvas as supreme spiritual beings, they are generally understood to be extremely rare, and 
only in the Mahāyāna does the bodhisattva become the goal for all followers. This shift in the 
goal entails a shift in focus on other teachings and practices as well. Keown points to a shift from 
the Theravādin focus on the personal development of the central virtues of wisdom or insight and 
the practice of morality to the focus on wisdom or insight and compassion toward others that 
distinguishes the Mahāyāna ethics.99 This focus on perfecting wisdom and compassion is clearly 
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1.6.1. The Bodhisattva Path 
The bodhisattva path begins with developing the supreme altruistic motivation, bodhicitta, the 
Mind of Enlightenment or Awakening Mind, which arises from deep compassion for the 
suffering of others.
100
 Śāntideva expresses this as: 
This mind to benefit living beings,  
Which does not arise in others even for their own sakes, 
Is an extraordinary jewel of a mind, 
Whose birth is an unprecedented wonder.
101
 
Bodhicitta is expressed as a commitment to pursue enlightenment for the benefit of all other 
beings. According to the Aşţasāhasrikā Prajñapāramitā Sūtra, being filled with great 
compassion for the countless other beings he sees, the bodhisattva swears, “I shall become a 
savior to all those beings, I shall release them from all their sufferings!”102  
The path continues with the pursuit of six pāramitās, or perfections: dāna (giving), śīla 
(morality/ethics), vīrya (energy), kşānti (patience), samādhi (meditation), and prajñā 
(wisdom).
103
 These bear some resemblance to the factors of the Noble Eightfold Path insofar as 
the bodhisattva virtues of śīla, samādhi, and prajñā, as mentioned above, are also the three main 
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categories into which the Eightfold Path is often divided in the Theravāda tradition.104 Dāna is a 
central virtue in the bodhisattva path, as well as in a discussion of poverty relief, and will be 
discussed in greater detail below. The practice of the first five perfections culminates in the 
perfection of wisdom in which the bodhisattva realizes śūnyatā, or the fundamental emptiness 
that pervades all reality.  
In essence, śūnyatā opposes dualistic thought, indicating that there is ultimately no genuine 
difference between self and other, or even between nirvana and saņsāra; any such apparent 
distinctions result from ignorant or misguided perceptions. In the bodhisattva ideal, this perfect 
wisdom unites with perfect compassion, the desire to end the suffering of all other beings.
105
 
Thus, a bodhisattva must strike a balance in the seeming paradox between compassion in 
identifying all beings and their suffering with him or herself, and wisdom in recognizing that the 
concept of a self is empty of true independent reality, meaning therefore that a self does not 
genuinely exist in anything more than a conventional sense.
106
   
Similar to the Theravādin stages leading to arahatship, the Mahāyāna also outlines a set of stages 
on the bodhisattva path leading toward perfect Buddhahood.
107
 Perfect Buddhahood follows the 
passing of the final stage on the path. The first stage is entered after the arising of bodhicitta and 
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each stage following is marked by increasingly exalted virtue and form in higher realms. The 
sixth stage is believed to be equivalent to the insights needed to become an arahat, but the 
bodhisattva is said to then continue through an additional four stages, mastering all aspects of the 
Dhamma and gaining an ability to manifest multiple forms, to finally fulfill the bodhisattva vow 
by becoming a perfected Buddha.
108
 
Lay followers in the Theravāda and Mahāyāna traditions can be noble persons who have 
undertaken the path to perfection, either as stream-enterers or bodhisattvas, but the conventional 
distinction between the lay and the monastic saṅgha blurs somewhat more in the Mahāyāna.  
Bodhisattvas are commonly referred to as either home-dwelling (gŗhastha) or home-departed 
(pravrajita), and may fill one of a wide range of social roles, making it more common, for 
example, to find more advanced or enlightened practitioners who continue to remain farmers, 
heads of household, or even political rulers.
109
 
1.6.1.1.  Generosity and Compassion 
Two key Buddhist virtues related to the bodhisattva ideal are closely associated with the 
Buddhist concept of poverty relief and deserve closer attention here. They are dāna, meaning 
generosity or giving, and karuňā, meaning compassion. The Mahāyāna sūtra, 
Dānapāramitāsamāsaų, links these two virtues, indicating that the ornaments of a bodhisattva 
are the marvelous streams of virtue that result from “the thought of giving attended by 
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compassion.”110 While these virtues are also essential to Theravāda Buddhism, they receive 
added emphasis and weight in Mahāyāna teachings; they are also of special interest in this study 
because of their clear connection to the concept of poverty relief or poverty alleviation.   
1.6.1.2. Dāna  
Dāna is perhaps the most basic and central virtue in both the Theravāda and Mahāyāna traditions 
for effecting karmically skillful or fruitful actions, and its importance cannot be overstated as 
regards its role in Buddhist social interaction. In the Pāli Canon, as well as in later scriptural 
texts, dāna is a universally applicable virtue that monks and lay followers alike are urged to 
perfect.
111
 In addition to lay followers, the monks likewise are enjoined to develop dāna, 
primarily by giving the teachings of the Dhamma, but also by providing other necessary material 
goods to the needy.  The act of giving is so universally applicable and fundamental in Buddhist 
thought that in the Mahāyāna Upāsakaśila-sūtra even those who seem to have nothing, like the 
poor lay followers and the monastic saṅgha, are told to give.  
In the Mahāyāna tradition, the role that dāna plays in the path to enlightenment is more overtly 
highlighted as a key perfection to pursue that facilitates the attainment of the other essential 
perfections. The Saķdhinirmocana Sūtra describes the inter-relationship between dāna and the 
other perfections: 
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Because Bodhisattvas benefit sentient beings by giving them material goods, they benefit 
them through generosity. Because they benefit beings by not impoverishing them, not 
harming them, nor scorning them, they benefit them through ethics. Because they benefit 
them by not considering [their own] impoverishment, harm, or scorn, they benefit them 
through patience. Thus they benefit sentient beings through these three [perfections].
112
   
Dāna is also significant as the primary symbol of one of the highest Buddhist religious values, 
self-sacrifice.
113
 One particularly poignant example of self-sacrifice from the Theravāda tradition 
is the well-known Jātaka tale of a previous life of the Buddha as a hare who sacrificed himself to 
become a meal for a hungry ascetic.
114
 Thus, the culmination of the perfection of dāna becomes 
the willingness to sacrifice everything—even one’s own flesh and life. In The Bodhicaryāvatāra, 
Śāntideva says: 
To begin with, Buddha, the Guide, encourages us 
To practice giving such things as food. 
Later, when we become used to this, 
We can gradually learn to give our own flesh. 
When eventually we develop a mind 
That regards our body as being just like food, 
What discomfort shall we feel 
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From giving away our flesh?
115
 
Similarly, in the Dānapāramitāsamāsaų, Ārya-Śūra states: 
After that, he who is intent on the welfare of the world must apply himself to the method 
of giving that there is no ungainliness due to recoil from the practice, even if someone 
asks for his own limbs.
116
 
Meadows stresses that the directive to sacrifice one’s life and flesh is only intended to point to 
the bodhisattva’s willing self-sacrifice in a spiritual sense through a general altruistic concern for 
the welfare of others: 
On the most general ethical level, giving the body means that the bodhisattva places the 
welfare of others before his own, that altruism and self-sacrifice are the guiding 
principles of his social behavior. In more specific doctrinal terms, it also means that his 
concern for the spiritual realization of the world compels him to postpone his own entry 
into nirvana, so that he can continue to work for others within the saņsāric realm.”117 
Thus, the perfection of dāna is an essential step on the bodhisattva path and is directly related to 
the relief of suffering through means of material offerings as well as through spiritual teachings 
and guidance.   
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1.6.1.3.  Karuňā 
As I have indicated, combined with wisdom, karuňā, meaning compassion, is a cardinal virtue in 
the Mahāyāna tradition. Compassion for all other sentient beings is said to be the motivation for 
the accumulation of wisdom, and for perfecting all of the six key virtues along the bodhisattva 
path.  As the Upāsakaśīla-sūtra asserts, “Good son, compassionate thought is the producing 
cause of the six perfections.”118 Śāntideva similarly points to compassion as the chief virtue by 
noting in the extremely influential Śikşā-Samuccaya, that conatained in the one virtue of great 
compassion “all the virtues of the bodhisattva are included.”119 So important is it in the 
bodhisattva path that another extremely popular text, The Bodhicaryāvatāra, indicates that 
“actions that are otherwise proscribed” or forbidden are in point of fact permitted if done in 
compassion for the benefit of another.
120
 In this way compassion in the Mahāyāna may at times 
even take the form of the over-riding virtue that justifies other acts—even those very acts that 
would normally otherwise be forbidden. 
The Upāsakaśila-sūtra identifies the recognition of the state of suffering of other sentient beings 
in various circumstances as the method to cultivate compassion.
121
 Śūnyatā, the key Buddhist 
teaching that refers to the emptiness of inherent existence in all phenomena and the unity of the 
experiencer and the experience, is exemplified in relation to compassion towards others in the 
Śikşā-Samuccaya; Śāntideva argues that bodhisattvas should constantly identify with other 
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beings since there is no genuine difference between others and self, and one should act to prevent 
the suffering of any being.
122
 By the same token, in the Bodhicaryāvatāra he asks “why should I 
not conceive my fellow’s body as my own self?”123 Correspondingly, he proclaims, “I must 
destroy the pain of another as though it were my own, because it is a pain,” demonstrating that 
there is no genuine difference between one’s own suffering and that of another—there is only 
suffering.
124
 But, it must also be acknowledged that compassion is not only important in the 
Mahāyāna tradition, but is also imperative in the Theravāda and other early schools as one of the 
four brahmavihāras (divine abidings) that practitioners are to cultivate through meditative 
practices. By cultivating the virtues of loving-kindness (mettā), compassion (karuňā), altruistic 
joy (muditā), and equanimity (upekkhā), one is assured of rebirth into a divine realm. And when 
these virtues are coupled with the insight into the true nature of all reality, ultimate release in 
nirvana is finally won.
125
   
1.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the key Buddhist teachings that make up the Buddhist world-view and 
that will serve as the foundation for a further examination of the concepts of poverty and poverty 
relief in Buddhist thought. Despite the noted diversity within the Buddhist tradition, which seems 
to have been evident since its earliest history, there are also some key doctrines that are virtually 
universal among all schools of Buddhism and that can be therefore said to represent the tradition. 
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While this does not present an essential definition of Buddhism, it does outline some core beliefs 
that are characteristically similar to a degree throughout the various schools. The central focus on 
the Buddha’s teachings is the ultimate liberation from all forms of suffering.  The Buddha’s first 
teachings contained in the Four Noble Truths outline the causes of suffering, and that it can be 
overcome through the cultivation of key virtues and the elimination of defilements or 
unwholesome states; this core message has remained consistent throughout later schools as well. 
By developing the prescribed virtues, such as moral discipline, generosity, compassion, and 
insight, and thereby overcoming greed, hatred, and attachment one may attain nirvana—the 
ultimate release from the cycle of rebirths, and the ceasing of karma, suffering, and thirst. In 
keeping with the heart of the Buddhist message and Buddhist ethics, many of the key Buddhist 
virtues making up the path to enlightenment relate to alleviating the suffering of others as well as 
oneself. This is especially the case with compassion and generosity. Compassion is said to 
involve a recognition and concern for the suffering of others, while generosity requires giving 
directed at improving the lives of others. 
Poverty fits within this Buddhist world-view as a particular kind of suffering—that grievous 
form of suffering which is caused by a lack of the basic requirements for survival, for active 
participation within society and for meaningful participation in the Buddhist community and 
development along the path to enlightenment. The following chapters will more fully develop a 
Buddhist concept of poverty by examining the meaning of poverty, its causes and effects, and 
duties to relieve poverty that are found in Buddhist texts. However, before examining the 
concepts of poverty and poverty relief, it will be helpful to first address the general approaches to 
Buddhist social ethics, specifically considering the role of the individual in society. Questions 
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concerning the proper relationship between individuals and the broader society, the monastic 
saṅgha, and the political rulers, have been at the center of Buddhist studies for generations. The 
next chapter will outline the major positions in this debate and current thinking regarding social 
roles and responsibilities in Buddhist social ethics in order to provide a background for a 
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2.  Buddhist Social Ethics  
The fact that poverty is a major source of significant suffering for both individuals and societies 
in the modern world is undeniable. In Buddhist thought, due to the underlying interdependence 
and inter-relatedness of phenomena in the natural world, the suffering or well-being of others 
cannot be fully and authentically divorced from one’s own. As such, the relationship between the 
individual and society, a topic of debate at the center of Buddhist studies since its inception in 
the West, is closely related and essential to understand when addressing Buddhist perspectives 
on the issue of poverty. So, how are individual spiritual pursuits related to moral demands 
concerning others in social or economic ethics?  
Academic approaches to the role of the individual in society in Buddhist social ethics have 
varied widely, initially with early descriptions in the West of the tradition as wholly asocial; this 
became a sort of accepted wisdom among Westerners, while more recent descriptions based on 
more extensive readings of the Pāli Canon as well as anthropological and sociological data 
commonly portray the social relationships as fundamentally and deeply interdependent and inter-
related by nature. The Pāli Canon is of particular importance here because it offers the best 
glimpse possible at the teachings regarding social relationships taught among the earliest 
Buddhists, regardless of whether they are actual or ideal, from a time when accounts describing 
the manner in which Buddhists related to one another and to the broader Indian society are 
otherwise scarce. While the passages outlining the relationships between the monastic saṅgha, 
the lay followers, and the rulers are often prescriptive, describing the manner in which these 
 M o n s o n  P a g e  | 58 
 
social groups ought to relate, they also provide illustrative examples of particular actual 
historical relationships.  
2.1. Major Approaches to Buddhist Social Ethics 
In this chapter, I will review major approaches to the issue of Buddhist social ethics, relying on 
the writings of Max Weber, Melford Spiro, and Payutto Bhikkhu as examples of the most 
influential and common approaches. Following Payutto’s focus on the interdependent nature of 
the social relationships portrayed in the Pāli Canon, I will outline the particular scriptural texts 
that serve as a foundation of Buddhist social ethics. 
2.1.1.  Max Weber: Buddhism as the Quintessentially Asocial Religion 
The earliest studies of Buddhism in the West commenced near the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, typically envisioning a religion fully committed to an individualistic pursuit of salvation 
or liberation. The writings of the father of the sociology of religion, Max Weber, who directly 
addressed the nature of Buddhist social ethics and their economic effects, exemplify this 
approach to Buddhist social ethics. These early approaches in Western scholarship often 
portrayed Buddhism as primarily a philosophy focused on individual liberation from this world, 
or nirvana, most often through mental cultivation in order to transcend all forms of desire, and 
therefore tended to discount or ignore social relationships or practices.  
In his influential study, The Religion of India, originally published in 1916, Weber aimed to 
demonstrate why the particular form of capitalism that developed in conjunction with Protestant 
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Christianity required protestant values and therefore could not have also arisen among Buddhism 
and the other eastern religions.
126
 With this goal in mind, Weber characterized Buddhism as 
essentially inadequate and lacking in the requisite ethical framework. In Weber’s view, 
Buddhism teaches a form of salvation that is fundamentally opposed to the notion of social 
responsibility or social ethics. He saw in Buddhism “an absolutely personal performance of the 
self-reliant individual. No one, and particularly no social community, can help him. The specific 
asocial character of genuine mysticism is here carried to its maximum.”127 To Weber, Buddhism 
is wholly asocial and “anti-political”, an other-worldly religion only interested in an individual 
form of salvation as a means of transcending all aspects of this world.
128
 As Weber understood it, 
this highly individualistic path to enlightenment entailed transcending all forms of desire or 
passion, including any notions of brotherly love or compassion.
129
 For Weber, the Buddhist non-
self teaching of anattā particularly precluded genuine compassion toward others, and any notion 
of social ethics, or social responsibility based upon the infinite value of a human ‘soul’. Thus, in 
this view, the welfare of others is of very limited concern—only so far as it relates to one’s own 
individual salvation, or, in the case of the monastic saṅgha, insofar as the other is able to provide 
alms to support them in their own pursuits.
130
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Weber’s perspective on Buddhism shaped Buddhist studies in the West to a high degree for 
generations.
131
 Ronald Green summarizes three main reasons that have been commonly 
advanced by Western scholars to support the Weberian view of a Buddhism unconcerned with 
social ethics.
132
 Firstly, the doctrine of anattā is said to fundamentally undermine moral concern 
for the welfare of others. Presumably, it is supposed that in the same way that the concepts of 
self and other are undermined by this teaching, so is any notion of moral responsibility of one 
individual toward other individuals. Secondly, if nirvana is viewed as a strictly individualistic 
and transmundane goal of liberation from this world of saņsāra, then only the most rudimentary 
and undeveloped social ethics guiding interactions in the world is possible in Buddhist thought. 
Thirdly, the law of karma is said to undercut any critical examination of the social and economic 
order and as a substitute instead promotes a passive acceptance of what is assumed to be the just 
order of things. These points help explain the enduring appeal of Weber’s view and present a 
clear framework to follow here in a critique of this approach.  
Weber attempted to identify the source of the perceived deficiencies in Buddhist social ethics in 
key Buddhist doctrines, such as karma and anattā. He correctly identified key Buddhist 
teachings which in fact do have a strong influence on the Buddhist world-view, but it is doubtful 
that Buddhists have commonly understood these doctrines in the same way that he interpreted 
them is, and it is questionable whether those teachings indeed affect Buddhist social ethics in 
practice in the particular ways he and his adherents have claimed. In particular, the ethical 
implications of the doctrine of anattā require a mistaken interpretation of the doctrine in order to 
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reach the conclusions of the Weberian view. Rather than interpreting it as fundamentally 
undermining any moral concern for others as Weber does, the non-self teaching is commonly 
interpreted instead as actually encouraging actions expected to result in the welfare of all beings 
since one’s own suffering or well-being is inextricably bound to that of others.133 In this way, an 
understanding of anattā dissolves selfishness and greed by removing the deluded attachment to 
ego, establishing a sense of interdependency and inter-relatedness among other beings and 
facilitating the cultivation of the key Buddhist virtues of loving-kindness, compassion, and 
generosity towards others.
134
 As a result, rather than undermining moral concern for others, 
anattā in fact promotes the very virtues that can form a foundation for social responsibility and 
moral concern for others. As previously noted, anattā is commonly understood as standing in 
opposition to ego and selfishness, while the notion that it removes moral concern would be a 
strange and mistaken interpretation of the doctrine.  
For Weber, the wholly ‘other-worldly’ nature of Buddhism in teaching an individual form of 
salvation was the primary obstacle to genuine social responsibility. Donald Swearer has 
countered the view that nirvana is solely an individualistic goal. Contrary to the Weberian view 
that Buddhism is fundamentally an ‘other-worldly’ religion, Swearer notes that the concern of 
Buddhism is not exclusively an individual pursuit of nirvana, but also includes ‘this-worldly’ 
concerns as well, some of which are of necessity related to other beings. As Swearer summarizes 
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it, “the goals of Buddhism are, in short, both nibbanic and proximate—a better rebirth, an 
improved social and economic status in this life, and so on; the two are necessarily 
intertwined.”135 The individual pursuit of liberation or enlightenment does not necessarily 
preclude collective concerns, but in fact requires it through the cultivation of virtues which are 
practiced through moral conduct toward others as outlined in the Eightfold Path taught by the 
Buddha. As Hu states it, “the central teachings of the Buddha carried in the early and 
foundational Nikāya texts, such as interdependent co-arising, non-Self, and ﬁve aggregates, in 
effect, denied the very possibility of purely individualistic spiritual advancement.”136  
The combination of collective and individual concerns is perhaps nowhere more evident than in 
the bodhisattva vow to aid in the liberation of all beings, which is at once a commitment to the 
well-being of others as well as a step toward one’s own enlightened state. Additionally, related to 
this point, Harvey Aronson has argued against the Weberian portrayal of the notion of 
equanimity which presents the ideal Buddhists as completely dispassionate and indifferent 
toward others in their pursuit of transcendence, experiencing “only the feeling of neither-
pleasure-nor-pain.”137 Contrary to this representation, Aronson maintains:  
The discourses, commentaries, and historical records, however, indicate a different 
picture of the ethical ideal of Theravada Buddhism as well as the results of its practice. 
[The Buddha], the paradigm of practice, followed an altruistic ethical ideal and exhorted 
his disciples to do the same. Motivated by an interest in others’ well-being, he achieved 
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enlightenment and went on to be involved with society through his teaching. He was 
capable of a wide range of attitudes and feelings: a man with kindness, concern, and joy. 




The final point Green suggests that supports the Weberian view is that the doctrine of karma 
promotes a passive acceptance of circumstances as cosmic justice. Yet the claim that belief in 
karma as cosmic justice undermines the possibility of an active social ethic presupposes a 
deterministic form of karma in which virtually every state or event is necessarily caused or 
predetermined and just. If everything we experience now is simply the just karmic result of some 
previous actions, attempts at social or economic reform are not only misguided, but also futile. 
This simplistic and deterministic understanding of karma not only lacks firm support, but is in 
fact specifically repudiated by the Buddha in the Pāli Canon. This deterministic view is included 
in a set of three views explaining the role of karma that the Buddha disavowed: 
There are certain recluses and brāhmins who teach thus, who hold this view: Whatsoever 
weal or woe or neutral feeling is experienced, all that is due to some previous action. 
There are others who teach:—Whatsoever weal or woo or neutral feeling is experienced, 
all that is due to the creation of a Supreme Deity. Others teach that all such are uncaused 
and unconditioned. Now, monks, as to those recluses and brāhmins who hold and teach 
the first of these views, I approach them and say: ‘Is it true, as they say, that you worthy 
sirs teach that ... all is due to former action? ‘Thus questioned by me they reply: “Yes, we 
do.” Then I say to them: So then, owing to a previous action men will become murderers, 
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thieves, unchaste, liars, slanderers, abusive, babblers, covetous, malicious, and perverse 
in view. Thus for those who fall back on the former deed as the essential reason there is 
neither desire to do, nor effort to do, nor necessity to do this deed or abstain from that 
deed. So then, the necessity for action or inaction not being found to exist in truth and 
verity, the term ‘recluse’ cannot reasonably be applied to yourselves, since you live in a 
state of bewilderment with faculties unwarded.
139
  
Prebish and Keown note, “The Buddha made a distinction between karma and deterministic fate 
(niyati) in this sense, and accepted that random events and accidents can happen in life. Not 
everything need have a karmic cause, and winning the lottery or catching a cold can be simply 
random events.”140 Not only are there random events, but, in fact, one’s own intentions and 
desires can lead to wholesome or unwholesome actions or states. Murderers, thieves, liars, 
recluses or monks are not predetermined states that one is born into, but are in actuality the 
results of a complex of intentional, but optional and avoidable, decisions and behaviors. While 
moral actions and intentions do result in karmic outcomes, not everything that happens in life is 
the direct and necessary result of the karma generated by previous actions. If such were the case, 
all actions would be wholly predetermined by the karmic results of all previous actions, 
effectively rendering moral choices impossible.  
Contrary to this Weberian view, Green notes that in point of fact a clear understanding of the law 
of karma leads one to act in a manner that will ensure that one’s present condition is improved in 
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the current life and any future lives.
141
 This in itself is enough to encourage proper ethical 
behavior within society. Furthermore, to return to the previous point, the doctrine of karma 
taught in the Pāli Canon includes a collective aspect in which individual actions and intentions 
may affect all of society in turn and vice versa.
142
 As I have indicated, at its essence Buddhist 
ethics teach that reducing individual suffering and misconduct also reduces the suffering that one 
inflicts upon others. Hence, rather than precluding the possibility of a social ethic, the notion of 
karma instead provides a firm foundation for ethical behavior within the interpersonal and social 
realm.  
Hu makes this point clear by pointing out the implications of interdependent co-arising on 
notions of individualism and karma: 
The teaching of interdependent co-arising deconstructs the concept of independent “Self” 
that stays uninﬂuenced by its surroundings, but by no means does it dissolve moral 
responsibilities of individuals. Quite the contrary, what is revealed by co-arising is the 
fundamental sociality and interconditionality of human existence. According to co-
arising, an individual is constituted in the existing socio-cultural contexts, and the socio-
cultural contexts are in turn constructed and reconstructed through individuals’ actions. It 
is in this light that the Buddha’s ethicization of the long-existing term kamma can be 
rightly understood. Inasmuch as a person interdependently co-arises with the contexts she 
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or he is in, and with the people around her or him, every volitional action functions to 
reconﬁgure the socio-cultural contexts as well as one’s own personality and character, 
and every person is directly or indirectly responsible for the well-being of others. This 
complex social implication of interdependent co-arising can be further accentuated by 
taking a look at the contemporary socio-economic and environmental studies on the 
global situations. What seems to be individual kamma more often than not has its social 
and even global impacts, and the cessation of dukkha depends on all those who are 
tangled in the same kammic web of existence realizing the social dimensions of their 
actions and striving to be socially aware and conscientious.
143
 
The ultimate deficiency in Weber’s analysis of the results of Buddhist teachings on social and 
economic thought, however, is that it takes little notice of the interactions between the monastic 
saṅgha and the lay followers beyond the one-sided lay function of supporting the monastic 
saṅgha. David Gellner offers this critique: 
By paying no attention to the Vinaya (monastic discipline) texts, Weber underestimated 
the all-important role of the Sangha (monastic community) in the life of the monk. He 
also underestimated the degree to which early Buddhism had already accommodated 
itself to lay religious interests and therefore included elements of prayer, deification of 
the Buddha, and so on.
144
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By ignoring these fundamental and reciprocal relationships among the laity and the saṅgha, 
Weber was left with a view of Buddhism that appeared exceedingly individualistic and solitary. 
Commenting on the content of the vinaya texts, Gregory Schopen counters this view:
145
 
Although the vinaya texts were written by monks and for monks, they often have little in 
common with the image of the Buddhist monk that is commonly found in our textbooks, 
and even in many of our scholarly sources. That image ... presents the Buddhist monk as 
a lone ascetic who has renounced all social ties and property to wander or live in the 
forest, preoccupied with meditation and the heroic quest for nirvana or enlightenment. ... 
The monk [of the vinaya texts] is caught in a web of social and ritual obligations, is fully 
and elaborately housed and permanently settled, preoccupied with worldly matters- bowls 




The vinaya texts we know are little interested in any individual religious quest, but are 
very concerned with the organization, administration, maintenance, and smooth operation 
of a complex institution that owned property and had important social obligations.
147
  
Stanley Tambiah similarly criticized Weber’s depiction of the asocial and other-worldly pursuits 
of the monastic saṅgha as underplaying the “highly formalized and systematized technology of 
meditation and ascetic practices,” and ignoring the vinaya texts which detail elaborate social 
                                                             
145
  Schopen, 1995: 473-502. 
146
  Schopen, 1995: 473. 
147
  Schopen, 1995: 475. 
 M o n s o n  P a g e  | 68 
 
rules for the monastic saṅgha, whose very objective was “the promotion of ‘brotherly’ conduct 
among the members of the monastic community.”148 Indeed, perhaps unaware of the texts related 
to monastic discipline that promote such brotherly conduct, Weber had explicitly claimed that 
such brotherly love or compassion stood in direct opposition to the mystical and undifferentiated 
affection known to Buddhism.
149
 It is understandable that Weber might overlook the Vinaya 
texts, which were not well-known to Western scholars at the turn of the 20
th
 Century. But, the 
more important oversight on his part, and the less understandable omission, is that he gave only 
the most cursory treatment of the very teachings that are the most related to economics and 
which are found at the very heart of the path to nirvana- namely, Right Livelihood.
150
 These he 
interpreted as only of marginal importance, rather than as essential a component of the Noble 
Eightfold Path that the Buddha outlined as are the other factors which were the focal point of his 
analysis. 
2.1.2.  Melford Spiro: Nibbanic, Kammatic, and Apotropaic Buddhism 
In his highly influential account of Burmese Buddhists, Melford Spiro largely followed Weber’s 
analysis.
151
 Spiro developed a three-fold classification system of the Theravāda Buddhism as 
                                                             
148
  Tambiah, 1984: 324. 
149
  Weber, 1958: 208. 
150
  Weber, 1958: 215. 
151
  Spiro, 1971.  
 M o n s o n  P a g e  | 69 
 
practiced in Burma, comprised of Nibbanic, Kammatic, and Apotropaic divisions.
152
 Nibbanic 
Buddhism in this classification refers to the teachings, practices, and concerns of the saṅgha, the 
monastic community that is primarily focused on the pursuit of final liberation or nirvana 
through the more advanced ascetic practices of the Eightfold Path which often lead to a 
withdrawal from worldly concerns.
153
 Kammatic Buddhism, on the other hand, is concerned 
ultimately with striving to attain a better rebirth, such as in the human or heaven realms, and to 
prevent negative karmic consequences like rebirth in a lower realm of existence. This is 
accomplished primarily by following the basic precepts outlined above, and generating karmic 
merit through dāna– this largely through donations to support the monastic saṅgha, although 
other forms of generosity are also included.
154
 The final division in Spiro’s model is Apotropaic 
Buddhism, a classification that represents a primary concern of making use of magical powers 
that are associated with the Dhamma. Primarily this is for some sort of protection, such as from 
natural or even supernatural dangers.
155
  
Under this schema, the vast majority of Buddhists throughout history would fall under the 
Kammatic Buddhism division. As Stewart McFarlane explains:  
In Buddhist societies both past and present, 'Nibbanic Buddhism', or the systematic 
following of the Path (magga), with the overt intention of rapidly gaining liberation and 
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the spiritual status of being an arahat (Sanskrit arhat, 'worthy one') is the concern of a 
minority of monks within the sangha. The majority of devout Buddhists, including most 




Spiro concluded from his observations in Burma that most Buddhists simply tried to keep the 
basic precepts primarily in order to avoid the negative karmic consequences of breaking them, 
such as rebirth in a hell, rather than primarily in the pursuit of nirvana.
157
 In a manner similar to 
what was earlier proposed by Weber, those following the Nibbanic path, on the other hand, were 
said to seek primarily to transcend this world by following the advanced practices of the 
Eightfold Path. Ironically, Spiro stated that these divisions should not be seen as independent or 
‘neat bundles’, and yet he then took this latter view in stating their fundamental discontinuity.158 
Spiro’s classifications are frequently used among Western scholars due to their effectiveness at 
presenting the complexity of understandings of the Buddhist teachings and goals that can exist 
within a culture.
159
 However, the rigid division of these spiritual aims in his model has been the 
target of criticism from scholars nonetheless. In his critique of Spiro’s thesis, Damien Keown 
finds fault with the radical distinction he makes between actions aimed at karmic fruitfulness and 
those aimed at observing the Eightfold Path for attaining nirvana, identifying the Kammatic 
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sphere with the laity and the Nibbanic with the monastic saṅgha.160 As indicated in the previous 
chapter, the attainment of nirvana requires the perfection of all aspects of the Eightfold Path, 
particularly the combination of both moral virtue and insight.
161
 Karmic merit generated through 
moral virtue cannot, therefore, be fully isolated from the pursuit of nirvana, and relegated to just 
one sociological group. Making reference to sociological and anthropological work in Southeast 
Asia, Keown further refutes the sharp distinction between lay and monastic goals, demonstrating 
that a general complementarity exists in respect to the lay and monastic goals of rebirth and 
nirvana.
162
 Individual Buddhists can and do pursue both goals, often simultaneously as karmic 
merit moves them closer towards a good rebirth as well as nirvana.  
Contrary to Spiro’s model, striving primarily to gain merit that will ensure a good rebirth does 
not necessarily preclude the lay follower from maintaining the ultimate goal of attaining nirvana 
in a future life and pursuing both goals simultaneously. A chief reason that a good rebirth is 
valuable is precisely because it brings a greater possibility of attaining nirvana. By the same 
token, karmic merit also plays its own part in the division of Nibbanic Buddhism as well insofar 
as moral conduct serves as the foundation of the more advanced practices leading to the insight 
necessary for attaining nirvana. While Spiro’s model is helpful in identifying the complexity and 
diversity of aims within a Buddhist community, it also harbors a danger in seeing the goals as 
representing different paths pursued by distinct groups and fails to accentuate the inter-
relatedness of the goals. 
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2.1.3. Payutto Bhikkhu- Social Ethics and the Pāli Vinaya 
A more balanced approach than those of Weber and Spiro in regards to the role that the 
individual plays in social, political and economic matters and the relationship between this and 
enlightenment has been expounded more recently by Bhikkhu Payutto. In ‘Foundations of 
Buddhist Social Ethics’, Payutto responds to scholars who he maintains misrepresent Buddhism 
as an ascetic religion, taking the whole of Buddhism to be simply the religion of a group of 
monks and conflating the ideal of Buddhist ethics with the metaphysical aspects or meditative 
practices of the monks.
163
 He observes, “Buddhism is the religion or way of life not only of the 
monks, but of the laity as well”; the monks only make up a part of the Buddhist community, and 
represent only a part of Buddhist ethical reflection.
164
 According to Payutto, Buddhist ethics 
should be seen as comprised of both Dhamma, as in law or doctrine, and vinaya, or discipline. In 
this way, he identifies both the pure doctrines and the manner in which they are applied to daily 
life as essential aspects of Buddhist ethics. Furthermore, Payutto notes that the Pāli Canon 
identifies the ‘four assemblages’ comprising the Buddhist community as made up of the male 
and female lay followers, and the monks and nuns, concluding that the monks and the laity are 
intended to be seen as complementary sides of a single moral community.
165
 In his view, the 
differences between the laity and the monks and nuns are not radical ones; rather, lay and 
monastic ethics and practices are merely different and complementary aspects of the single 
community. These social groups are necessarily interdependent and inter-related in the pursuit of 
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their liberating goals. Payutto’s approach is helpful in identifying the commonalities among the 
lay followers and the monastic saṅgha, while simultaneously recognizing that certain differences 
exist. While their roles in society and daily practices may clearly differ, the guiding principles 
and virtues, and both proximate and ultimate goals are remarkably similar.  
2.2.  Buddhist Social Ethics in the Pāli Canon 
Following the approach that Payutto Bhikkhu outlined in ‘Foundations of Buddhist Social 
Ethics’, certain clear principles forming the foundation of Buddhist social ethics are evident in 
Buddhist teachings early enough to be included in the Pāli Canon. Because these form the 
essential framework used for approaching Buddhist notions of poverty and poverty relief in later 
chapters, they will be detailed further here. 
2.2.1.  Moral Behavior of Individuals Benefits Society at Large. 
In accordance with the key Buddhist teaching of inter-dependence, ethical and moral behavior is 
said to benefit not only individuals on their path toward liberation, but also to benefit society as a 
whole. In the first case, individual ethical and moral conduct reduces the suffering inflicted upon 
others, but the influence that one’s virtuous behavior has on the behavior of others should also be 
considered. Passages in the Pāli Canon, such as the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta, explicitly refer to 
widespread moral degeneration of society resulting directly from the immoral behavior of the 
king.
166
 In this sutta, the pervasive immorality only begins to reverse, after a period of brutality 
and chaos, when particular citizens undertake moral discipline and once again establish the 
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beginnings of a moral and peaceful society. This passage will be dealt with more fully later, but 
for now, a general principle to be gleaned is that a spiritual and temporal interdependence among 
the main social groups in the Buddhist tradition—the political rulers, the saṅgha and the laity. 
The actions of the political ruler as well as the actions of the monastic saṅgha each had wide-
reaching effects on broader society and the individuals within it. 
2.2.2.  Social Groups Are Interdependent and Inter-related 
Various passages in the Pāli Canon affirm the interdependency of the major social groups in their 
social roles. In the Itivuttaka, for example, the Buddha teaches: 
Bhikkhus, brahmins and householders are very helpful to you. They provide you with the 
requisites of robes, almsfood, lodgings, and medicine in time of sickness. And you, 
bhikkhus, are very helpful to brahmins and householders, as you teach them the Dhamma 
... with its correct meaning and wording, and you proclaim the holy life in its fulfilment 
and complete purity. Thus, bhikkhus, this holy life is lived with mutual support for the 
purpose of crossing the flood and making a complete end of suffering.
167
 
Thus, while the role of the laity in providing material support to the saṅgha is well-known and 
often noted, this passage concludes with the message of mutual support between these groups for 
the purpose of attaining enlightenment. The mutual interdependence exists on both the spiritual 
and temporal planes. On the temporal level, the saṅgha relies on the donations from the laity and 
the king, as well as on the stable society and necessary political freedoms provided by the king, 
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in order to properly function and fulfill their role in society. The laity similarly relies on the king 
to provide a society that is safe, crime free, and prosperous. They often rely on the saṅgha to 
provide a level of education to many, and the needy in society may also rely on the saṅgha for 
donations of material goods, such as food, clothing, etc., although the chief contribution from the 
saṅgha is said to be spiritual. The king relies on the laity to pay taxes and follow the laws he 
institutes, and relies on the saṅgha to legitimate his rule and encourage the laity to follow and 
respect him.   
Ideally, on a spiritual level, the king and laity both rely on the saṅgha to teach them the Dhamma 
and give them advice according to it, to act as moral exemplars who model an alternative set of 
values pointing toward advancement on the path to enlightenment. In practicing the Dhamma, 
the king is also to act as an example or ideal for the householder laity to follow in their daily 
lives. And, in turn, the moral and ethical conduct of the laity and king provides the appropriate 
setting for the spiritual striving of the saṅgha and the rest of society. In this way, the social 
groups are all interdependent and individuals within them rely on each other for the proper 
functioning of society, and to fulfill their own duties and roles within society, as they strive for 
enlightenment and a good rebirth. 
This is, of course, a representation of the ideal social relationships—an ideal that is at times at 
odds with the historical reality. The relationship between the monastic saṅgha and the throne in 
particular is more complicated than the idealistic view presents. Somboon Suksamran, for 
example, has written on the relationship between the monastic saṅgha and the government in the 
process of political modernization of Thailand since the 1960s and while his study identifies 
relationships among these social groupings in modern Thai society similar to those outlined in 
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canonical texts, he also points to clear cases in which the groups made use of one another due to 
political motivations less grounded in doctrine.
168
 Historically these groups have colluded, 
relying on each other for legitimation before the lay public, while also at times clashing in power 
struggles. Trevor Ling points out that these complementary relationships may have simply come 
about quite naturally in early Indian Buddhism as the interests of the rulers and the interests of 
the saṅgha coincided, when “an ideology which needed a supportive political power met a 
political ruler looking for a legitimating ideology.”169  
There is some ambivalence toward politics in that the Buddha taught on a number of politically 
relevant topics, seems to have often associated comfortably with kings and their courts, and 
established rules in the saṅgha that precluded enemies of the state from entry, and yet on the 
other hand he also spoke of kings as dangerous and that at times they may be justly disobeyed 
and overthrown.
170
 And, a result of this ambivalence there has been a tension between the rulers 
and the saṅgha historically, in which kings have at times ordered the death and disestablishment 
of the saṅgha and particular members, and on the other hand, saṅgha members have called for 
the overthrow or attempted assassination of what they considered unjust rulers.
171
 Conversely, 
there also is a certain danger in the collusion of the two groups, which can lead to corruption if 
the saṅgha gives political and moral legitimation to an unjust ruler in exchange for the position 
in society as religious authorities.
 Ian Harris suggests that “a healthily functioning Buddhist 
polity is one in which the respective powers of king and sangha are held in a state of antagonistic 
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symbiosis.”172 Conceding that the complicated historical reality of the relationships between 
these major social groups is often at odds with the ideals, it is nonetheless helpful to recognize 
and identify the ideal social and political relationships outlined in the texts. 
2.2.3.  Role of Kings/Political Rulers 
In the Pāli Canon, a good king is characterized as the ideal lay member. Having not undertaken 
the vows of the saṅgha, by fully retaining his material possessions, and social and familial 
duties, the king remains a member of the laity and should strive to live according to the lay 
precepts and perfect the Buddhist virtues. The ideal ruler represented in the Theravāda tradition 
is the Cakkavatti ruler. As a representation of the spiritual and temporal ideals in the Buddhist 
tradition, the Cakkavatti king is sometimes paired with the Buddha as his political equivalent 
who is born with the same remarkable bodily features, although he has not attained 
enlightenment and therefore remains subordinate to the Buddha.
173
 The duties of the king 
outlined in Buddhist scriptures are primarily to provide moral leadership by following the 
Dhamma and to provide a safe society and stable economy. The Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta 
details the duties of the universal rulers: 
But what, sire, is the duty of [a Cakkavatti king]?" "It is this, my son: Yourself depending 
on the Dhamma, honouring it, … acknowledging the Dhamma as your master, you 
should establish guard, ward and protection according to Dhamma for your own 
household, your troops, your nobles and vassals, for Brahmins and householders, town 
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and country folk, ascetics and Brahmins, for beasts and birds. Let no crime prevail in 
your kingdom, and to those who are in need, give property. And whatever ascetics and 
Brahmins in your kingdom have renounced the life of sensual infatuation and are devoted 
to forbearance and gentleness, … if from time to time they should come to you and 
consult you as to what is wholesome and what is unwholesome, what is blameworthy and 
what is blameless, what is to be followed and what is not to be followed, and what action 
will in the long run lead to harm and sorrow, and what to welfare and happiness, you 
should listen….174 
 These duties are also detailed in the exceedingly influential Kūţadanta Sutta, in which the king 
is told to fulfill his duties to provide a safe society, free from crime and other social ills, and to 
practice the Buddhist virtue of giving—particularly to the poor and to support the saṅgha.175 
Here the Buddha recounts the narrative of a sacrifice which he had performed as the head priest 
or chaplain for a king in a previous life in order to instruct the brahmin Kūţadanta in the correct 
manner of performing a great sacrifice. The king was pleased with the wealth and land he had 
accumulated and wanted to offer a sacrifice that would be to his “lasting benefit and 
happiness.”176 The Buddha, as the high priest, instructed him that before offering the sacrifice he 
must first eliminate the plague of thieves destroying villages and towns across the countryside. 
He taught the king that raising taxes, threatening, imprisoning, executing or banishing the thieves 
would not remove the plague from his kingdom. Only giving to his subjects could successfully 
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remove the plague; he further instructed the king to give grain and fodder, capital, and proper 
living wages to subjects in his kingdom. Once the king had done this, the plague of thieves was 
removed. The Buddha, in the role as high priest, then taught the king that giving alms-food and 
shelter to monks and joining the saṅgha are the greatest ‘sacrifices’ one can offer. Thus the king 
is to rule by moral example, establishing peace and prosperity, and providing for the needs of the 
saṅgha. And, rather than rule by harsh punishments, he is instead to exemplify the Buddhist 
virtues, as he is instructed by the saṅgha. 
2.2.4.  Role of Lay Followers 
The role of the lay followers in Buddhist society as outlined in the Pāli Canon is chiefly to 
establish the ideal circumstances for spiritual advancement. This is accomplished primarily 
through moral discipline in fulfilling social roles, by following the Buddhist precepts and 
perfecting the Buddhist virtues. Most importantly, this entails providing the material needs for 
the monastic community, but also includes supporting a righteous king through paying taxes, and 
following the laws of the land.  
The key relationships of the lay followers are divided into six groups in the Sigālaka Sutta: 
parents and children, teachers and students, wife and husband, friends and companions, workers 
and employers, and ascetics or monks and lay people.
177
 The lay followers are to exemplify 
Buddhist virtues in relationships with each of these groups. Friendship is a common principle in 
virtually all of these relationships; friends are to show generosity in giving to one another, to 
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speak kind words, to be helpful, to treat one another with respect and sincerity, and to keep one’s 
word. In Payutto’s view, friendship is a central principle in Buddhist social ethics.178 Hu reaches 
the same conclusion, referring to the Buddha’s advice in the Māgandiya Sutta to associate with 
“true men”.179 “The Buddha said that association with good friends would bring one to hear the 
Dhamma, would prompt one to practice accordingly, and would allow one to know for oneself 
the formation and cessation of  dukkha (i.e., co-arising).”180 This is also evident in the 
Kosalasaņyutta Sutta, in which the Buddha corrects his close follower Ānanda, for claiming that 
good friendship constitutes a full half of the holy life: 
Not so, Ānanda!  This is the entire holy life, Ānanda, that is, good friendship, good 
companionship, good comradeship. When a bhikkhu has a good friend, a good 




The reciprocal and complementary nature of the relationship of interdependence between monks 
and the laity is evident in the duties outlined in the Pāli Canon. It is said in the Sigālaka Sutta 
that the lay followers are to show loving deeds, words and thoughts to the monks by opening 
their house to them and providing them with their material needs. In return the monks are to 
show compassion toward the lay followers by discouraging them from evil, teaching them of the 
benefit of good actions, loving them with a kind heart, helping them hear what they have not 
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heard, clarifying what they have already heard, and pointing them to a heavenly state.
182
 It is 
worth noting that it is said that the gods not only worship the Buddha as a spiritual superior, but 
also those followers of the Buddha that put the Buddha’s message in practice; this includes the 




As previously indicated, the virtue of dāna, or generosity, is central to Buddhist teachings, and is 
particularly important to lay practice in the Pāli Canon. That generosity is directed primarily 
toward the saṅgha as the most fruitful source of generating merit, although not exclusively so.184 
The Buddha taught the householder Anāthapiňđika that the perfection of generosity, or having a 
heart free of stinginess and delighting in giving charitable gifts, leads one to obtaining certain 
desirable conditions which includes wealth for oneself and one's family and friends. One is said 
to seize opportunities and turn them to fruitful merit when wealth is used to make family and 
friends secure and happy, and offerings are given to living relatives, guests, deceased relatives, 
kings and gods.
185
   
Additionally, in the Ghaţīkāra Sutta, the potter Ghaţīkāra receives a great benefit by generously 
giving his wares away for free. In return he is supported by the king and his neighbors.
186 
Ghaţīkāra is praised for his generosity and for looking after his blind parents and also attending 
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upon Kassapa Buddha with complete reverence. Furthermore, the Vighāsa Jātaka tells of a 
previous life of the Buddha as the god Sakka in which he taught a group of renunciants that one 
should first give alms to recluses, brahmins, and beggars, and then live on the “remnants left 
from charity.”187  
There are also important instructions to the lay followers related to business and economics 
found in the Pāli Canon. In this realm, the role of the lay-followers in society has in this modern 
era of globalization expanded to rival and in some cases even eclipse the role of the rulers or the 
state. One of the results of globalization has been the globalizing of a world economy and the 
emergence of large multi-national organizations that can significantly influence laws and 
regulations that affect the lives of virtually the entire world’s populations and can do so with 
little regard for national borders or cultural norms. While householders and lay-follower 
businessmen historically have exerted influence locally, today it can be argued that multi-
national corporations rival states in their influence on the economy and much of public policy. 
As lay institutions, the teachings on social and economic ethics found in the canonical sources 
should apply to both the small householder and businessman as well as to the large multi-
national corporations. These teachings mainly revolve around the Right Livelihood aspect of the 
Eightfold Path, which provides instructions concerning the manner in which an income is to be 
earned and spent, but there are also more detailed instructions to employers and employees. The 
topic of wealth and poverty will be covered in detail in Chapter 4, while Buddhist economic 
principles will be covered further in the Chapter 3. In short, the lay followers are encouraged to 
industriously engage themselves in pursuing wealth through ethical and wise means—connoting 
                                                             
187
  Jat 393 (Cowell, 1895: 193-194). 
 M o n s o n  P a g e  | 83 
 
a non-attachment and contentment with simplicity—and to use the wealth they earn to benefit 
themselves and others. In so doing, the lay followers are to engage themselves in industrious 
pursuits to prevent or escape from poverty, and to undertake activities which help others to do so 
as well. 
2.2.5.  The Role of the Saṅgha 
The duties of the monastic saṅgha outlined in the Pāli Canon include undertaking vows of 
simplicity and the ownership of only minimal personal possessions, receiving charitable 
donations from the laity and the rulers in order to allow them to benefit from the karmic merit, 
and instructing the laity and rulers in living according to the Dhamma so that individuals and 
society can prosper. The saṅgha makes alms-rounds, seeking donations for their material 
support. In turn, they provide the opportunity to gain merit, and also strive to perfect generosity 
by giving the Dhamma.
188
 
The life of simplicity, a form of voluntary poverty, is central to one's spiritual development along 
the path to liberation. By voluntarily undertaking this life of simplicity, the monks and nuns 
embody an alternative set of values, representing the ideal example of spiritual pursuits. 
Examples concerning the role that monks play in instructing the kings in ruling virtuously have 
been presented above; the kings who remove the plagues, famines, and other social ills from 
their kingdoms are typically presented as doing so by following the advice of a monk or ascetic 
counterpart. The monks are portrayed as contributing to the economic prosperity in a kingdom 
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by teaching the rulers and lay followers to live according to the Dhamma. 
According to Payutto, whether or not it was a function of the monasteries originally, over time 
they came to offer goods and services to the needy in society, such as providing food, clothing, 
education, medical care and more.
189
 This role of the saṅgha in poverty relief will be discussed 
further in Chapter 5. Two brief examples of the karmic merit generated from charitable giving to 
the saṅgha as a way of eliminating poverty are instructive here, though. One noteworthy passage 
is found in the Sāma Jātaka which tells of parents who are thrust from wealth into extreme 
poverty because their son enters the saṅgha.190 Upon hearing that this has happened to his 
beloved parents, the monk considers leaving the saṅgha to become a householder and provide 
for his parents. Instead, he decides to use the alms that he receives to support them, thereby 
remaining faithful to his vow of homelessness. After some time, another monk discovers that he 
has been giving his alms to his parents who are lay followers. He explains that it is unlawful to 
waste the alms of the faithful by giving them to lay followers, and reports it to the Buddha. The 
young monk is thereby made to feel ashamed of what he has done, but, rather than reprimand 
him, the Buddha repeatedly praises him for his actions. Moreover, the Buddha tells him that he 
also provided for his parents by making rounds asking for alms in a previous life. This tale is of 
particular interest here because it indicates that, contrary to the widely held views, certain social 
responsibilities, such as providing material support for the needy, seem to outweigh or supersede 
the highly important vow to forsake personal property and the social standing based on family or 
wealth by entering the saṅgha. 
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Additionally, in the Kuňđaka-Kucchi-Sindhava-Jātaka, the Elder monk Sāriputta is said to have 
rescued a woman from poverty simply by accepting an invitation to dine at her door.
191
 The poor 
old woman asked the clerk to send a monk to her home so she might offer dinner, but all the 
monks except for Sāriputta had already been assigned to other homes for dinner. When word had 
spread that Sāriputta would be dining with the poor woman, the king and other impressed 
neighbors sent money to her home to buy food, clothing, and entertainment. So much money was 
sent to her on that day that she became wealthy. Her reward is both physical and spiritual as she 
is edified and converted by the kindness and gratitude of Sāriputta. Here we see another example 
of the mutual support and interdependence among the social groups for their collective well-
being. 
2.3.  Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the key issues related to a social ethical theory. The early Western 
studies of Buddhism tended to identify it as a religion of monks that focused on the individual 
pursuit of nirvana and sought to transcend virtually all worldly desires and relationships. 
Although some version of this approach has endured in the writings of many scholars since the 
time of Max Weber, it has been subject to much criticism and widely rejected in favor of 
approaches that highlight the interdependent relationships among the monastic saṅgha and the 
laity. 
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In this chapter, I dealt with the underlying questions of the relationship between the individual’s 
role in broader society, and more particularly the relationship between karmic merit and the path 
to nirvana. Contrary to the common misconception that the ideal in Buddhism is to transcend all 
desires or passion, including such virtues as compassion and generosity, Keown has 
demonstrated that these virtues not only serve as the foundation for the development of the 
necessary liberating insight, but are also essential for attaining nirvana. Thus, whether an 
individual focuses on the proximate goal of attaining a good rebirth in coming lives, or on the 
ultimate goal of attaining nirvana, generating karmic merit through moral discipline is essential.  
Buddhist teachings thus include motivation toward social betterment as well as toward personal 
spiritual development. 
Relying on the approach of Payutto, as well as additional passages from the Pāli Canon and 
Jātaka Tales, I also outlined some key relationships within Buddhist society that illustrate the 
interdependence between the monastic saṅgha, the laity, and the rulers. In Payutto’s view, both 
the Buddhist community and Buddhist social ethics include diverse perspectives of all of these 
social groupings. All of them rely on one another for support in fulfilling their own roles and 
responsibilities, as well as in pursuing liberation. Recognizing the complementary nature of these 
key relationships is essential to an understanding of how these groups are to undertake poverty 
relief in Buddhist social ethics. In the following chapters I will address the notions of wealth and 
poverty found in the Pāli Canon and various Mahāyāna sūtras, and also the duties outlined 
therein to relieve the suffering of the poor. As I will demonstrate, these social groupings have an 
interest in the relief of poverty in their society, and each have specific roles in doing so detailed 
in Buddhist scriptures. 
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Part II.  Buddhist Conceptions of Poverty & Poverty Relief  
3.  Buddhist Economics 
It should be clear at this point that the Buddhist tradition exhibits concern for ‘this-worldly’ 
affairs and that appropriate social relationships form an important aspect of Buddhist morality. 
Buddhist social ethics demand that proper behavior in relationships be performed in the 
marketplace just as it is demanded more broadly in society; arguably, the marketplace is where 
individuals exert the greatest and most far-reaching influence in the lives of others. In addition to 
the principles outlined previously concerning social ethics found in the Pāli Canon and 
Mahāyāna sutras, additional passages concerning more overtly economic principles are also 
found. In this chapter, I will provide an overview of the key principles outlined in Buddhist 
scripture that are most relevant to economic ethics. I will also briefly outline the growth of a 
movement toward the development of a Buddhist economics. While some writers have taken up 
the task of developing an economic system based on Buddhist principles to rival and even 
replace the dominant Western economic systems, others are skeptical of the possibility of 
success in such a colossal undertaking and have the more modest goal of offering a critique of 
misguided values of mainstream economic models in order to transform the global economy into 
a more ethical one.  
Simon Zadek argues that the central questions of concern are “whether we can believe any 
longer that the secular trajectory of economic development typical of industrialized countries is 
sustainable over the long, or possibly over the not so long, term”; and whether the role of 
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religion “in some shape or form, offers a basis for evolving more effective mechanisms for 
survival, let alone reasonable levels of well-being, for the majority.”192 Concerning the role that 
Buddhist principles can play in the economic realm, Zadek cautions, “we should not under-
estimate the difficulty of thinking about a modern economy based on a Buddhist economics.”193 
Zadek contends that the diversity of thinking in the fields of Buddhism and economics raises 
difficulty in reflecting accurately the real wealth of Buddhism or its meaning for economics.
194
 
Neither Buddhism nor Western economics are monolithic entities, but reflect a wealth of 
opinions and practices. Moreover, although he points to deficiencies with Western economic 
models, Zadek remains skeptical of the assumption that a Buddhist economics can develop to the 
point of fully replacing the dominant Western models.  
Does Buddhist Economics then resolve what are seen as valid economic questions of our 
time? Does it throw light, for example, on the matter of inflation, of interest rates, or on 
the most appropriate rate of technological progress? Does it inform us as to the optimal 
rates of taxation, of savings, or of social security? The answer to this must be broadly 
negative. Buddhist Economics does not answer these questions directly, and in all 
probability will never do so in any clear-cut manner. Furthermore, the argument that this 
apparent 'deficiency' arises through the infant-nature of the discipline is not really 
sustainable, since there is nothing apparent in its underlying principles (at least to me) 
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that foreshadows revelation on these subjects. Shortcomings in these areas do not, 
however, mean that Buddhist Economics has nothing to offer.
195 
In Zadek’s view, although it may not offer complex analysis of highly specialized economic 
topics on par with the dominant economic theories and systems, Buddhist economics can make 
important contributions to Western economics. It offers principles of behavior associated with 
the appreciation of the interdependent nature of existence and notions of well-being; it proposes 
alternative means of conceptualizing our experience in the social and non-social spheres; and, it 
offers a means of interpreting economic practices in the context of Buddhist principles and 
associated individual aims.
196
 In brief, even if the goal of completely replacing the global 
economy may be unrealistic, not so that Buddhist economics can offer critiques and alternative 
ways of conceptualizing issues, particularly ethical issues, within the field of economics that 
address certain deficiencies and thereby can have a real influence on the global economy.  
Over roughly the last decade, a broad movement towards more pluralistic approaches to 
economics has gained considerable traction with the potential to change fundamentally the future 
of the entire field of economics.
197
 These approaches generally urge a rethinking of the basic 
assumptions of dominant mainstream economics and the privileged position of mainstream 
economic approaches as the final authority on all economic matters; instead, they highlight the 
value of multiple viewpoints and methodologies in constructing the best approaches for 
particular areas and issues, such as unemployment or distributive justice. While the theoretical 
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possibility of genuine engagement between the fields of religion and economics may remain 
questionable, as well as the very notion of a truly religion-based economics, religious ethical and 
moral systems also can and do offer meaningful critiques of, and contributions to, economic 
thought and analysis. Despite the obvious conflict that arises between religious notions of 
authority, such as divine revelation, and the foundation of reason and data analysis as the basis of 
economic methodologies, religious moral and ethical systems do intersect with economics and 
can make a profound contribution to the undertaking of returning ethics and moral values to the 
foundation of the field of economics.
198
 A growing number of economics scholars affirm the 
inseparable nature of ethics and economics, arguing that economic theory is founded on value 
judgments from the outset, making it impossible to fully detach it from discussions of ethics and 
morality.
199
 If the movement persists and the field of economics continues to become more 
welcoming of heterodox approaches, more open to the notions that economic values are founded 
to some extent on culturally derived value judgments, and of the notion that different systems of 
thought can, therefore, likely contribute to a more comprehensive approach to both global and 
local economic issues, then Buddhist economics will likely continue to garner increasing interest 
among economists and scholars as its contributions to the endeavor of economic analysis become 
more apparent.  
Generally speaking, Buddhist economics addresses the general Buddhist notions of wealth and 
poverty and the manner in which fundamental Buddhist teachings apply to practical concerns of 
how to apply the principle of Right Livelihood, including concerns of appropriate modes of 
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production, distribution and consumption of goods, in addition to questions of political economy 
and political social thought. Over the last few decades, Buddhist economics has garnered 
increasing interest among scholars of religious studies, economics, anthropology, as well as 
business management and organizational development. The gap in literature by scholars 
knowledgeable in the Buddhist tradition and these other disciplines concurrently is gradually 
diminishing as the contributions made by Buddhist economics to discussions in these fields 
increases. This chapter will outline the general Buddhist principles and doctrines gleaned from 
the Pāli Canon that apply to the economic realm and have commonly been used in discussions of 
economy, and will then briefly outline the development of Buddhist economics as a topic of 
scholarship broadly. This will serve as a foundation for a more detailed focus on the specific 
issue of poverty in the following chapter. 
As is also the case with the broader field of Buddhist ethics, Buddhist economics largely came 
about as an area of study near the end of the 20
th
 Century, taking hold predominantly in 
Theravāda Buddhist countries of Southeast Asia. Approximately since the early 1970s, a number 
of Buddhist leaders and scholars have sought to extract the teachings on economics and business 
from Buddhist scripture and use them as guiding principles in formulating a coherent and, in so 
far as possible, a reasonably complete economic system. While such economic principles are 
clearly evident throughout the Pāli Canon and have guided Buddhist leaders and scholars in the 
past, devising an economic system that is in line with these principles of Buddhist thought on a 
scale comparable to the dominant Western system is a formidable undertaking that is still very 
much in its infancy. Because the passages in Buddhist scripture that clearly and directly deal 
with economic issues often do so only in general or vague terms, the task of explicating a set of 
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basic principles that can form a rich Buddhist economic theory or system is largely a creative 
endeavor in which each contributor to the task must make assumptions or suggestions about how 
the principles might or ought to apply to contemporary economic issues or discussions. This 
pursuit has not been a wholly academic one, however; some political leaders in Southeast Asia 
have attempted openly to apply some form of Buddhist economic theory to national economic 
policies and have achieved some successes, such as King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s much praised 
Sufficiency Economy in Thailand.
200
 I will not focus on actual economies of Buddhist nations 
here, however, as it lies beyond the scope of this introduction to economic ethics, although I will 
describe some key examples of attempts to implement community development or poverty 
alleviation projects based on Buddhist principles in this and following chapters. My focus here is 
instead on the Buddhist teachings and principles related to economics that can serve as a 
foundation for economic analyses, policies, and that are likely to exert a noteworthy influence on 
the general economic behaviors and that form a connection between morality and ideal economic 
activities.  
3.1.  Buddhist Attitudes Concerning Wealth 
Much like the relationship between the individual pursuit of enlightenment and the moral 
demand of social responsibilities is easily misconstrued, the concepts of poverty and wealth and 
their proper roles in the Buddhist tradition also easily lend themselves to misunderstanding. 
There is some ambivalence in the Buddhist conceptions of poverty and wealth. On the one hand, 
wealth is commonly praised and its accumulation often encouraged, even to the point of 
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overwhelming extravagance. Stories praising wealthy lay donors are certainly not infrequent in 
the Pāli Canon. The most popular of these must be the stories of the extravagant wealth and 
generosity of the affluent householder Sudatta who earned the nick-name Anathāpiňđika, 
meaning ‘feeder of the poor’ or ‘feeder of the orphans and helpless’, for his enormous donations 
to the poor and the saṅgha.201 Yet, on the other hand, voluntary poverty is even more frequently 
praised in the Canon as a virtue, in the form of simplicity, with the abandonment of personal 
possessions and wealth plainly designated as an essential step on the path to final liberation.  
To understand clearly the Buddhist concepts of poverty and wealth, it is helpful to begin with an 
understanding of the traditional Brāhmaṇic teachings on wealth that set the background and 
framework for the Buddha’s teachings. Once wealth is seen in the proper light as a worthy goal 
of the laity, although it is also still to be forsaken by the monastic saṅgha, the attitude toward 
material possession becomes clearer. Distinctions can then be made between the Buddha’s 
teachings on material poverty as simplicity and material poverty as deprivation, which will 
follow in the next chapter. 
3.1.1.  Artha: Wealth as a Worthy Goal 
As I have indicated previously, the dominant religion in India at the time of the Buddha was 
Brāhmaṇism; the influence that it, as well as Jainism, had on the Buddha and his followers is 
significant. The Brāhmaṇic views set the backdrop and established an Indian world-view that the 
Buddha and virtually all of his followers, associates, and adversaries would have been familiar 
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with. The Buddhist teachings on wealth in particular are highly influenced by Brāhmaṇism. 
Basing their teachings upon the ancient scriptures known as the Vedas, the Brāhmaṇs specified 
three worthy goals in life for all mankind (puruṣārtha): living in accordance with one’s duties or 
righteousness (dharma); gaining wealth and power (artha); and, enjoying the sensual pleasures 
of life (kāma).202 The later Śramaṇic movement—a broad movement which included the Buddha 
as well as Mahāvīra, the founder of Jainism—looked beyond these worldly pleasures to an 
ultimate bliss found outside of this world and a release from a cycle of rebirths and the 
subsequent re-deaths. Thus, the Śramaṇas added a fourth and supreme goal of life, mokṣa, 
signifying the release from this cycle of rebirths. Although disagreeing with the other Śramaṇas 
on certain points, particularly on what he perceived as an unnecessarily austere path to this 
ultimate liberation, the Buddha agreed fully with the general Śramaṇic criticism of the 
inadequacy of the Brāhmaṇic goals, and with the necessity of an ultimate liberation from the 
recurring cycle of births and deaths.   
However, although the Buddha considered the Brāhmaṇic model inadequate, he did not see it as 
wholly incorrect or useless. The Buddha preserved the roles of dharma, artha, and kāma as 
worthy goals of life, even while subordinating them to the final and highest goal of mokṣa. Thus, 
while the members of the monastic saṅgha forsake common worldly goals and devote 
themselves to the attainment of enlightenment in this lifetime and final liberation, the lay 
followers nonetheless are encouraged in the pursuit of wealth, power, and sensual pleasure, as 
proximate or immediate goals—provided that they are pursued in an ethical or moral way, in 
keeping with the basic Buddhist precepts and virtues. While these ‘this-worldly’ goals and the 
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‘proximate salvation’ of a better rebirth may be considered inferior to the final liberation of 
nirvana, as Stewart McFarlane points out, “it should be emphasized that there is nothing 
improper or un-Buddhist about limiting one's aims to this level of attainment.”203As detailed 
previously, lay followers may pursue these worthy immediate goals of life while simultaneously 
looking forward to arriving at a stage, in this life or in another, and as a result of the karmic 
fruitfulness of their behaviors, of forsaking all worldly possessions and social standing by 
entering the monastic saṅgha in order to pursue their final goal of ultimate liberation.  
3.2.  Economic Principles in Buddhist Thought 
Indian society seems to have undergone a number of significant socio-economic changes shortly 
before the time that the Buddha came onto the scene.
204
 The growth of large cities played an 
important role in the growth of Buddhism as many early followers came from a growing class of 
merchants and traders in these urban centers.
205
 While the traditional Brāhmaṇic structure 
faltered in providing this new class of wealthy merchants a desirable status and sanction for their 
livelihood, the Buddhist teachings offered a more universal ethic that emphasized thrift and 
diligence, and looked favorably upon trade, money-lending and certain types of debt.
206
 Some of 
the appeal to these wealthy merchants was the full social inclusion the Buddhist teachings 
offered, one that was based upon behavior rather than birth, as well as the prospect of securing a 
better rebirth largely through the simple practice of giving donations to the monastic saṅgha. 
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With the assuredly heightened awareness of socio-economic changes taking place in Indian 
society, let alone the perennial and perpetual concern over material needs, it would be hard to 
imagine a burgeoning new religious movement like Buddhism spreading so successfully without 
giving some attention to the real economic concerns of its followers and potential converts.  
3.2.1.  Early Buddhist Teachings on Economy 
As should be expected, numerous passages in the Pāli Canon reveal a concern over economic 
matters among the Buddha and his followers at an early stage. Because the historical records 
from this time in India are otherwise somewhat scarce, the Pāli Canon has been an important 
source for evidence of social and economic teachings since the time of the earliest recorded 
history of the Buddhist tradition. It is even more important here because the pursuit of Buddhist 
economics has largely been the endeavor of Theravāda Buddhists who hold the Pāli Canon as the 
highest authoritative source of the Buddha’s teachings. Furthermore, the Mahāyāna sūtras that 
contain economic teachings essentially mirror the general economic principles outlined in the 
Pāli Canon. Many of the Buddha’s sermons to his followers in the Pāli Canon respond to 
economic issues with teachings ranging from general approaches to poverty and wealth, to 
instructions for rulers to promote economic welfare broadly in society, to business advice for 
householders.   
Following the Brāhmaṇic approach, Buddhist teachings do not condemn wealth; in the Esukāri 
Sutta, for example, the Buddha taught, “I do not say that one is better because one is of great 
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wealth, nor do I say that one is worse because one is of great wealth.”207 Presumably, for the 
same reasons that the Buddha rejected the notion that the caste one is born into can make one 
noble, he also held that one’s wealth or poverty does not make one noble or ignoble. Therefore, 
to some degree, wealth and poverty are irrelevant to such concerns; what matters is how one 
behaves. Condemnation is reserved for attachment to wealth and for the misuse of it that results 
therefrom; praise is reserved for those who are generous and virtuous. We shall see in the 
following chapter on poverty, that material deprivation itself is condemned primarily on the 
grounds that it is a source of suffering and an obstacle to enlightenment for individuals. The laity 
is encouraged to accumulate wealth in a proper manner, which is to say in accordance with 
Buddhist principles, the most notable of which is Right Livelihood. The teachings on non-self 
(anattā), impermanence (anicca), the general unsatisfactoriness (dukkha) of existence, and 
interdependent co-arising (paţicca-samuppāda), which guide Buddhist thought and social ethics 
more broadly also establish the framework for economic ethics. In this way, individuals are part 
of a complex web of relationships, each related to and dependent upon other individuals, society 
collectively, and even nature; applied to the economic realm, Buddhist morality also demands 
that as economic agents individuals seek to relieve the suffering that they and others experience 
through economic activities.   
The Buddha further praises those who have a propensity for increasing their wealth and creating 
new wealth as long as they also are not blind to moral considerations that inevitably accompany 
it, and they can clearly distinguish between good and bad, praiseworthy and blameworthy, etc.
208
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As we have already seen, the Buddha taught the householder Anāthapiňđika, for example, that 
property ownership, wealth and freedom from debt are all basic sources of satisfaction and bliss 
in life.
209
 According to the Buddha, the bliss of wealth is to acquire wealth energetically and 
lawfully, but also to use it to do good deeds and for the enjoyment of oneself and others.
210
 
Wealth gained and used in this way is praised in the Pāli Canon. Condemnation is reserved for 
those who are idle or lazy, those who obtain their wealth in an unjust manner, those who waste 
their wealth, or those who are greedy and attached to it. In the Gāmaňisaņyutta, the Buddha 
gives advice to the laity on how to gain and use income. He praises those who obtain wealth 
lawfully, without violence, making themselves happy, and who share their wealth and use it for 
meritorious deeds without being attached to it or absorbed by it.
211
 The manner in which wealth 
is distributed has direct bearing on poverty relief. Clearly, generosity toward those suffering from 
a lack of material needs will rank high as a priority if wealth is said to be used to generate 
happiness for oneself and others. The wealth is to be shared and used for meritorious deeds, and 
not to be held onto with greed, longing, or infatuation. Lay followers are to remain cognizant of 
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3.2.1.1.  The Concept of Happiness (sukha) 
Just as the goal of Buddhist ethics or morality is to remove or reduce the suffering inflicted on 
oneself and others, economic activities are primarily intended to reduce or eliminate suffering 
(dukkha) and correspondingly to increase pleasure or happiness (sukha). This notion of 
happiness is fundamental to Buddhist economic thought and has found its way into popular 
discourse in mainstream economic analysis recently as well. As indicated earlier, the Buddhist 
concept of happiness refers to both sensual pleasures and the bliss accompanying higher 
meditative states. It is, therefore, understood in a comprehensive way which includes full human 
development. Apichai Puntasen notes the distinction commonly made in Buddhist thought 
between the forms of happiness: kāmasukha refers to the happiness or pleasures of a more 
sensual nature, while nirāmisasukha refers to the happiness resulting from virtuous actions such 
as those motivated by generosity and compassion, or through meditative practice, and nibbāna-
sukha is reserved for the more elevated forms of bliss that result from more advanced mental 
development and attainment of the higher realms of existence as sources of dukkha are fully 
removed.
213
 While all these forms of happiness are favorable, the Buddha indicated that sensual 
or temporal happiness is worth only a small fraction of the mental happiness arising from a 
wholesome and faultless moral life.
214
 Nevertheless, temporal pleasure or happiness, such as that 
which results from wealth, is still worthy of pursuit, and in fact the good lay followers are said to 
deserve them.
 
The Anaňa Sutta indicates four types of happiness related to wealth for the laity: 
happiness from having wealth or accumulation, happiness from the use of wealth or 
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consumption, happiness from debtlessness, and the bliss of blamelessness.
215
 The implication 
here is that the laity may rightfully pursue the happiness of owning property or material goods 
and of consuming them provided that happiness also entails the knowledge that they are free 
from debts and have obtained their wealth in a moral and legal way. A related passage from the 
Dīghajānu Sutta addresses the pursuit of the mundane and transcendent goals of happiness and 
well-being. An apt example of the balance between ‘this-worldly’ and ‘other-worldly’ teachings 
that are common in the Buddha’s message to the laity, here the Buddha teaches a group of lay 
followers the conditions that lead to well-being and happiness, along with material wealth, both 
in this life and in the life to come.
216
 Well-being and happiness in this life are said to be brought 
about through persistent and skillful efforts, vigilance in protecting wealth, good friendship, and 
balanced livelihood; while well-being and happiness in the life to come results from faith in the 
Buddha’s enlightenment, virtue in keeping the basic Buddhist precepts, generosity, and wisdom. 
3.2.1.2.  Right Livelihood 
The importance of Right Livelihood to Buddhist economics cannot be overstated as it entails the 
most central and clear teachings of an explicitly economic nature. It is widely considered the 
foundation of Buddhist economics due to its centrality to Buddhist thought and practice as one of 
the eight factors in the Noble Eightfold Path and due to the specific teachings on moral or ethical 
duties concerning the production and accumulation of wealth that it outlines, as well as notions 
of distribution of wealth related to it. Even more importantly, because it is part of the Eightfold 
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Path to enlightenment it forms a clear connection between the general soteriological goals of 
Buddhism, the cultivation of the mind, and the ethical and economic realms.
217
  
Right Livelihood has generally been understood primarily as delineating appropriate professions, 
in opposition to those sources of livelihood that conflict with the basic Buddhist precepts, such as 
producing or selling meats, alcohol, illegal drugs or poisons, or prostitution.
218
 These activities 
should be avoided as they are said to cause direct harm to other beings, and therefore, 
correspondingly, also to produce harmful or unfruitful karmic results for oneself.  
3.2.1.3.  Sufficiency 
In addition to these basic teachings on the proper accumulation of wealth entailed in the principle 
of Right Livelihood, the Pāli Canon also includes corollary teachings on the proper consumption 
and distribution of wealth. Wealth is said to be beneficial if it is sought ethically and without 
greed; if it is used for the good of family, friends, employees, the monastic saṅgha, and one’s 
community.
219
 One should not be stingy with wealth, but rather use it for the pleasure and benefit 
of oneself and others. Thus, it is ensured that one’s views on wealth are consistent with Buddhist 
ethics and the fundamental principles and factors of the Eightfold Path generally and that it is 
seen primarily as a means of alleviating suffering and establishing the appropriate conditions for 
the cultivation of the mind. 
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This concern for the proper level of consumption is referred to as sufficiency or what P.A. 
Payutto appropriately calls Right Consumption.
220
 The path that the Buddha taught is known as 
the Middle Way, which the Buddha exemplified by rejecting the extremes of physical denial 
typified by austerities or mortification on the one side and the indulgences in sensual pleasures 
on the other. Applying the Middle Way to the economic realm suggests that moderation in 
consumption is a part of the Buddhist teaching in addition to using wealth for the well-being of 
oneself and others.
221
 Right Consumption can be thought of as the minimum level of 
consumption necessary to promote optimal well-being and prevent the physical discomfort 
caused by the lack of the necessities for survival. Consumption beyond the level of necessity for 
optimal well-being no longer contributes significantly to further well-being, and, in fact, will 
likely detract from it. Furthermore, it results from attachment to or desire for sensual pleasures 
and is thus considered excessive. The obvious example here is the ideal of simplicity in the 
monastic saṅgha, which instructs that the Buddhist monks and nuns are only to own the most 
basic of personal material possessions required to sustain a comfortable level of existence 
without becoming entangled in attachments. So, wealth is intended primarily for producing 
physical well-being, social stability, and ultimately for the pursuit of nirvana, not merely to 
produce sensual pleasures; these goals are ultimately met by practicing the complementary 
principles of Right Livelihood and Right Consumption, which outline the Middle Way between 
extravagance and austerity and lead one away from attachment and the unwholesome states it 
brings. 
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3.2.1.4.  Economic Advice for Pursuing Prosperity 
In addition to the general principles of Right Livelihood and sufficiency that constitute an overall 
economic ethic, a number of passages in the Pāli Canon further specify particular economic 
principles for prosperity and for successful business endeavors and entrepreneurship. While the 
teachings on Right Livelihood can clearly be seen as fitting into the karmic framework as the 
means of generating sufficient fruitful karmic merit to secure a good future rebirth after this life, 
there are also passages that include clear principles indicating a path to prosperity in the 
accumulation of material wealth in the here and now.  
In addition to the general guidelines given concerning utilizing one’s wealth for the well-being of 
oneself and the larger community, the Buddha gave more specific guidelines about how  
business owners should save and invest much of their wealth.
222
 According to these guidelines, 
wealth should be divided into four parts; one part should go toward costs of living and duties 
toward others; two parts are to be used to expand business; and, the final part is to be saved. 
These guidelines are doubtless meant as an ideal model for the more wealthy lay followers as it 
implies a large disposable income which very few likely enjoyed; it is assuredly at least as 
unlikely that many could live on less than a quarter of their total income then as it is today. 
Nevertheless, it is significant that we find here such a clear indication of the Buddha advocating 
that followers not only save for unforeseen circumstances, but also that they additionally make 
large investments of their total income in the expansion of their business.   
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Additionally, the Buddha detailed the virtues of successful businessmen in the aforementioned 
Dīghajānu Sutta. These are four conditions leading to temporal happiness through carefully 
preserving and increasing prosperity.
223
 The first is having skill, efficiency, earnestness, and 
persistent effort in one’s profession. Thus, knowledge of a particular skill coupled with hard 
work is prerequisite for the creation of wealth.
 The second condition is the protection of one’s 
wealth through attentiveness, particularly in reference to guarding against natural disasters such 
as fires or floods, as well as man-made adversity such as theft, the imposition of excessive taxes, 
and greedy or malevolent heirs. Third, associating with good friends establishes security and 
stability to protect one’s wealth, but also involves encouragement in cultivating other Buddhist 
virtues and in keeping the precepts. Association with good friends is also a central teaching of 
the Sigālaka Sutta, which is one of the most important sources of social teachings for the laity.224 
The fourth condition indicated for increasing prosperity is balanced livelihood, which refers to 
striking a balance between income and expenses that is neither miserly nor extravagant; in short 
it is to exemplify the Middle Way through Right Livelihood and Right Consumption.  
There is also another complementary list in the Pāli Canon of conditions for increasing 
prosperity in the Sigālaka Sutta which is contrasted with a list of conditions that lead to the 
destruction of amassed income.
225
 The practical conditions that increase wealth include 
abstinence from debauchery, drunkenness and gambling, and, once again, having friendships 
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with good people. Conversely, the conditions that destroy one’s wealth are the exact opposites: 
debauchery, drunkenness, gambling, and association with evil-doers.   
3.2.1.5.  Labor Relations 
The importance of the complementary or reciprocal nature of relationships in Buddhist society 
was highlighted in the previous chapter. It should be mentioned here that among the six social 
relationships identified in the Sigālaka Sutta are guidelines for one relationship which has clear 
and direct bearing on labor economics and business management, namely the proper relationship 
between employers and employees.
226
 Employers are told to arrange work for their employees 
according to their individual abilities; to supply them with food and wages, or what today would 
likely be called a living wage; to look after them when they become ill, likely referring to 
ensuring that basic health care needs are met; to share special delicacies with them, which seems 
to advocate the sharing of goods that for the workers would be luxuries beyond their own 
purchasing power; and, finally, setting reasonable and fair working hours. In short, employers 
are not to overwork their employees, and are to treat them with due respect and dignity; 
employers have a duty to provide beyond their mere livelihood and comfort to include enjoyment 
in consumption as well.  
Correspondingly, employees are to reciprocate similar kindnesses toward their employers by 
working diligently, starting work before the employer and finishing after; by taking only what is 
given, or in other words dealing honestly and not stealing; by performing one’s duties well; and, 
by praising and upholding or protecting the employer’s good reputation.  
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Insofar as these teachings on maintaining proper relationships were intended to promote spiritual 
advancement, happiness, and wealth, the guidelines for employers and employees point to a 
general inter-relatedness between the good of the employer and the good of the employees. The 
well-being of the employees is identified as of chief importance among the other goals that 
would motivate one in business pursuits, such as generating profit or expanding reach. 
3.2.1.6.  Money-Lending and Interest 
An issue that often arises when discussing economics and religion is usury or the question of 
what should be considered an appropriate rate of interest to charge on loans to avoid the 
exploitation and oppression of those in need. Whereas some religions, most notably Islam, have 
held prohibitions against charging any level of interest, Buddhism seems to have found it 
acceptable, or at least tolerable, under certain circumstance since early times. Bailey and Mabbett 
indicate that this tolerance toward money-lending, debt, and interest may have been a part of the 
appeal for merchants and traders in early Buddhism who used these regularly as means to their 
increasing prosperity.
227
 In fact, loaning money—even sometimes at high interest—later became 
a practice within some monasteries and temples fairly early in Buddhist history, after these 
Buddhist monastic institutions developed and spread beyond India into China and Japan.
228
 In his 
history of interest, Sidney Homer notes that the first credit institutions in China seem to have 
been the Buddhist monastery pawnshops, as early as 200 C.E., which offered credit to the rich 
and poor alike against precious metals, produce, and various other goods which were stored in 
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 By contrast, Bailey and Mabbett note that Brāhmaṇical texts describe interest as 
polluting, and go even further in prescribing that money-lenders or usurers should be avoided. In 
early Buddhist texts, while debt is generally portrayed in a negative light as a burden and source 
of stress and suffering, and debtlessness is often praised, there is also an indication that taking 
out loans for business purposes may be a wise investment. The Sāmaññaphala Sutta notes: 
Just as a man who had taken a loan to develop his business, and whose business had 
prospered, might pay off his old debts, and with what was left over could support a wife, 
might think: "Before this I developed my business by borrowing, but now it has 
prospered...", and he would rejoice and be glad about that. 
230
  
It would seem that taking on the burden of debts as an investment in one’s business is here 
portrayed as not only acceptable but even wise. The practice of money-lending is not condemned 
in Buddhist texts, rather potential borrowers are instead advised to consider the inherent costs of 
indebtedness and avoid the burdens of debt, especially excessive debt.
231
 Freedom from debt is 
described as a source of mental peace, relief, and happiness in life.
232
 But, this does not convey 
the full weight of the Buddhist attitude towards the repayment of debts, which is so serious that it 
is a requirement of ordination in the monastic saṅgha.233 In other words, in order to take the 
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important step on the path to enlightenment of entering the monastic saṅgha, one must first have 
faithfully repaid one’s debts, or at the least have a plan in place to do so upon entering.234  
3.2.2.  Lay and Monastic Economic Ethics 
Buddhist economic ethics apply to both the laity and the monastic saṅgha, although there is a 
distinction made in how they apply. While the lay and monastic economic ethics are both 
oriented toward enlightenment through common principles of nonattachment to wealth, giving, 
and the avoidance of greed, there are some important differences between them and among 
different schools of Buddhism. The principles outlined in the Pāli Canon referred to above relate 
primarily to the behavior of the laity in the economic realm as the monastic saṅgha in early 
Buddhism was typically required to avoid work and to live largely without personal possessions, 
but instead to rely mainly on the generous donations from the laity for support—or at least this 
was the case with the early Śravakayāna schools in India, which included Theravāda Buddhism. 
However, this changed for many Mahāyāna saṅghas as Buddhism developed and spread to new 
regions, particularly China and Japan. Gregory Ornatowski describes the development of these 
variations as Buddhism spread to new regions.
235
 According to Ornatowski, the absolute 
distinction between nirvana and saņsāra eventually dissolved as the Mahāyāna doctrine of 
emptiness evolved, and the value of charitable activities within the realm of saņsāra also 
increased accordingly and became more central to the bodhisattva ideal.
236
 While, as we have 
seen, compassionate action was always a part of the path taught by the Buddha, it took on more 
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of a central focus in the teachings of the bodhisattva path; a supreme example of compassion for 
the suffering of others is said to be in becoming enlightened and yet choosing to remain in this 
world of saņsāra in order to more effectively end the suffering of all other sentient beings. As 
altering one’s perceptions of nirvana and saņsāra to fully realize the teaching of emptiness 
became a chief Mahāyāna effort, economic activities that had customarily been discouraged or 
prohibited among the saṅgha also ultimately became more permissible.237  
This altered perspective on the broader acceptance of worldly activities is often noted in the 
famous collection of Chan Buddhist ox herder images. The images prominently depict the stages 
along the way of the pursuit of enlightenment, and conclude with the enlightened bodhisattva 
figure returning from the disciplined stages of practice and the transcendence that follows in the 
advanced stages to the busy marketplace and giving of his abundance to the needy.
238
  





Figure 2: Entering the Marketplace with Open Hands.
 239
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This represents a clear divergence from the classic Śravakayāna images of nirvana as fully 
distinct from saņsāra, and also of the more common portrayal of monks as the recipients of the 
donations from the lay followers. 
As the saṅgha became well established after the time of the Buddha, the Buddhist monasteries in 
India and China became more involved in the activities of the community, even lending money 
and goods to the laity and charging interest.
240
 Ornatowski summarizes the innovation that took 
place in China as the monastic centers began to engage in “various commercial activities … such 
as grain milling, oil seed pressing, money lending, pawnshops, loans of grain to peasants (with 
interest), mutual financing associations, hotels and hostelries, and rental of temple lands to 
farmers in exchange for some percentage of the crop.”241 Whereas early on in Buddhist history, 
monks in India and China were generally forbidden manual labor, Chan or Zen Buddhism in 
China and Japan for the most part came to accept monastic labor. Consequently, manual labor 
became for them a religious act that promoted social harmony as monks primarily provided for 
themselves through their own labor.
242
 Thus, although there remains a consistency in the core 
principles of Right Livelihood, sufficiency, simplicity, and the inter-relatedness and 
interdependence of economic agents, we see a variety of innovations and the transformation of 
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early Buddhist economic ethics as Buddhism further developed and spread to new regions where 
full enlightenment came to be seen as fundamentally compatible with the mundane requirements 
of daily life within the world. 
3.3.  Developing a Buddhist Economics 
Having dealt with the debate concerning Buddhist social ethics, and an outline of the key 
principles related to economic matters, I will now address the pursuit of a Buddhist economic 
theory as it has developed historically. The pursuit of an economic theory based on Buddhist 
teachings in scholarship only began about four decades ago, near the time that Buddhist ethics 
emerged as a distinct field of study in academia. From the beginning, much of Buddhist 
economics has largely developed as a critique of the dominant economic models and an attempt 
to develop an alternative to them that is based on the economic principles outlined in 
authoritative Buddhist texts. Juliana Essen notes that at a superficial level the Buddhist economic 
and the dominant Western economic models share common ground, both being fundamentally 
based on individual rational choices toward material wellbeing, but many conflicting differences 
also emerge upon closer examination of economic objectives, productive activities or work, and 
attitudes toward how to consume and disperse wealth.
243
 I will outline here the approaches to 
Buddhist economics as represented by A.T. Ariyaratne, E.F. Schumacher, P.A. Payutto, Priyanut 
Piboolsravut, Apichai Puntasen, and the Santi Asoka group. 
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3.3.1.  A.T. Ariyaratne and Sarvōdaya Śramadāna 
While discussions of Buddhist economics typically begin with E.F. Schumacher’s ground-
breaking introduction to Buddhist economics, arguably, Dr. A.T. Ariyaratne and Sarvōdaya 
Śramadāna is where this discussion of the development of a Buddhist economics should begin. It 
was after all founded in 1958, meaning it predates the other approaches to Buddhist economics 
that will be presented here. And, it is in many ways the ideal example of the sort of development 
movement promoted in Buddhist economics. I will give a brief outline of Sarvōdaya Śramadāna 
here as an introduction to the economic principles they exemplify and, in chapter 5, I will return 
to the topic of Sarvōdaya’s poverty relief efforts. 
Working in more than 15,000 villages throughout Sri Lanka, Sarvōdaya Śramadāna is a grass-
roots movement that focuses on self-help through community-led development projects based on 
what are considered traditional spiritual and social values.
244
 The name Sarvōdaya Śramadāna 
means the 'sharing effort for the enlightenment of all' movement referring to the comprehensive 
combined personal and community development goals. In 1958, Dr. A. T. Ariyaratne began 
taking his High School students to live and work in a secluded poor village and began a project 
that would eventually spread across Sri Lanka to become Sri Lanka’s largest non-governmental 
organization.
245
 The goal of Sarvōdaya Śramadāna is to promote economic development in 
impoverished villages by relying on traditional spiritual and social values to involve all segments 
of a community in identifying, and actively working to address the needs of the village.
246
 While 
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Sarvōdaya Śramadāna is based on Buddhist principles, it is not strictly a Buddhist organization 
and also takes some of its inspiration from Gandhian principles. Sarvōdaya Śramadāna 
accomplishes its goals by helping communities undertake the projects they deem needed in their 
own community, such as building roads, wells and canals, operating pre-school education, 
orphanages, and so forth.
247
 Projects begin in each community as a volunteer enters the 
community and organizes regular meetings with community members to strengthen relationships 
and set goals about improvement projects that the members of the community feel are needed. 
The projects continue in the community beyond the development of the individuals in the 
community into outreach and volunteerism into neighboring communities. Thus the Sarvōdaya 
approach is a participatory self-help approach that looks beyond the singular goal of increasing 
individual income to a far more comprehensive goal of transforming individuals and broader 
society into more ideal relationships and states that no longer succumb to the processes and 
conditions that lead to impoverishment and suffering. 
Ariyaratne identifies Buddhist principles as the source of the Sarvōdaya approach, saying, “The 
philosophy that influenced us most in evolving our Sarvōdaya concept in Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 
was Lord Buddha’s teaching.”248 He called for a revolution to build “a society whose value 
system is based on Truth, Non-violence, and Self-denial … a no-poverty, no-affluence 
society.”249 But, Sarvōdaya’s vision for societal transformation is also based on Gandhian 
economic principles like a strong work ethic and local means of production that are not as clearly 
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grounded in Buddhist teachings. This will be a problem that arises with E.F. Schumacher’s 
description of Buddhist economics, which will be detailed below, but it is less of a problem for 
Ariyaratne because he did not claim to represent a Buddhist economics; indeed, the term does 
not seem to have been coined until several years after Sarvōdaya was founded. In fact, 
Ariyaratne openly attempted to make his model open to all other religions as well as to 




Nevertheless, Sarvōdaya has been criticized for its claims of basing its development organization 
on Buddhist principles and its efforts to re-entrench traditional values in society. Most notably, 
Richard Gombrich and Gananath Obeyesekere have argued that Sarvōdaya essentially 
transforms the difficult ‘other-worldly’ demands of the Buddhist path into oversimplified ‘this-
worldly’ activities; additionally, Ariyaratne’s vision of the traditional culture in Sri Lanka’s past 
is an idealized one that Gombrich and Obeyesekere argue has no grounding in history, but 
instead is a means of promoting bourgeois values from the middle- and upper-class leaders 
among the lower-classes.
251
 Peter Harvey responds to these criticisms, arguing that “Sarvōdaya 
activity exists alongside an increase in ‘demanding’ meditative activity in Sri Lanka by both 
monks and laity, and Sarvōdaya has stimulated other types of demanding activity in many who 
were unlikely to have engaged in meditation (other than chanting).”252 Moreover, Harvey 
responds, “while Ariyaratne’s vision is certainly idealistic, he clearly recognizes the vices of 
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traditional village life and seeks to rectify these by drawing on neglected strengths that he, 
rightly or wrongly, sees as implicit in Sri Lankan village life. His glowing picture of certain 
ancient Sinhalese civilizations …certainly contains exaggerations, and is thus best treated as an 
inspiring vision, yet his movement certainly seems to be producing good results.”253 It is hard to 
argue that the Sarvōdaya community development projects have not been helpful to many Sri 
Lankans, whether or not the idealized goals and inspirational models are grounded in historic 
facts. There is certainly nothing un-Buddhist about using metaphors and even fictional narratives 
to inspire benevolent and virtuous activity; this is, in fact, not an inaccurate way to describe one 
of the Buddha’s own common teaching methods. 
Much of Ariyaratne’s critiques of economic models have been echoed in the later writers that 
will be covered immediately below. In accordance with the Buddhist notion of attachment 
leading to suffering, he notes that the key deficiency in Western economic models is that they 
depend on the creation of desire, while Sarvōdaya’s explicit goal entails the elimination of 
craving or unskilfull forms of desire and suffering.
254
 In Ariyaratne’s view, in the free-market 
open economy the religious and spiritual heritage of Sri Lankan societies had been brushed 
away, opening space for the flourishing and inundation for competitive and possessive 
instincts.
255
 This explains the impetus for a return to an idealistic state in which cultural values 
encouraged a general sociality and collective concern for others. Sarvōdaya criticizes both 
capitalism and socialism for taking too narrow a focus concerning purely material economic 
activity; the fault with capitalism being the tendency toward consumerism, and the fault of 
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socialism being that it takes a rigid top-down approach rather than a more participatory grass-
roots approach.
256
 Sarvōdaya takes a more comprehensive and multidimensional view on 
development, considering several basic needs for full human welfare and fulﬁllment.257 Basic 
income or consumption levels are not considered to accurately reflect the whole of human 
experience or well-being, which also must necessarily include cultivating virtuous character and 
healthy social relationships. 
Sarvōdaya stands as an ideal example of Buddhist economics in practice. While many of 
Ariyaratne’s ideas predate the Buddhist economics movement, the development of Buddhist 
economics echoes many of the points he made in his local undertaking to transform Sri Lankan 
society. It exemplifies community self-help projects that are based on, and seek to re-entrench 
cultural and religious values as inspiration toward improvement efforts. Development Ethicist, 
Denis Goulet, summarized the lesson he learned from his time studying Sarvōdaya: 
The main lesson a development ethicist learns from Sarvodaya is that a cultural 
community can choose to create a new paradigm of development for itself by looking to 
its past traditions and finding therein the dynamic forces for producing social change. It 
can create modem institutions and behavior on its own terms and not as a passive, 
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In many ways, Sarvōdaya was an early precursor to many growing movements in the broad field 
of development economics, such as the movements toward more comprehensive and 
multidimensional approaches to well-being as well as toward participatory approaches to 
economic development. It also represents a first step in modern times toward not only offering a 
critique of the effects on local communities of dominant economic systems, but also in re-
embedding Buddhist principles in the market place on a large scale. 
3.3.2.  Santi Asoke 
Santi Asoke is a contemporary communal reform movement in Thailand that stands as an 
interesting example of a Buddhist group that places a heightened focus on economic activities 
and the ethics that relate to them. Santi Asoke diverges from mainstream Thai Buddhism on 
several points: rejecting worship using Buddha images, following strict vegetarian diets, and 
emphasizing daily work as a form of meditation.
259
 The group emerged in the 1970’s when 
Samana Bodhirak denounced the Thai Saṅgha for immoral laxity and failing to sufficiently 
address the moral problems of Thai society. He started his own group with the goal of reviving 
Buddhism in Thailand.
260
 Santi Asoke has approximately 10,000 members in nine communities 
in Thailand, with residents who follow the slogan, “Consume Little, Work Hard, and Give the 
Rest to Society.”261 Like Sarvōdaya Śramadāna, Santi Asoke was also influenced by the 
Gandhian ideals of self-sufficiency and simple living and endeavors to cause a spiritual 
transformation in Thai society to counter what it sees as rampant materialism. Santi Asoke 
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members run a wide variety of nonprofit and for-profit businesses for the benefit of society- such 
as providing free or cheap food, services, and education to the broader community.  
A reduction in personal consumption is connected in Santi Asoke to social improvement as well 
as personal merit. By consuming less, they have more to give back to society, and do so in the 
hope of generating merit. Merit plays a central role in the movement as much of their practice 
has to do with living moral and simple lives as a means to generate merit. Formal meditative 
practices are not emphasized in Santi Asoke, so morality and merit take the highest level of 
concern. Mackenzie notes that according to Bodhirak, this belief in meritism as the path 
encourages people to be good, to do good and to help others, in doing so the people gain more 
merit. This is said to lead to a state of contentment and non-attachment to material wealth, a state 
of generosity, and a concern for the environment. This contented state is often directly contrasted 
with capitalism, which is perceived as tending toward leading people to attachment to riches, 
selfishness, and competitiveness as well as to polluting the environment.
262
 These views lead 
Harvey to refer to Santi Asoke as anti-Capitalist and anti-consumerist in nature. Their criticisms 
of Capitalism largely refer to the inherent greed, consumption, competition and exploitation that 
becomes prevalent as a result of Capitalism.
263
  
Departing from the more mainstream Buddhist view that personal possessions are not seen as 
presenting problems among the lay-followers, Santi Asoke holds that a simple and austere 
lifestyle is required for the lay-followers just as it is for monastics.
264
 This contentment and 
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simplicity is seen as the antithesis of Capitalism and as a spiritual purification process. By 
actively engaging in community improvement programs, Santi Asoke members feel they are 
generating the karmic merit that leads to greater happiness and a state of nirvana in this life; 
nirvana is seen in more mundane terms as a state of mind that is described as a lack of self-
centeredness.
265
 The generation of karmic merit as a path toward the attainment of a ‘this-
worldly’ nirvana provides a strong motivation to teach their message to others, to give up time, 
energy and resources to the improvement of society.  
Santi Asoke and Sarvōdaya both represent Buddhist community movements that place economic 
concerns, a focus on Buddhism in the market place, at the forefront of practice. While Sarvōdaya 
is more representative of a Buddhist non-governmental community development program, Santi 
Asoke falls more in the category of a new religious movement. Both are instructive of the role 
that Buddhism can play in regards to applying Buddhist principles to the market place, in 
addition to the varying perceptions of the centrality of economics in Buddhist thought and 
practice that we find in the Buddhist tradition. 
3.3.3.  E.F. Schumacher 
In 1973, E. F. Schumacher’s Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered was 
published. Small Is Beautiful presents a humanistic critique and approach to economics, which 
included a chapter on Buddhist economics that ignited the initial interest in Buddhist economics 
among many Western scholars. Schumacher made a few initial points in his argument for 
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Buddhist economics that were groundbreaking. A key point made by Schumacher that was rare 
at the time is that economic systems are not based on purely objective and empirically verifiable 
principles, but are in fact based on values and presuppositions that are in a sense culturally 
contingent; it may be wrong-headed, therefore, from the outset to try to base all economic 
policies and emerging systems in the developing world on modern Western economic thought, 
rather than on the values that are already part of a culture.
266
  
The second key point is that Right Livelihood is central to the Buddhist path and the foundation 
of Buddhist economic ethics. “If there is such a thing as Right Livelihood in the Noble Eightfold 
path,” Schumacher reasoned, “there must be something like Buddhist economics”.267 
Schumacher then outlined what he envisioned as a Buddhist approach to economics, which 
attempts to ground economic analysis in humanistic values, reclaiming the value of labor, and to 
shift the focus toward small and local production. A central point in Schumacher’s approach is 
the importance of human needs beyond those which fall merely into the realm of material needs; 
this serves as the basis for his critique of the modern Western economic systems. To counter 
what he sees as the destructive tendencies of the modern economic system, Schumacher proposes 
a notion of Buddhist economics, one based on the concept of Right Livelihood in particular, 
which he sees as a superior alternative for providing for human needs. “It is a question of finding 
the right path of development,” said Schumacher, “the Middle Way between materialist 
heedlessness and traditionalist immobility, in short, of finding Right Livelihood.”268 Schumacher 
                                                             
266
  Schumacher, 1973: 56. 
267
  Ibid. 
268
  Schumacher, 1973: 58.  
 M o n s o n  P a g e  | 121 
 
provides an early economic model based on the notions of the Middle Way and Right 
Livelihood—at least in the forms that Schumacher understood them. 
Schumacher’s ideal economic model includes references to some key Buddhist teachings on 
economic activities, noting that wealth is not in itself an obstacle to liberation, but rather it is 
craving for pleasurable things and attachment to them that prevents ultimate liberation. In 
Schumacher’s analysis, the main issue in Buddhist economics is “how to gain given ends 
through the minimum means,” thus his title Small is Beautiful.269 He contends that the issue is 
largely one of consumption, obtaining the maximum well-being with the minimum of 
consumption. This also applies to production and labor as well; labor is reconceived as an 
activity that can provide meaning, and simple technologies that provide full employment and 
encourage a work ethic are considered the favorable means of production over more complex 
technology that eliminates the need for manual labor and also reduces the need for laborers. This 
Schumacher contrasts with modern Western economics which seeks primarily to maximize 
consumption using the optimal production. Also, in Schumacher’s view, because of the high 
value placed on self-sufficiency in Buddhism, local communities acting in accordance with 
Buddhist economic principles would strive to reduce their dependence on imports as much as 
possible, striving instead for full employment and maintain means of production and productive 
activity within their own community. 
In contradistinction to the Weberian approach to Buddhism and economy, Schumacher clearly 
recognized, and drew the initial attention among mainstream economists, to the existence of 
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explicit economic teachings in the Buddhist tradition and their potential for positive 
contributions to the broader field of economics. However, much of the ideal economic system he 
proposed is based more on his humanist ideal that “small is beautiful” than it does in Buddhist 
teachings. Rather than a wholly Buddhist approach to economy, what we find in Schumacher’s 
analysis is more of an exposition on how Buddhism can be read in light of a humanistic approach 
to economy.  
Thomas Weber argues that Schumacher’s approach is based more on Gandhian principles of 
local production, consumption, and self-sufficiency than on Buddhist principles.
270
 Though they 
may be beneficial in countering the perceived deficiencies with modern Western economics, 
these principles are not clearly founded in Buddhist scripture. While I have indicated, for 
example, that a concern over consumption and sufficiency is an important aspect of Buddhist 
economic ethics, it is not clear why Buddhist teachings should be considered opposed to trade, 
particularly when many of the Buddha’s early followers were themselves merchants and traders. 
Similarly, in reviewing Schumacher’s work, Stephen Batchelor points out that while Schumacher 
believed firmly in the need to rediscover spiritual values in economics, rather than basing this 
rediscovery primarily on Buddhist concepts, he based it more on Judeo-Christian values.
271
 
Batchelor notes that Schumacher’s larger framework is founded on a correspondence theory of 
truth developed by Aristotle and Aquinas, which understands truth as a correspondence between 
a thing to be known and the knower. This is based on a dualistic notion in which the mind is 
                                                             
270
  Weber, 1999: 349- 361; 2004: 218-231.  
271
  Batchelor, 1990: 178. 
 M o n s o n  P a g e  | 123 
 
fundamentally distinct from the natural world.
272
 Batchelor’s basic critique is that a Buddhist 
economics must be based on the non-dualistic principle of emptiness or Suññatā (Sanskrit: 
Śūnyatā): 
Buddhist economics has to start from the premise of non-duality—recognizing that at 
root the distinction between agent, act, and object is merely conceptual. It is nothing but a 
grammatical convenience that has been tragically mistaken to represent three intrinsically 
separate entities or substances. In fact there are no things apart from the agents that act 
upon them, and no agents apart from the things upon which they act…. The truth upon 
which Buddhist economics would have to be based is not of correspondence, but of 
emptiness (sunyata). Prior to any correspondence, things and minds are grounded in the 
truth that they are empty of being separate, independent substances.  
But, Schumacher was quite candid about this and acknowledges that his approach to Buddhist 
economics is intended to contrast a set of spiritual assumptions with the more materialist 
assumptions of the dominant economic systems. His choice to use Buddhism as the source of 
certain spiritual assumptions was, as he said “‘purely incidental; the teaching of Christianity, 
Islam or Judaism could have been used just as well as any other of the great Eastern 
traditions.”273  
Schumacher began the conversation about Buddhist economics among Western scholars and 
made some important initial steps toward developing a Buddhist economics. He took the first big 
step in arguing for the propriety of developing economic models as much as possible, or as much 
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as is effective in achieving desired goals, within the framework of established local values. He 
also pointed out key Buddhist principles that apply to economic analysis, including the centrality 
of economic ethics to the Buddhist path. While Schumacher’s model is not a wholly Buddhist 
one, it did have a major influence on later thinkers and the development of a Buddhist 
economics.  
More recently, approaches to Buddhist economics have come from within the Theravāda 
Buddhist tradition among Buddhist monk and lay scholars. I will outline here some of the major 
scholarly contributions to the emergence of a Buddhist economics since Schumacher, namely 
Payutto Bhikkhu, Priyanut Piboolsravut, and Apachai Puntasen.  
3.3.4.  Payutto Bhikkhu 
Payutto Bhikkhu is a well-known and influential Theravādin monk scholar whose book Buddhist 
Economics: A Middle Way for the Market Place was a widely read exposition of how Buddhist 
principles apply in the economic realm.
274
 While Payutto’s Buddhist Economics was not widely 
read and influential among mainstream economists like Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful, it has 
been extremely influential among other writers on Buddhist economics. Payutto’s status as a 
monk-scholar within the Theravada Buddhist countries has given his book some measure of 
authority and has made it a foundational work that set the course for much of the later writings 
on the subject. A main concern for Payutto is the notion of objectivity in in economic analysis. In 
his view, much like Schumacher’s view, economics is a field based on human activity and 
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human values and should therefore be considered also fundamentally to be a matter of ethics. 
Payutto’s writings on Buddhist economics take on three main issues: first is the role of 
economics in Buddhist teachings; second, the limitations of contemporary economic theory; and 
third, the characteristics of a Buddhist economics.
275
  
In his approach to contemporary economic theory, Piboolsravut identifies four main limitations 
to modern or neoclassical economics in Payutto’s approach.276 The first of the limitations he 
calls the specialization of knowledge, by which he means the tendency to isolate economic 
activity and treat it separately from all other areas of human activity.
277
 Economics, he argues, 
should not be dissected from other branches of knowledge and experience, if we want an 
accurate perspective on human activity. If economic models are intended to accurately reflect, let 
alone in any way predict, human behavior, then they must include the full range of the activities 
and dimensions that make up human life. Payutto seems to have an interdisciplinary approach to 
economics here that will combine the learning from other fields that closely study human 
activities and behaviors, perhaps such as psychology, sociology, anthropology and even religion. 
Such an interdisciplinary approach would account for the inter-relatedness among different 
dimensions of human life, such as business and economy, family life, mental health and well-
being, social activity, and so on.  
The second limit he identifies is an issue of making value judgments, meaning that economics 
should not be treated as an objective and value-free field of study, but instead the significant 
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influence that ethics and value judgments have in the field should be recognized and accounted 
for.
278
 While the field of economics has developed scientific and mathematical forms of inquiry 
that constitute the method of economic analysis, there is nevertheless a level of economic 
thought that has to do with prioritizing goods. This act of electing and prioritizing goods requires 
relatively subjective value judgments. Notions like well-being or happiness, and justice and 
equality, while virtually universally held, are nonetheless also notoriously difficult to clearly 
define and even more difficult to bring about through policy. What constitutes human well-being 
and how can it be brought about at a societal level? Does justice require some level of equality of 
goods and services for all or only of opportunity for all to attain them, for example? Should the 
focus of social policy be on improving the circumstances of the least well-off in society or of the 
majority? When dealing with normative issues, the ‘oughts’ of social and economic policy, 
moral values and ethical judgments are necessary. For Payutto, ignoring the deep-seated value 
judgments that lay beneath the veneer of objectivity in economic thought puts a serious 
limitation on accurately reflecting human activity. 
The third limitation that Payutto notes is that economics should not be treated as a scientific 
inquiry in search of abstract knowledge. Its goal is not only to formulate ways of accounting for 
or predicting human activity and behavior or even merely to identify the problems facing 
humanity, but also to provide some indication of possible solutions; and again, this endeavor 
should require an interdisciplinary approach. Fourth, Payutto notes, economics lacks clarity 
concerning human nature. In his view, in regard to the notion of demand, modern economics is 
preoccupied with addressing quantity instead of quality. In other words, modern economics 
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seems more concerned with satiating an increasing desire for supply rather than questioning the 
value or morality of those desires. He notes that, while Buddhism and modern economics both 
agree that humankind has virtually unlimited wants or desires, Buddhism makes a distinction 
here between blind craving, called taṇhā, and a desire for true well-being, called chanda.279 
Because modern economics too narrowly defines economic activities and misperceives human 
nature and the nature of desire, Payutto contends, there is a need for Buddhist economics.  
He deals with the first issue by addressing the role of wealth in the Buddhist tradition. As I have 
indicated above, possessing wealth is neither a good nor an evil from a Buddhist perspective. 
How one possesses wealth, meaning whether one is attached to the wealth, stingy with the 
wealth, or obtains it through immoral means, is the moral issue at hand. Payutto notes that 
having great wealth and using it ethically is often highly praised.
280
 
Payutto also outlined some key characteristics of a Buddhist economics that influenced virtually 
all other writers on the topic after him. He contends that a peaceful and stable society and an 
understanding of Dhamma are prerequisites for an ideal Buddhist economic system to exist in 
practice. Such a system, according to Payutto, would ensure that economic activities promote 
and enable people to be creative, fulfill their potential, and strive to be good and noble.
281
 
Consumption and wealth are economic tools, means to achieve the end of well-being and a good 
life in accordance with the Buddhist principles outlined above; consumption and wealth are not 
ends in themselves and the ends that are achieved through consumption and wealth should be of 
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highest concern. Economic principles in society are related to three interconnected factors: 
humans, nature, and society.
282
 These factors are interdependent and influence one another. The 
well-being of each factor is necessary for the well-being of the others and, conversely, what is 
detrimental to one will inevitably detract from the others to some degree as well. This relates 
well to his social theory outlined in the previous chapter. Payutto further acknowledges two main 
principles of Buddhist economics, the Middle Way, in which he includes the principle of 
moderation in consumption, and the non-harm principle which relates to Right Livelihood; in 




Payutto identifies ignorance as the source of dukkha which manifests itself in various social 
problems. Lacking cultivated wisdom, people are enslaved by their cravings and limited in their 
experiences and their humanity. This further leads to a cycle of craving and ignorance in which 
the amassing of material wealth in attempts to satisfy selfish craving and desires in turn 
entrenches one deeper and deeper in ignorance. Alternatively, wisdom entails an understanding 
of the true nature of humans and reality which transforms these base cravings into motivation for 
the well-being of oneself and others. This, according to Payutto, allows economic activities to 
generate real value, as opposed to the artificial value, or merely the appearance of value, 
produced by craving, delusion, and the defilements.
284
 Payutto clearly utilizes the Buddhist 
principle of interdependent co-arising in both his social theory and approach to Buddhist 
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economics. His identification of ignorance as the source of craving and suffering is fully in line 
with the general Buddhist world-view I outlined above. His perceptive application of key notions 
in Buddhist thought to the economic realm had a significant impact on the development of 
Buddhist economics and the issues he identified remain central to Buddhist critiques of economy 
today.  
3.3.5.  Priyanut Piboolsravut 
Priyanut Piboolsravut also made important contributions to the development of a Buddhist 
economics through An Outline of Buddhist Economics.
285
 While her general approach bears 
much in common with Payutto’s, she is exceptionally well-versed in the field of economics and 
includes a high level of economic analysis that was unprecedented. Piboolsravut developed a 
Buddhist economic theory composed of two parts—a positive theory and a normative theory.286 
The positive theory is intended to demonstrate how things are, providing a framework for 
analyzing phenomena, while the normative theory is intended to indicate how things should be 
ideally.  
She bases her positive theory on the three marks of existence that in Buddhist thought are said to 
be the fundamental nature of all phenomena in the saņsāric realm—unsatisfactoriness (dukkha), 
impermanence (anicca), and non-self (anattā). According to Piboolsravut’s analysis, in 
economic activities, individuals seek to reduce their own dukkha while also trying not to inflict 
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 This approach is clearly grounded in Buddhist thought and also highlights 
the ethical nature of economic activities. This positive theory is limited by the notion of avijjā, or 
ignorance; when individuals are a part of an interconnected whole, but lack perfect knowledge, 
meaning that they are unaware of certain conditions that effect other conditions or the whole, the 
need arises for a normative theory to establish peace and stability in the system.  
Piboolsravut’s theory includes complementary normative principles based on Buddhist 
teachings, such as the universal moral law of karma, and the cultivating of the virtues of giving 
(dāna), morality (sīla), and meditation (bhāvanā). Practicing these principles constitutes moral 
behavior, such as generosity and mental concentration, which allow for the development of 
wisdom (paññā) to in turn counter the ignorance that results in dukkha. Piboolsravut stands out 
in the development of Buddhist economics because she works in the field of economics and 
finance, providing her a specialized knowledge of the analytical tools of the field in addition to 
her understanding of the Buddhist doctrines that apply. The resulting economic analysis is far 
more in-depth and complex theory and system than previous attempts. 
3.3.6.  Apichai Puntasen 
Apichai Puntasen is a Professor and Dean of Management Science, and author of Buddhist 
Economics: Evolution, Theories and Its Application to Various Economic Subjects, a 
comprehensive introduction to Buddhist economics.
288
 Many works on Buddhist economics in 
the past, prior to Piboolsravut and Puntasen, tended to focus on discovering relevant Buddhist 
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doctrines without clearly identifying their full relationship to specific economic principles, or on 
the other hand, they focused heavily on the economic analysis from a Western perspective with a 
more cursory treatment of the related Buddhist principles.
289
 Much like Piboolsravut, Puntasen 
endeavors to synthesize the previous research and construct Buddhist economic principles on par 
with the systematic approaches of mainstream economics, and suggests possible contributions 
that Buddhist economic analysis can make to contemporary economic issues and discussions.  
In a sense, Puntasen stands as the synthesis of decades of influential scholars and monks writing 
on Buddhist economics. Proponents of Buddhist economics from Ariyaratne and Schumacher 
tended to see the prevailing modern Western economic models as fundamentally deficient, 
typically pointing to destructive outcomes resulting from the narrow understandings of human 
nature that form their foundation and are subject to, and promote, unskillful or unwholesome 
states as a result. Apichai Puntasen also takes this course in his discussion of the emergence of 
Buddhist economics and expresses it more clearly and comprehensively: 
As one looks at the history of the development of economic thought in the West, one sees 
that the part that is missing is an adequate model of the reality of human behavior. The 
use of mainstream economics’ current model of homo economicus … as a rational, 
perfectly informed and self-interested agent who desires wealth, avoids unnecessary 
labor, and has the ability to make judgments toward those ends, only generates alienation 
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and much harm for human beings. The use of the Buddhist Economic model of man 
where, … each individual is part of the connected whole and each individual lacks 
perfect knowledge, allows Buddhist Economics the potential to be developed into a social 
science that can actually be used to serve humanity.
290
 
In short, in Puntasen’s view, the Western economic models are fundamentally deficient, 
primarily in their assumption that mankind is always driven by a self-interested greed in making 
decisions about attaining a superficial notion of well-being, decisions which are based on 
ignorant and faulty views of reality. Buddhist economics, on the other hand, stresses the 
interdependence and inter-connectedness of all beings which combats narrowly selfish desires; 
that the greed motive can be overcome; and, that a correct understanding of the true nature of 
reality is possible only as one progresses toward enlightenment by practicing the Eightfold Path. 
These inherent deficiencies in mainstream economics resulting from generally misguided 
assumptions about human nature and well-being are then to be countered by approaching 
economics from the perspective of a Buddhist understanding of human nature and of such 
comprehensive notions as suffering (dukkha), well-being (sukha), and the proper functioning of 
wealth within society (Right Livelihood).  
Puntasen indicates that what he calls mainstream economics refers to a variety of modern 
approaches to economics; ‘mainstream economics’ is useful to Puntasen and other writers on 
Buddhist economics because it is a broad enough term to include any or all Western models such 
as Smithian, Keynesian or Marxist economics broadly as well as Eastern or Thai models like 
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Thaksinomics, the commonalities among which are set up as the antithesis of Buddhist 
economics.
291
 Puntasen defines mainstream economics as: 
A subject related to economic activities with the goal of an individual achieving 
maximum utility under the condition of resource constraint and for society to reach 
maximum welfare under the same condition.
292
 
Puntasen contrasts this with Buddhist economics which he defines as: 
A subject related to economic activities with the goal for both individuals and society to 




Thus, in Puntasen’s view, Buddhist economics is intended to focus on eliminating suffering in 
society, as opposed to achieving maximum material welfare, as he sees is the goal of mainstream 
economics. While peace and tranquility in society might also easily be construed in Western 
economic analysis as necessary to maximum utility for individuals, Puntasen uses this point as a 
wedge to highlight the tendency in mainstream Western economics toward individual material 
concerns over social or even spiritual concerns. It is expected in his analysis that the elimination 
of suffering for individuals and society will be accomplished by basing the approach to economic 
analysis and policy on broader and more comprehensive Buddhist notions.
294
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In a similar caricature of mainstream models, Laszlo Zsolnai closely follows Puntasen in 
describing the key difference between Buddhist economics and Western economics as between 
maximizing demand by cultivating desires and minimizing suffering by simplifying and reducing 
desire and greed.
295




Figure 3: Modern Western Economics versus Buddhist Economics.
296 
While Puntasen and other proponents of Buddhist economics are correct in some of the 
criticisms, pitting Buddhist economics against Western economics as if they are wholly alien and 
incompatible is an unfortunate oversimplification of legitimate issues and concerns. As Zadek 
noted, neither Buddhism nor Western economics is a monolithic approach.
297
 Western 
economics has a long history covering more than two centuries of theorizing and debates which 
is presented as, and admittedly has some commonalities as, a historical tradition, and Buddhist 
economics also represents a history of different thinkers drawing on similar resources to 
formulate their own approaches to applying religious principles to an academic field that is at 
                                                             
295
  Zsolnai, 2007. 
296
  Zsolnai, 2007: 152. 
297
  Zadek, 1997. 
 M o n s o n  P a g e  | 135 
 
times wholly unrelated to the topics of the texts. Comparisons between the different models is 
helpful and can point out potential weaknesses or limitations that should be of legitimate 
concern, but it also runs the risk of oversimplifying the positions to make targets of them, which 
likely does more to hinder constructive discussions than clarify them. Such portrayals are helpful 
in highlighting more subtle distinctions for consideration, but also ignore the fact that critiques of 
Western economic assumptions and global Capitalism broadly have also been occurring from 
economists within the Western traditions.  
One need not look outside of Western mainstream economics to find criticisms of too narrow 
portrayals of human nature and activities in economic models.
298
 The identification of problems 
with the notion of Homo-Economicus or ‘economic man’, for example, which stands as a key 
point of criticism of dominant economic models is not unique to Buddhist economics. 
Rodriguez-Sickert, for example, by the same token identifies Homo Economicus as a prevalent 
approach to human behavior among economists today, and he also points out that it has serious 
limitations and weaknesses in its narrow scope.
299
 And, not all of these critiques are recent, some 
of these issues had been discussed by Western economists for many years. In his history of the 
development of the notion of happiness and well-being in the history of mainstream economics, 
Ian Steedman notes that Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics, which was first published in 
1890 and widely held as a foundational work in mainstream economics, contains nuanced 
discussions of the complexity of human motivations and the varying quality of desires, noting 
that rich and poor alike can find higher forms of happiness in such things as religion, character 
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development, and family than are found in mere material wealth.
300
 Interestingly, Steedman 
notes that Marshall refers directly to the ‘Buddhist doctrine’ that ‘real riches consist not in the 
abundance of goods but in the paucity of wants’, remarking that ‘the only direct effect of an 
increase in wants is to make people more miserable than before.’301 Moreover, many 
contemporary mainstream Western economists and business management scholars have also 
been looking to alternative models for re-embedding a moral or spiritual dimension that they 
perceive has been removed from mainstream economics; Buddhist economics has recently 
become one viable alternative among others
302
 There is more common ground there than the 
simple caricature of a greedy and materialistic model on the one hand and a social and spiritual 
model on the other portrays. Puntasen’s own analysis includes far more complexity and nuance 
in his comparisons with alternative Western models than the general caricatures would suggest.  
3.4.  Buddhist Economics and Western Economics 
The movement to develop Buddhist economics largely gained its foothold in Thailand, but has 
since spread to other Buddhist countries and has even become a topic of interest to Western 
economists who are not Buddhists, although it continues to center largely in Thailand and 
includes mostly Theravāda Buddhist countries of Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka. Interest among 
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Western economists in particular has once again increased in the past several years.
303
 While 
Buddhist economics is often put up in opposition to its supposed antithesis, mainstream or 
dominant Western economics, it shares certain affinities with some Western alternative models 
and critiques of the dominant economic models. Attention is increasingly being paid to 
similarities between Deep Ecology, a radical form of environmentalism, and Humanistic 
economics which include notions of Happiness economy and Sufficiency economy. The 
following sections will briefly outline the fundamental nature of these approaches in order to 
expose the similarities and differences between them as a means to revealing the rich dialogue 
that can occur at the intersection. This will also provide a better understanding of Buddhist 
approaches to the notion of well-being which will prove particularly helpful for the discussion of 
Buddhist notions of poverty relief which will follow in the subsequent chapter. 
3.4.1.  Deep Ecology 
Deep Ecology is a movement emerging from the field of environmental ethics that stresses the 
inherent value of all living beings regardless of their usefulness to human life. The term Deep 
Ecology was introduced by Arne Naess in 1973 with the aim of reforming the environmentalist 
movement by moving beyond the ‘shallow’ approaches of recycling and renewable energies 
toward a fundamental re-evaluation of the very role and place of human life on earth and an 
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appears again to be on the rise, particularly as it relates to business and management. 
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acknowledgment of the intrinsic value of all living beings.
304
 Deep Ecology rejects the notions of 
a human and nature duality and an ego-centered or narrowly self-interested model of the world, 




A number of scholars have written on the many similarities and the high degree of compatibility 
between Buddhist thought and Deep Ecology.
306
 Some of the core Buddhist principles, such as 
ahiņsā, or non-violence, evince a clear concern for the well-being of other sentient beings. 
Furthermore, in as far as Buddhism promotes a vegetarian diet and discourages professions that 
cause direct harm to sentient beings—and perhaps even vegetation—it appears to be in line with 
the guiding principles of Deep Ecology. On a theoretical level, Deep Ecology and Buddhist 
economics both share a clear emphasis on the interdependence and inter-relatedness of 
humankind, other creatures in nature, and the environment. Some understand the principle of 
interdependent co-arising (paţicca-samuppāda) as teaching that all phenomena are 
interdependent due to a delicate web of inter-relationships, a notion closely resembling Deep 
Ecology.
307
 Additionally, Puntasen and Zsolnai note similarities in the interest among the 
approaches of Buddhist economics and Deep Ecology toward sustainability and the radical 
reduction of the burden of economic activity on the environment and other beings.
308
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However, while some similarities between these two systems are readily apparent, on closer 
examination certain differences also become apparent and doubts arise concerning how 
compatible they may actually be. Certain key points cause difficulties if not incompatibility 
between these two approaches. While key features of Buddhist thought include notions of 
interdependence and inter-relatedness, nonviolence toward other beings, and an ideal of 
cooperation with nature rather than a subjugation of it, as Harvey notes, Buddhist thought places 
an obvious emphasis on the superiority of human life.
309
 Keown further adds that as the ultimate 
goal in Buddhism is enlightenment, the natural world is given a secondary or instrumental value, 
not as a world that is to be restored to ecological balance, but rather as an imperfect saņsāric 
realm that is ultimately to be escaped.
310
 While an awareness of the interdependence of all 
phenomena, as well as the dissolution of dualistic forms of thinking, are also parts of progress on 
the path toward enlightenment, Keown notes that this does not entail one’s self-identification 
with all other sentient beings and nature as it is understood in Deep Ecology.
311
 Collete Sciberras 
proposes that Mahāyāna Buddhism may be more consistent with environmentalist perspectives, 
including Deep Ecology, than is Theravāda Buddhism because Mahāyāna Buddhism does not 
understand nirvana as wholly distinct from the natural world of saņsāra.312 Rather, the essential 
difference between nirvana and this unsatisfactory world of suffering is due primarily to one’s 
mental development and perspective; as such, the natural world may have the opportunity to play 
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  Sciberras, 2010. Nevertheless, Sciberras notes, there remains difficulty in reconciling 
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a greater role in Mahāyāna thought. Sciberras further suggests that Buddhist environmentalists 
may do well to convey their message to other Buddhists as an effort to protect the possibility of 
adaptation and evolution within an ecosystem, rather than to protect any static system or 
particular beings within it.  
While there may be fewer similarities with Deep Ecology and Buddhist thought than first 
expected, some have noted that Deep Ecology shares affinity with some particular Socially 
Engaged Buddhist thought, such as that of Thich Nhat Hanh who also considers these two 
systems as fundamentally compatible.
313
 Nhat Hanh advocates meditative practices that include 
an awareness of the interdependence of all sentient beings and the dissolution of dualistic 
thought that views humanity as outside of nature. In this sense, Socially Engaged Buddhist 
practices may take a step closer toward Deep Ecology, filling in the gaps where necessary in 
order to apply Buddhist thought to finding practical solutions to contemporary environmental 
crises. Additionally, such meditative practices may serve as valuable practice for Deep 
Ecologists who wish to deepen the experience of interdependence and such non-dualist thought. 
3.4.2.  Humanistic Economics 
Much like Buddhist economics, Humanistic economics is an alternative approach to dominant 
economics that emerged as a critique of the dominant capitalist models.
314
 Although there have 
been numerous strands of humanism throughout history, they all tend to share a focus on reason, 
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ethics, and justice while upholding the primacy of human values and a common humanity. While 
humanism today is often equated with growing secularism and a rejection of religion, historically 
speaking, humanist thought has often overlapped with progressive religious thought. As Matt 
Cherry notes, no history of humanism can ever be fully separated from the progressive ideas of 
the various ‘more-or-less humanist’ religious thinkers such as the Buddha.315  
3.4.2.1.  Humanist Psychology 
To a large extent, Humanist economics are based on principles of Humanist psychology as 
developed in the late 20
th
 Century. An in depth understanding of these principles is helpful in 
identifying similarities between the Humanist and Buddhist approaches to economics. The 
Humanist notion of human needs is also a comprehensive one that in addition to the basic 
physical requirements for survival and safety includes social and spiritual values as a part of its 
goal of human well-being and flourishing.
316
 Abraham Maslow began the Humanistic tradition in 
modern psychology, developing a hierarchical model categorizing human needs that serves as an 
exceedingly valuable model for conceptualizing Buddhist thinking on the role and value of 
material needs as well. Maslow developed a hierarchy of needs in order to explain human 
motivation toward fulfillment in the sense of Aristotle’s eudaimonia.317 Aristotle’s notion of 
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eudaimonia or happiness is more than mere hedonistic pleasure, but instead refers to a full well-
being or flourishing that is achieved through living well and attaining excellence and virtue, 
similar to the Buddhist notion of sukha at the more advanced levels.
318
 To Maslow, this sort of 
fulfillment was to be achieved through meeting human needs, a category which includes 
clothing, shelter, and nourishment, as well as healthy social relationships and moral or what 
might be called spiritual development. 
Maslow’s hierarchy is founded on the notion that humans are naturally motivated to fulfill their 
potential or capabilities. As Maslow states it, ‘what humans can be, they must be,’ meaning 
humans are driven by a need to become all that they are capable of becoming.
319
 Thus his 
hierarchy begins with basic physiological needs and progresses through social needs to the 
highest level of moral needs, or what Maslow called self-actualization.
320
 While basic 
physiological and social needs, or Deficiency-motives, are most powerful and must be satisfied to 
some degree before it fully manifests, there is also a drive toward the Meta-motives, which refers 
to the need to fulfill human potential or actualization.
321
 This hierarchy of needs is illustrated in 
the following chart:  
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Figure 4: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. 322 
In Maslow’s view then, the Deficiency-motives must be met at least to some degree before an 
individual is capable of focusing attention on the Meta-motives. A person who suffers from 
hunger pains, or is anxious about their safety, survival, or familial relationships, for example, is 
not immediately concerned with expressing their own creativity. However, as these more 
fundamental needs are met, individuals typically become more concerned with fulfillment rather 
than survival. Maslow described self-actualized individuals as exhibiting four key 
characteristics.
323
 First, they have a more efficient or accurate view of reality, meaning that they 
are less inclined to distort reality out of fear or hope and are better at recognizing distortions or 
deception by others. Second, they are spontaneous and natural or genuine in their relationships 
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with others and in their confidence about themselves. Third, they are focused on benefiting 
others, liberated from their selves, rather than being egocentric. And, fourth, they tend to enjoy 
solitude and privacy, standing relatively detached from the anxiety and busyness of the social 
and material world around them.  
3.4.2.2.  Humanistic Economics and Buddhist Economics 
Maslow’s focus on the pursuit of self-actualization, particularly as it takes on this sense of self-
transcendence in overcoming ego-centeredness, clearly has much in common with the 
characteristics and goals of the arahats and bodhisattvas. Indeed, Maslow’s self-actualization 
model is a fairly helpful way for Westerners to conceptualize the development of the Buddhist 
ideal virtues because many of the characteristics of Maslow’s self-actualized person resemble 
key Buddhist virtues, including Buddhist conceptions of wisdom and compassion, and the 
brahmavihāras, or sublime attitudes: lovingkindness (mettā, Sanskrit: maitrī), compassion 
(karuṇā), sympathetic joy (muditā), and equanimity (upekkhā, Sanskrit: upekṣā).324 As in 
Maslow’s model, these sublime attitudes are most often cultivated through, often solitary, 
practices of meditation. 
There are also striking parallels between Maslow’s conception of the relationship between 
material and social needs and spiritual development and Buddhist thought as expressed in a well-
known narrative found in the Dhammapada which famously declares “hunger is the worst 
disease.”325 Despite the fact that the word hunger may also be taken to refer more generally to 
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desire or attachment, the role of physical hunger for nourishment has often been highlighted. The 
highly influential Dhammapadaţţhakathā highlights this perspective and elaborates the 
background story leading to the verse.
326
 The hunger described in this narrative refers to a poor 
follower of the Buddha who suffered specifically from physical hunger which stood as an 
obstacle to spiritual development.
 
The Buddha is said to have postponed beginning his sermon to 
a group of well-off listeners until after a poor peasant had arrived. Upon his belated arrival, the 
peasant was very hungry and tired. Instead of beginning the sermon so that the others would not 
have to wait any longer, the Buddha further postponed his sermon until after the peasant was fed 
with the alms-food collected for the attendant monks, and rested. As a result of this 
postponement and generosity, upon hearing the teachings of the Buddha, the peasant virtually 
immediately attained ‘stream entry’, the first crucial breakthrough toward enlightenment. When 
the monks later asked the Buddha why he had postponed his sermon until the man had eaten, and 
why he had fed the poor man from the food prepared for the monks before they had eaten, he 
responded that “there is no affliction like the affliction of hunger.”327 Notwithstanding that the 
Buddha had ascertained that the man was generally in a proper condition to take in the Dhamma, 
his hungry state seems to have presented an obstacle to attaining ‘stream entry’. The Buddha is 
depicted explaining to the monks, “If I preach the Law to this man while he is suffering the 
pangs of hunger, he will not be able to comprehend it.”328  
The notion that the Buddha’s poor follower had to be fed in order to then be prepared for the 
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opportunity to attain enlightenment bears resemblance to Maslow’s hierarchy. While 
actualization or enlightenment is the goal, one must have basic needs met first. This is a key 
message of the Middle Way approach as well. Additionally, as I have noted previously, the key 
lay Buddhist practices of generosity or giving to the saṅgha, as well as the general category of 
morality or ethics within the Eightfold Path, which must be practiced in relationships with others, 
have a social aspect to them that very much fits into Maslow’s hierarchy as social needs. One 
clear Buddhist example of these principles in practice is Sarvōdaya Śramadāna, which 
undertakes community development projects, aimed at improving the material circumstances in a 
community, through cooperative social action, and with the ultimate goal of ‘the enlightenment 
of all’. Sarvōdaya Śramadāna stands as a prime example of both a Buddhist and a humanist 
approach to economic development. 
The parallels between the Humanistic tradition following Maslow and E.F. Schumacher’s 
economic views has been noted by Mark Lutz, who points to Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful as 
the first significant book on Humanistic economics.
329
 As intimated above, there is a clear 
connection here in Schumacher’s thinking on a more humanistic approach to economics than the 
dominant Western systems and Buddhist economics. While Buddhist economics is only one 
chapter in Schumacher’s book, it is proposed as Schumacher’s suggestion for achieving a more 
humanistic economics. Schumacher then seems to have been the first to posit the similarities 
between Humanistic economics and Buddhist economics. 
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In fact, there are many significant similarities between Buddhist economics and Humanist 
economics. While Humanist economics may begin with the question of basic human needs, its 
focus does not stay solely on the most basic physical needs; these needs are meant to include and 
ultimately lead to human flourishing in the sense of Aristotle’s eudaimonia. Much as has also 
been the case with Buddhist economic analysis described above, Tim Jackson points out that 
Humanist psychologists have argued that a basic misunderstanding of human nature has misled 
dominant Western economics in a drive for income growth above other goods.
330
 Humanistic 
economics aims to improve the mainstream approach by basing it on a complete image of human 
nature that includes both the self-interested side as well as the collective-interested or 
cooperative side. Beyond the basic material needs for nutrition, housing, and clothing, any 
further drive for material accumulation and consumption only promotes harmful competition, 
creates unbalance and distracts from those things that offer meaning and purpose to life in the 
higher levels of fulfillment.
331
 This approach to material needs bears significant similarities to 
the Buddhist approach outlined above as well, which also sees the basic necessities of life as 
good in so far as they prevent unnecessary suffering—such as hunger pains, illness, and 
anxiety—and as essential to the pursuit of further mental and spiritual development. This will 
become clearer in the following chapter on poverty which addresses directly the issue of the 
harm resulting from material deprivation.  
While Puntasen identifies Humanistic economics as the Western economic model which bears 
the greatest similarities to Buddhist economics, he nonetheless argues that there are also 
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fundamental differences between Humanistic economics and Buddhist economics.
332
 In 
Puntasen’s analysis, Humanistic economics lacks a clear explanation of the “factors that will 
enhance the mental development of a person through the range of material needs to social needs 
and the moral needs of self-actualization.”333 In other words, although both economic theories 
identify similar deficiencies in mainstream economics, Buddhist economics goes noticeably 
further than Humanist economics in correcting these deficiencies insofar as it not only identifies 
the need for the return of human-centered values to the heart of economic analysis and policy, 
but it also identifies a clear path and highly developed practices to overcoming the problems of 
ignorance, greed and attachment that both economic theories identify as sources of suffering 
resulting from the mainstream economics approach.   
3.4.2.3. The Happiness Approach 
While many Western economists historically had tended to assume that monetary measures were 
effective and sufficient indicators of well-being and happiness, since the latter half of the 20
th
 
century, a growing number of economists and sociologists have also taken notice of the points 
made above by Humanistic psychology and have given careful consideration to the notions of 
well-being and happiness that it advances in their own disciplines.
334
 In the field of economics, 
this has led to a reevaluation of the common models holding monetary measures as supreme 
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indicators of well-being, such as Gross National Production (GNP) or Gross Domestic 
Production (GDP), in favor of more comprehensive and multidimensional measures, such as the 
Subjective Well-Being Approach, which measures life-satisfaction and satisfaction in several 
domains of life, such as health, employment, family, friends, and so on.
335
 As the notion of 
happiness became the subject of more serious evaluation, empirical data indicating objective as 
well as subjective indicators of happiness and well-being have also become more widely 
accepted, forcing a fundamental reevaluation of the purpose or goals of economic activities. The 
Easterlin Paradox famously indicates that while monetary gains are significant determinants of 
happiness and well-being at lower income levels, beyond a basic level of material needs, 
additional increases in income generate fewer and fewer increases in both subjective and 
objective measures of happiness.
336
 Although income levels remain by and large the most 
commonly used key indicators of the well-being of individuals and nations, the idea that non-
monetary conditions, such as freedoms, family and broader social relationships, or physical and 
mental health, play major roles is now gaining increased profile in mainstream economic 
analysis.
337
 A growing number of countries, from Bhutan to Canada, France, Australia, and the 
UK, have undertaken programs to include more comprehensive measures in their State economic 
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In 1972, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, the King of the Buddhist Nation of Bhutan first proposed the 
concept of Gross National Happiness as a commitment to aligning economic goals with the 
Buddhist values of his country. Over the last few decades, Bhutan has worked to develop the 
capabilities to measure the general well-being of their population, by measuring diverse 
indicators such as health, education, psychological well-being, how time is spent, as well as 
income.
339
 As the only country in the world currently using Gross National Happiness as its 
mechanism for economic analyses, Bhutan is leading the way in happiness-based public policy 




3.5.  Political Economy 
A question that naturally arises concerning economics is ‘what is the proper form of political 
economy according to Buddhist thought?’ The answer, however, is not a simple one. Ian Harris 
notes that from an early period Buddhism showed a marked preference for monarchical forms of 
governance.
341
 However, he continues, “it would be wrong to conclude that kingship is the only 
form of governance authorized by the textual tradition and Buddhists in many regions of Asia 
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have been able to flourish without a kingly protector. Indeed, the Buddha's own utterances also 
seem to give support to the idea of republican or socialist systems of political organization”.342 In 
the twentieth century, Socialist models gained favor in modern Buddhist countries throughout 
Southeast Asia, no doubt due in part to the notion that the forsaking of personal property 
exemplified by the saṅgha should serve as a model for the rest of society. Yet, Southeast Asian 
economies have seen significant growth over the last couple of decades in connection with free-
market Capitalist principles. Rejecting both Communism and Capitalism on the grounds that 
they foster greed and attachment, Buddhadhāsa Bhikkhu taught that the economic teachings 
found in the Pāli Canon clearly imply a form of Socialism, which he called ‘Dictatorial 
Dhammic Socialism’.343 He taught that a Socialist system, modeling the saṅgha, would be 
concerned principally with collective well-being. Such a system, led by a ruler who is guided by 




Swearer notes that the notion of Buddhist Socialism is based on the idea that the state is to ensure 
that its people have the four requisites, much like the saṅgha—food, shelter, clothing, and 
medicine.
345
 Sarkisyanz and Swearer both argue that the ideal Buddhist state would be both 
socialistic and democratic, following the model of the saṅgha which largely uses majority vote 
in decision-making.
346
 On the other hand, Schmidt-Leukel points out that the dictatorial aspect 
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necessary for Buddhadāsa’s system stands in direct opposition to principles of liberal democracy 
insofar as it is doubtful that it could be implemented society-wide without severe coercion.
347
 
Harris notes that the complex relationships between Buddhist religion and politics vary among 
Buddhist countries throughout history and cautions against simplistic generalizations about how 
they affect one another: 
We should be careful not to conflate the disparate and historically distinct cultures and 
political systems of Asia, particularly when their only common feature may be shared 
commitment to Buddhism, and glib generalizations about the precise relation between 
religious and political spheres in Buddhist cultures are best avoided.
348
  
While Buddhism seems closely aligned with certain notions of collective well-being and state 
provision of basic material necessities, Buddhist teachings do not necessarily proclaim any one 
system as the appropriate one. In other words, Buddhist teachings are consistent with a variety of 
political and economic perspectives and have been used to legitimate the authority of a variety of 
political systems.  
For our purposes here, the question of political economy revolves around the more pointed 
question of what role the government should play in alleviating poverty, a question that will be 
addressed more fully in the following chapter. The notion of Right Livelihood strongly implies 
that economic activities that might directly cause death or suffering to other living beings should 
be avoided. But beyond this general concern, should welfare programs be put in place to give 
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directly to those suffering in poverty, or should these economic goods primarily be accomplished 
through free market incentives and private charity? Robert Thurman has argued that the services 
and goods listed in the Rājaparikathā-ratnamālā by Nāgārjuna imply a welfare state, which he 
calls Compassionate Socialism.
349
 Similarly, Sarkisyanz includes the welfare state as an essential 
aspect of an ideal Buddhist State.
350
 The passages concerning the proper role of the government 
or rulers in providing for the needy I outline in the following chapter will make it clear that direct 
action by the rulers through targeted giving is clearly and repeatedly acknowledged as a primary 
duty of the rulers. In light of the various passages in Buddhist scripture that contain 
admonishments directly to the political rulers, it would be extremely difficult to make the case 
that an ideal Buddhist state would not have some important role to play in providing basic 
necessities to those suffering in poverty. The poor are to be a priority when taxes and other 
policies are considered, but giving material goods needed for sustenance as well as investment in 
new business undertakings are also identified as appropriate modes of poverty relief. But, having 
acknowledged the central role that the government is to play, it is also important to recognize the 
role that private organizations, individuals, and the poor themselves are to play. These will be 
covered in detail below. Suffice it to say that principles outlined in the Pāli Canon indicate that 
rulers are to provide for the needy, through what appears to be some form of government welfare 
or assistance programs, but a comprehensive approach is required that includes cooperative 
efforts among all major sectors of society. Beyond a mere concern for those within one’s own 
borders, this applies to the realm of international relations as well. Harvey notes that the highly 
influential model of Buddhist kingship, King Ashoka is said to have set the example of providing 
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aid to neighboring kingdoms.
351
 The eminent Mahāyāna scholar Nāgārjuna also advised King 
Udayi not only to be concerned about the safety and protection of property of those outside of his 




Buddhist economics emerged in the late twentieth Century in Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka 
largely as a critique of, and response to, mainstream Western economies. While these critiques 
often follow the thinking of some similar Western critiques in highlighting the deficiencies in the 
basic assumptions of the nature of ‘economic man’ and in the need to return ethics to economic 
analysis, Buddhist economics offers its own unique responses to these critiques as well in 
providing a larger worldview within which to fit a more ethical and multidimensional approach 
to economics as well as outlining motivations for moral behavior and practices to cultivate such 
a character. If, as Fullbrook has suggested the trend is moving, and the field of economics does 
in fact become more welcoming of heterodox approaches, more open to the notions that 
economic values are culturally derived and that different systems of thought can contribute to a 
more comprehensive approach to economic issues, then Buddhist economics will likely continue 
to garner increasing interest among economists as its contributions to the field become more 
apparent.
353
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Buddhist economics is based largely on the principle of Right Livelihood, which is generally 
understood as concerned primarily with whether income is generated in an ethical manner that 
causes no direct harm to other living beings. Buddhist economics also relies on the additional 
teaching that income is to be used to provide for the needs as well as the enjoyment of oneself, 
family, friends, and community. It follows Buddhist thinking in identifying suffering as the key 
concern of ethical and economic activities; suffering is reduced and eliminated primarily, not by 
consumption, growth, or production, but rather by removing attachment, aversion, greed, and 
ignorance. Happiness or well-being is a key target and purpose of economic activity and this 
well-being is understood in a broad and comprehensive manner which includes material as well 
as social and spiritual fulfillment.  
Buddhist economics requires much further study and development in order to become a well-
established area within the field of economics. As Zadek and Puntasen suggest, it is still missing 
a clear application to specific economic issues and subjects, such as international trade, public 
finance, and monetary economics.
354
 Much of this work will necessarily be carried out by 
scholars fluent in the languages of these particular areas as well as Buddhist economic thought. 
While the general principles of Buddhist economic thought outlined above will not likely 
produce a single approach to each of these specialized topics, the general questions raised by 
Buddhist economic theories will certainly generate fresh and valuable insights and further 
questions. Despite these gaps in the application of Buddhist economic theory, it nevertheless can 
make significant contributions to mainstream economic thought, primarily by way of a more 
enriched approach to human nature, well-being, and the goal of economic activity than is offered 
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through the assumptions of human nature and behavior suggested by the homo oeconomicus 
approach. 
A clear contribution from Buddhist economics is the return of moral or ethical value to the realm 
of economics. This was an initial point of interest to Schumacher and has continued to be of 
interest to many economists today. Especially as a result of the recent global economic decline, it 
has become clear to many that unchecked greed and continuous growth and consumption at 
seemingly any cost ultimately result in the suffering of many, and most particularly of the 
world’s poor. Buddhist economics not only offer a systematic critique of the sources of greed, 
attachment and suffering, but also proposes a full and systematic path intended to transform them 
into compassion, equanimity and wisdom. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, because 
it is grounded firmly in the Buddhist tradition, Buddhist economics not only offers principles for 
a more compassionate and generous approach, but it also offers strong motivation to follow those 
principles and so behave morally in economic affairs—a strong motivation to a sizeable portion 
of the world’s population. 
The emphasis in Buddhist economics on pursuing happiness and pleasure that places greater 
value on mental if not spiritual development, and on healthy social relationships, than on 
material acquisition, shares common ground with current economic thought, as well as on human 
development and poverty alleviation, namely notions of social capital and the Capabilities 
Approach; this will be discussed further in the following chapter on Buddhist approaches to 
poverty and poverty relief.  
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4. Buddhist Concepts of Poverty 
An estimated 2.6 billion people currently live in poverty; of those, it is estimated that some 18 
million die each year from starvation or preventable poverty-related diseases—10 million of 
whom are children under the age of five.
355
 Tragically, in spite of targeted poverty alleviation 
efforts over the past few decades by local and international bodies, both public and private, 
poverty seems to have only increased—most shockingly, even in many of the targeted areas.356 
Global poverty has perhaps never been more of a concern of so many people around the world as 
it is today in this age of globalization. In spite of the facts that virtually everyone is familiar with 
poverty to some degree and that there is a wide consensus that it is a growing major global 
concern, even the task of articulating a definition of poverty has proven difficult, rendering a 
proper approach to its alleviation even more difficult to envision.  
Although the notion of suffering is widely recognized as the primary preoccupation in Buddhist 
thought, it is still often erroneously assumed that the Buddhist approach to poverty is essentially 
to realize that impoverishment is the result of one’s karmic merit and that such a state should 
simply be dispassionately accepted. Having reviewed key approaches to Buddhist social and 
economic ethics in the previous chapters, here I more closely examine the particular teachings on 
conceptions of poverty and their correspondence to the current academic approaches to poverty 
commonly in use. However, despite the interest in world poverty as an issue of contemporary 
ethics, and the clear relevance of these topics to the increasingly popular discussions of 
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globalization and social justice, surprisingly little has been written concerning the forms of 
suffering resulting from material poverty and the appropriate Buddhist approach to relieve this 
poverty. This dissertation and more particularly this chapter is intended to correct that, 
demonstrating that Buddhist teachings on poverty overlap in important ways with current 
thinking on poverty and poverty relief, and that these teachings can in fact make important 
contributions to ongoing discussions concerning global poverty. As Ter Haar noted above, 
religion can provide important resources to the development community.
357
 In addition to the 
social capital provided through the established relationships, organizational structures, and 
material resources available within a religious community, religion can also provide the 
philosophical or theological teachings that can support development goals and inspire and 
motivate such activities within a community. Buddhism offers just such a social ordering and a 
theoretical framework for effectively conceptualizing the problem of poverty, a conception of 
poverty that also implicitly includes a strong moral obligation to alleviate poverty. 
In this chapter, I will briefly outline common general categories of approaches to conceptualizing 
poverty. Once these conceptual models for describing poverty are established, I will proceed to 
present the notions of poverty that are described in Buddhist scriptures, beginning with the Pāli 
Canon and continuing on with various Mahāyāna sūtras that exemplify the Buddhist approach to 
poverty. While, as might be expected, there is no one unified approach to conceptualizing 
poverty, these texts will provide examples of what might be considered as genuinely Buddhist 
conceptions of poverty. Having outlined the notions of poverty found in Buddhist texts, I will 
draw comparisons to the general categories of approaches to poverty in order to identify the 
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contribution that the Buddhist tradition can make to the discussion of global poverty and poverty 
alleviation today. This chapter addresses definitions of poverty and will be followed directly by a 
similar chapter focused on notions of poverty relief and examples of contemporary Buddhist 
poverty relief programs. 
4.1. Defining Poverty 
A basic problem that arises when discussing poverty is that any definition of poverty one may 
propose will inevitably also set limits on the entire discussion, often narrowing its scope. This is 
primarily because it will necessarily entail judgments about poverty, though these are frequently 
unnoticed and unintended; these typically include unstated implications about what causes 
poverty, what are its effects, and what should be done about it. A clear definition of poverty 
must, therefore, address a wide range of questions, perhaps most significantly: is poverty simply 
a lack of the basic material needs for survival or does it include access to such resources as 
education, healthcare, and a safe and secure environment? What indicators effectively signify 
impoverishment, and how do we clearly distinguish between the poor and non-poor? Who or 
what is largely responsible for causing poverty? And, can poverty most effectively be alleviated 
on the level of individuals, families, or nations? Every individual, community, or organization 
that attempts to alleviate poverty must make similar judgments as they determine how to 
recognize and measure poverty to identify the target groups and assess the impact of their 
strategies. Historian of world poverty, Steven Beaudoin, notes that scholars have tended to use 
one of three broad categories of approaches in defining and measuring poverty—Absolute 
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Poverty, Relative Poverty, and a Capabilities Approach to poverty.
358
 Beaudoin’s categories are 
helpful because they effectively account for all the major approaches that have been taken in the 
past to define poverty; virtually all approaches to poverty fall into one of these simple 
categories.
359
 Moreover, they are also helpful for establishing the language and concepts for 
discussing the issue.  
4.1.1. Absolute Poverty 
The most basic approach to defining poverty, and certainly the most common historically, is to 
define it in monetary terms measured against a fixed standard; that is, to measure poverty by 
determining a minimum level of consumption or income for basic subsistence to serve as a 
standard.
360
 Individuals, although typically households are measured, falling below this level are 
considered to be in absolute poverty or destitution. This approach is based on the assumption that 
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a universal monetary measure or formula can be devised to uniformly account for the various 
impoverished circumstances of individuals regardless of their particular location in time and 
space. To accomplish this, such approaches are typically based on the cost of providing proper 
nutrition or caloric intake.
361
 Thus, those who have an income, for example, that is below the 
level needed to provide the basic requirements to sustain life, are considered to be below the 
‘poverty level’. In what many consider the first scientific study of poverty, in the late nineteenth 
century, British sociological researcher Seebohm Rowntree used this approach by estimating the 
monetary requirements for nutrition, clothing, and shelter.
362
 With some modern variation and 
improvements to account for modern life, this approach is still widely used today.
363
 In 1963, for 
example, the US government began its use of the Orshansky scale to establish the poverty level, 
which, similar to Rowntree’s approach, estimates the minimum expenses necessary for proper 
nutrition and then augments this with the costs of other necessary or vital expenses.
364
 The 
current extreme poverty level established by the World Bank is set at living on $1.25 a day; 
moderate poverty is defined as living on less than $2 a day.
365
 By this measure, an estimated 1.4 
billion people live in extreme poverty, and an additional 1.2 billion in moderate poverty.
366
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While the simplicity of this approach makes it a desirable working model for agencies and 
organizations that are focused on active engagement in alleviating poverty rather than merely 
studying it, it also has its shortcomings. 
Many consider the problems associated with the absolute poverty perspective to outweigh its 
usefulness. As Beaudoin points out, this approach is an oversimplification of extremely complex 
phenomena. It tends to gloss over important variables like the seasonal fluctuations in food 
supply and cost, cultural dictates on consumption and food preparation, and the connections 
between impoverishment and stages in the life-cycle.
367
 Households of different sizes and 
compositions, for example, may fair very differently economically, if one family is comprised of 
all healthy and employable members, or alternatively, if one is comprised of small children, 
elderly, or disabled members that contribute little, if any income, while also requiring additional 
expenditures on care. Moreover, it makes it difficult to take into consideration public goods that 
are not part of private budgets, although they are essential to survival, such as clean water, 
utilities, and sanitation. In short, individuals and families living in areas with clean water and 
sanitation are less likely to suffer from debilitating diseases that are often associated with 
extreme poverty than those living in areas without these basic utilities, and yet these public 
goods and other variances are not factored into the analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
some countries than others, a purchasing power parity exchange rate is used to 
determine the real exchange rate for international comparisons. Thus, to be precise, 
the poverty level is technically set at $1.25 PPP (2005 Purchasing Power Parity 
dollars). 
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4.1.2. Relative Poverty 
The second approach is to define poverty in relation to the living standards within a community 
or nation, and therefore, it focuses more on income inequality on average rather than on 
individual income.
368
 This approach considers impoverishment in terms of the disposable income 
of an individual in relation to the benchmark of the average overall wealth and living standards 
of the broader population. Here then, poverty is defined in terms of individual or family income 
as compared to average income in the area widely. Beaudoin indicates that the major measure 
employed with this approach continues to be income, although researchers also often consider 
the availability of certain public goods, such as statistics on sanitation, medical facilities, and 
housing. The general formula here is if a family falls below a certain percentage of the average 
income of other citizens of the country or region, then they are considered below the ‘poverty 
level’. The World Bank uses this approach to some extent by adjusting the daily income 
requirements between developed nations and underdeveloped ones, setting the poverty line 
significantly higher in industrialized nations—as high as $14.40 a day.369  
Although this approach has wide appeal because it avoids many of the problems associated with 
the absolute poverty approach noted above, it also has its critics. As Beaudoin points out, a major 
worry with this approach concerns income distribution. Measurement of income by household 
risks ignoring the typically higher level of poverty experienced by larger families who may have 
similar levels of income as smaller households, as well as the fact that income distribution within 
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the family may not be equal. Similarly, applying a national average income, such as the Gross 
National Product, fails to consider the vast income inequalities that may exist among the wealthy 
and poor within a given population. Furthermore, difficulties arise in determining what to 
consider luxury items or necessities, and what potential resources some individuals have as a 
result of their social relationships or the availability of public goods that others may be lacking. 
Is a microwave oven, an air-conditioner, or a flushing toilet, for example, a luxury item or are 
these essential to daily life in developed areas of the United States or the United Kingdom? What 
about in Nigeria, Bangladesh, or Nepal? Who is to decide and how? 
4.1.3. Capability Approach 
The third approach to defining poverty is the Capabilities Approach, which is most often favored 
for its accuracy in portraying the complexity and multidimensional nature of poverty. It views 
poverty primarily in terms of inhibiting choices or the freedoms that people enjoy, such as 
employment, education, healthcare, social standing and social interactions. Here, then, the focus 
is not on monetary measures or a lack of material goods, but rather on the ability to actively 
participate in what is considered normal life. Beaudoin suggests that the Capabilities Approach is 
in a sense the joining of the first two approaches.
370
 Like the absolute poverty approach, it 
acknowledges an absolute aspect of poverty, but focuses on an optimal standard or goal rather 
than a basic or minimum requirement; however, like the relative poverty approach, it also 
concedes that such optimal standards be established in accordance with varying cultural and 
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social values. Because this approach to poverty is so influential, due to its richness and complex 
nature, it merits a closer focus. 
4.1.3.1.  Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach 
The Capabilities Approach has been most notably championed by economist Amartya Sen who 
identifies the primary goal and means of development as enhancing the real choices and 
freedoms or capabilities that people have in order to allow them to lead the lives they have 
reason to value.
371
 In Sen’s approach to poverty and poverty relief, the most central concepts are 
capabilities and functioning, two intimately connected concepts, followed by agency.
372
 As Sen 
defines it, 
The concept of “functionings,” which has distinctly Aristotelian roots, reflects the various 
things a person may value doing or being. The valued functionings may vary from 
elementary ones, such as being adequately nourished and being free from avoidable 
disease, to very complex activities or personal states, such as being able to take part in the 
life of the community and having self-respect.
373
 
Functionings, for Sen, refer to those things that a person has reason for valuing, doing or being. 
As Sen notes, there is a wide variety of functionings. It is essentially a subjective term, a 
category that must be defined by each individual. Sen continues,  
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A person’s “capability” refers to the alternative combinations of functionings that are 
feasible for her to achieve. Capability is thus a kind of freedom: the substantive freedom 
to achieve alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally put, the freedom to 
achieve various lifestyles). For example, an affluent person who fasts may have the same 
functioning achievement in terms of eating or nourishment as a destitute person who is 
forced to starve, but the first person does have a different “capability set” than the second 
(the first can choose to eat well and be well nourished in a way the second cannot).
374
 
This is the essential idea of Sen’s influential Development as Freedom.375 The aim of 
development in Sen’s approach is to increase the capacities or the substantial freedoms to pursue 
those things that individuals have reason to value. This leads to the next central concept: agency. 
The expression "agent" is sometimes employed in the literature of economics and game 
theory to denote a person who is acting on some one else's behalf … and whose 
achievements are to be assessed in the light of someone else's … goals. I am using the 
term "agent" … in its older—and "grander"—sense as someone who acts and brings 
about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and 
objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria as well. This 
work is particularly concerned with the agency role of the individual as a member of the 
public and as a participant in economic, social and political actions.
376
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Thus, the idea of development is relatively subjective and will mean something different for 
different individuals, communities and cultures. Participatory approaches, which attempt to 
include the opinions, values, and goals of the very people who are to be raised out of poverty, are 
also included within the Capabilities Approach category. 
The UNDP adopts a Capabilities Approach in its Human Development Index (HDI), which 
measures a broad variety of factors contributing to personal fulfillment and opportunity, such as 
life expectancy at birth, adult literacy levels, and education enrollment ratios. Moving beyond a 
simple focus on income measures, UNDP conceives of poverty in broader and more 
comprehensive terms, recognizing that income is only one factor that humans have reason for 
valuing. Additionally, UNDP combines this HDI data with the Human Poverty Index, which 
focuses instead on deprivation, in order to obtain a more nuanced and comprehensive perspective 
on the opportunities for fulfillment among a given population and the extent and nature of the 
poverty afflicting those in the population who are denied those opportunities. 
4.1.3.2. Subjective Well-Being Approach 
An approach to defining poverty that merits further details here, which I briefly mentioned above 
in relation to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, is the Subjective Well-Being approach. As a more 
participatory formulation of the Capabilities Approach the Subjective Well-Being approach also 
offers a critique of the notions of impoverishment and well-being that are dominant in 
development thinking. Mariono Rojas argues for the Subjective Well-Being approach to poverty, 
presenting a random data analysis of correlations between income, experienced poverty, 
experienced economic poverty, and life-satisfaction, demonstrating that income is not a reliable 
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indicator of one’s experience of general well-being, economic well-being, or overall life-
satisfaction.
377
 Income is only one of the indicators of life-satisfaction and must be considered in 
light of other indicators related to other aspects of human existence in order to capture the 
complexity of the experience of poverty. Again here we see a concern for demonstrating a 
comprehensive and multidimensional understanding of human nature and existence. In the 
Subjective Well-Being approach, the concern is with what is referred to as experienced poverty, 
which refers to a low life-satisfaction or what we might call suffering in poverty or suffering due 
to low levels of satisfaction in the areas of life one values most highly. This distinction is helpful 
in acknowledging that people experience poverty and wealth in different ways; someone earning 
an income below an established poverty line may not feel impoverished, while another person 
with a higher income may experience the stress and suffering often associated with poverty even 
if their income is above the poverty line. Interestingly, Rojas’ data demonstrates that nearly equal 
percentages of low-income earners are not considered poor on the experienced poverty scale as 
those that are considered poor on the experienced poverty scale but who are not considered low 
income.
378
 Considering both of these cases, if income were the main criterion, we would 
incorrectly evaluate the impoverishment of nearly a quarter of the participants. Rojas notes that 
income and expenditure may be more or less effective at indicating a person or family’s 
economic satisfaction, but not the much broader and instructive category of life-satisfaction.
379
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Rojas further outlines several fundamental principles concerning poverty that the Subjective 
Well-Being approach is based on, demonstrating its skepticism toward approaches that focus on 
income as the sole or primary criterion for poverty.
380
 The basic principles indicate that well-
being is a subjective notion and as such cannot be defined or determined as effectively by a 
third-party as it can by the real-life person experiencing it. Each individual is in the best position 
to determine their own lived experience of well-being or suffering based on their own 
conceptions of well-being and life-satisfaction, happiness, or a good life, and such experience 
and value judgments cannot be dictated to them by experts or professionals.  
The multidimensional and interdisciplinary approach to studying poverty is at the heart of the 
Subjective Well-Being approach. While most research on poverty has focused on only one 
indicator, or some relatively small sample of them, Rojas demonstrates that the relationship 
between life- satisfaction and satisfaction in other specific and measurable domains is complex, 
including, but not limited to the domains of health, work, economic, friends, family, self and 
community. Including such a wide variety of the many domains that make up human experience 
allows for a more accurate determination to emerge. An important point here is that satisfaction 
in any of these domains, as well as the priority of each of them, is wholly subjective, meaning 
that development goals and methods must be set to a certain degree by the participants. While 
moving out of the experienced poverty category and into a higher life-satisfaction is an ultimate 
goal, moving out of income poverty is also seen as a goal, but only as a means to arrive at the 
end goal of higher overall life-satisfaction.
381
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Rojas also points out that high satisfaction in one domain can compensate for lower satisfaction 
in another making the overall level of life satisfaction higher.
382
 For example, high satisfaction 
with family may compensate for low satisfaction in the economic domain, or vice versa. Rojas’ 
model allows for those who are low income earners to nevertheless move out of the experienced 
poverty category, meaning that although they may continue to have relatively little income, they 
nonetheless experience high levels of satisfaction with other areas of life, areas that they consider 
more important and satisfying overall than income.  
Using Beaudoin’s conceptual model as a foundation for approaching poverty, in this chapter I 
will address the concepts or notions of poverty found in the Pāli Canon, as well as related 
Mahāyāna sūtras which indicate that these concepts were largely carried over into later 
traditions. While many of these passages will refer to poverty in an absolute sense, I will 
demonstrate that a substantial overlap exists with these Buddhist notions of poverty and the 
Capabilities Approach that is currently in use among a host of development agencies. 
4.2. Concepts of Poverty and Poverty Relief in the Pāli Canon 
While the notion of suffering is the primary preoccupation in Buddhist thought, surprisingly little 
has been written concerning the forms of suffering resulting from extreme poverty. Although 
poverty and poverty relief are issues that are clearly pertinent to Buddhist economic ethics, the 
current literature principally offers critiques of Western economic models that focus on 
overcoming greed and integrating more humanistic values in line with Buddhist thought with 
economic behavior without directly addressing impoverishment in its own right. However, some 
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scholars, such as Mavis Fenn, David Loy, and Peter Hershock, have broached this vital topic 
with clear explications of Buddhist approaches to issues of material impoverishment based on 
canonical texts and key Buddhist doctrines.
383
 I will here give an overview of the Buddhist 
perspectives on the nature of poverty that can then be drawn out of the canonical materials, 
followed by the analyses offered by Fenn, Hershock, and Loy as they offer important insights 
that typify Buddhist conceptions of poverty and poverty relief.  
4.2.1. Poverty in the Pāli Canon  
What, then, is the perspective on poverty found in the Buddhist texts? How is poverty portrayed? 
What does the term mean when used in Buddhist scriptures and texts? An examination of the 
references to poverty in the Pāli Canon reveals a complex perspective on poverty that includes a 
diverse array of purposes, causes, and effects. The common misconception in the West of 
Buddhism as unconcerned with material suffering is bolstered by the frequent portrayals in the 
Pāli Canon of poverty as beneficial, and the frequent praise of poverty as a virtue and even as an 
essential step on the path to salvation. However, this simplistic view overlooks the plain fact that 
canonical passages also clearly identify poverty in negative terms—as a hindrance to individual 
spiritual development, a social detriment, and a source of much individual and collective 
suffering. Thus, the texts clearly distinguish between two concepts of poverty, one negative, and 
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 I will address these conceptions of poverty found in the Pāli Canon, which 
outlines the earliest known notions of poverty in the Buddhist tradition. I focus here on the Pāli 
Canon because it is recognized by virtually all schools of Buddhism as an authoritative source of 
early Buddhist teachings, and because the Mahāyāna sūtras seem less concerned with the nature 
of poverty than with the obligation to relieve the suffering of the poor and how this ought to be 
accomplished; the Mahāyāna developments on the conceptions of poverty relief will be a 
significant focus of the following chapter. 
4.2.1.1. Material vs. Spiritual Poverty and Wealth 
A distinction is made at times between material and spiritual poverty and wealth. In contrast to 
the material sense of wealth and poverty, as in destitution, the terms poverty and wealth are often 
employed in spiritual terms, such as when these labels describe those who have attained, or 
alternatively those who lack, virtue or faithfulness. In the Debt Sutta, for example, the Buddha 
draws a comparison between the material poverty a householder might suffer under and the 
spiritual poverty of a monk that is said to be poor in the discipline. Much like a poor householder 
might borrow and enter into debt in a material sense, such a monk who is spiritually 
impoverished is also said to enter into a woeful form of debt because he lacks certain virtues and 
secretly works evil deeds, thoughts, and words.
385
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In the Poor Sutta of the Sakka-saņyutta, this notion of spiritual wealth is depicted as something 
which may remain unnoticed and yet which nonetheless prevails over indigent material 
circumstances as certain divine beings, called devas, are taught that, contrary to all appearances, 
a materially poor man is in reality wealthy because of his faith. The Buddha recounts this tale of 
an indigent pauper who undertook “faith, virtue, learning, generosity, and wisdom in the 
Dhamma and Discipline proclaimed by the Tathāgata.”386 As a result of this faithfulness, he was 
reborn into a heavenly world where he outshone the other Tāvatiņsa devas in their divine beauty 
and glory. The Tāvatiņsa devas then complained that this man who had previously been so poor 
became more glorious than any of them. Sakka, lord of the devas, defended this situation as 
merely the result of the faithful and virtuous undertakings in his previous life as a pauper, 
describing that faith and virtue as a wealth prevailing in importance over his indigent material 
circumstances.  
 When one has faith in the Tathāgata,  
 Unshakable and well established,   
 And good conduct built on virtue, 
 Dear to the noble ones and praised; 
 When one has confidence in the sangha 
 And, one's view is straightened out, 
 they say that one isn't poor; 
 One's life is not in vain.
387
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While preserving the role of wealth as a worthy goal, the Buddha compared the notions of 
material poverty and wealth with spiritual cultivation, repeatedly affirming the supremacy of 
spiritual wealth over material wealth. This is evident in the plain assertion of one of the best-
known Buddhist texts, the Dhammapada, that contentment is the greatest wealth.
388
 Virtue or 
righteousness in the Dhamma is thus portrayed as true wealth, and those who perfect the 
Buddhist virtues are truly wealthy and truly powerful. The Kuddāla-Jātaka includes a clear 
indication of this superiority of spiritual goods in a comparison between the overcoming of 
spiritual obstacles versus physical obstacles. The Buddha begins this tale with a poor young man 
who had nothing but the spade that he used for gardening.
389
 Upon realizing that the monks were 
eating better than he was and yet they were not toiling in the field to grow just enough food to 
eat, he hid his spade and became a recluse, living a life of simplicity like the monks. However, 
the tale continues, time and again the young man was overcome by greed and returned to the 
world of labor and ownership, only to forsake it again and return to the ascetic life. On the 
seventh time that he returned to his garden, he reminisced upon all the problems that the spade 
had caused him and he made up his mind to forsake it once and for all. Afraid he might return to 
his spade if he saw where it went, he closed his eyes and spun it around his head before throwing 
it with all his strength into a great river. Upon finally giving up all material possessions and 
thereby freeing himself from this attachment to his previous lifestyle, the monk repeatedly 
shouted “I have conquered!”390 He was approached by a powerful worldly ruler returning from 
conquering his own foes in battle, who asked the monk whom he had conquered, and explained 
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that he had also just recently conquered his enemies in a grand battle. The monk explained to the 
king that of the two he was the true conqueror himself because his battle was spiritual rather than 
material as was the ruler’s, inasmuch as he had conquered greed and lust in himself.391 
Mahāyāna texts generally support and incorporate the concepts of poverty found in the Pāli 
Canon, although there are some significant developments in the duties to relieve poverty, which 
will be discussed more fully below. As do passages in the Pāli Canon, Mahāyāna texts also often 
speak of wealth and poverty in spiritual instead of exclusively material terms. The Upāsakaśīla-
sūtra, for example, explains that if a person “has doubts with regards to the field of blessings” 
from giving, or “has much wealth, is free from obstructions, and there is a good field of blessings 
[to accept his offerings], but he still has no faith and cannot give”, he is poor.392 Thus, again we 
can see the terms ‘wealth’ and ‘poverty’ employed in spiritual senses of the words. Moreover, 
again we see in Mahāyāna texts such as this that material goods are often subordinated to 
spiritual qualities; spiritual wealth, or the wealth of faithfulness or virtue is depicted as having 
more value than any material wealth. While there are abundant passages defining poverty as a 
lack of key virtues, it is important to note that this is not the only notion of poverty in Buddhist 
texts; numerous passages also define poverty primarily in material terms. 
4.2.1.2. Simplicity vs. Deprivation 
As Fenn notes, the Pāli language contains different words to refer to these two very different 
concepts of poverty. In virtually all cases referring to poverty as a form of material deprivation, 
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the Pāli word used is dalidda.393 This means someone who is poor, indigent, or a pauper. When 
referring to simplicity and non-attachment, the ideal of voluntary poverty undertaken by the 
saṅgha, the Pāli word most often used is akiñcana, meaning possessionless, particularly in the 
spiritual sense of non-attachment to material goods.
394
 There is a clear distinction in the Pāli 
Canon, therefore, between the notions of material poverty as simplicity and poverty as 
deprivation.
395
 Moreover, poverty as deprivation is virtually always portrayed negatively in the 
Pāli Canon. On the other hand, poverty as simplicity, or the possessionlessness voluntarily 
undertaken as one enters the saṅgha—forsaking nearly all personal material possessions as well 
as the accompanying political or social standing that is based on material or other physical 
qualities—is universally portrayed positively.  
4.2.1.2.1.  Poverty as Simplicity 
Most of the references to material poverty found in the Pāli Canon portray it in a positive light, 
as a virtue and an essential step on the path to enlightenment or liberation. In keeping with 
teachings on removing craving and grasping, which inevitably lead to suffering and rebirth, the 
Buddha taught that one must overcome any greed or attachment, particularly to material 
possessions, in order to attain enlightenment. Thus, the ideal becomes material simplicity with a 
complete non-attachment, in particular to material goods. In the Brahmajāla Sutta, for example, 
the Buddha teaches the monks numerous different types of wrong view and promotes a life with 
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minimum possessions, supported by donations, and free from the wrong view of addiction to the 
enjoyment of stored-up goods.
396
 This type of voluntary poverty is known as possessionlessness 
or alternatively as homelessness. In the Sonaka-Jātaka, 8 blessings of the monk are described, 
which are due to the lack of wealth and homelessness.
397
 And, in the Cūĺahatthipadopama Sutta, 
non-attachment to material goods and a life of simplicity is again promoted as the way to 
spiritual fulfillment and the reasons for a renouncer’s worthiness.398 Again, in the Sangārava 
Sutta, the Buddha bestows typical high praise on the ascetics who willingly take up a life of 
homelessness, teaching that it is the renouncer who attains the ‘further shore’ of liberation.399 
Thus, monks voluntarily take up a life of homelessness, by giving up virtually all personal 
possessions, excepting a few basic items like a bowl and robes, and the social or political 
standing that often follow them, and, upon entering the saṅgha, live only on donor charity and 
the collective possessions of the saṅgha.400 The Buddha frequently taught these principles to 
those seeking to undertake the path to enlightenment.  
The narrative of the conquering monk found in the Kuddāla-Jātaka, which I briefly summarized 
above, also provides an example of the value of a possessionless life in the pursuit of liberation. 
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The poor young man, before becoming a monk, had nothing but the spade that he used for 
gardening.
401
 Nevertheless, as the tale indicates, time and again this little spade lured the young 
man into craving and attachment, which led to a cycle of repeatedly forsaking the world of labor 
and ownership in order to undertake an ascetic life, only to return to the life of labor and 
ownership again.
402
 Overcoming this temptation, the cycle resulting from craving and 
attachment, is seen as an essential step toward enlightenment. 
Customarily, the monks are allowed only the most minimal possessions. While describing the 
steps that a disciple must take toward enlightenment, the Buddha included forsaking a 
householder’s life of fortune and family for a life of homelessness, living contentedly with only 
robes for protection and alms-food to eat like a bird that “flies with its wings as its only 
burden.”403 They were originally said to possess only the ‘four requisites’ which represent only 
the basic necessities to sustain life: food from begging, robe from a dust heap, dwelling at the 
foot of a tree, and fermented cattle urine as medicine.
404
 An important implication here is that 
everyone– even those pursuing the ascetic ideal of simplicity– ought to have the basic 
requirements of life, including food, clothing, shelter, and at least some basic level of health care. 
But it is important to recognize that monks do not only forsake material possessions, but also 
forsake traditional family relationships and political and social standing based upon these things. 
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Several passages in the Pāli Canon, including the Bandhanāgāra Jātaka, Kumbhakāra Jātaka, 
The Udāna, and the Vessantara Jātaka go so far as to present family negatively, as objects of 
craving or attachment.
405
 However, while they forsake social and political standing based upon 
family name or possessions, the monks—Theravāda monks in particular—in a sense exchange 
this standing for social standing that is based instead on their perceived virtue and the 
renunciation of personal possessions. 
The ideal then becomes simplicity, meaning a general non-attachment and voluntary forsaking of 
material accumulation and the corresponding political and social standing built on it. The saṅgha 
stands as the clear example, but an important point is that they are examples to the lay-followers. 
While the monastic saṅgha is required to live by more strict codes of behavior in these regards, 
they stand as examples of the ideals toward which even the lay-followers strive. While lay-
followers do not typically forsake all their possessions, unless they join the monastic saṅgha, 
they are urged to strive to overcome craving and attachment, to live a more contented life of 
simplicity to the degree that they can as householders. 
4.2.1.2.2.  Poverty as Deprivation  
Voluntary poverty, however, is only one notion of poverty conveyed in the Pāli Canon. There are 
also a number of significant passages which elucidate the corresponding negative aspects of 
material poverty- those related to deprivation. As I have previously noted, the Dhammapada, for 
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example, succinctly proclaims “hunger is the worst disease.”406 While hunger here is often read 
merely as a general craving or attachment, it is undeniable that physical hunger is one 
particularly severe form of craving that is most difficult to overcome. Moreover, the basic 
message of the Middle Way is that starvation and mortification are as unhealthy as is hedonistic 
consumption. Poverty as deprivation is identified in the texts as a source of suffering and 
hindrance to spiritual development on an individual level; it is also identified as the cause of 
broader social ills which, if allowed to reach systemic levels, eventually lead to complete moral 
depravity and the decay of society at large.   
Material poverty is specified as a source of suffering in the Debt Sutta, in which the Buddha 
teaches that for householders, poverty is ‘a woeful thing’.407 Poverty leads one further and 
further into debt and thereby creates additional negative mental states and stress from the bills 
which must be repaid. Furthermore, poverty prevents one from enjoying those pleasures defined 
as worthy goals and rights of a householder—artha. This is specifically noted as the Buddha 
points to the pleasure of property, as one of the worthy pleasures or rights of householders.
408
 
Even more so than in the Pāli Canon, we find numerous passages in Mahāyāna sūtras referring to 
material poverty as a hardship to be alleviated. For example, The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight 
Thousand Lines plainly asserts, “all beings . . . should not go short of the requirements of life.”409 
Here we see clearly that the basic necessities of life should be available to all. 
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This notion of poverty entails the view that involuntary material poverty, or deprivation, stands 
as an obstacle or hindrance to one’s spiritual development and progression on the path to 
enlightenment. This is evident in the well-known narrative from the Dhammapadaţţhakathā, in 
which the Buddha postponed beginning his sermon to a group of well-off listeners until after a 
poor peasant had eaten, asserting that “there is no affliction like the affliction of hunger.”410 This 
Dhammapada commentary expands the narrative to tell us that the Buddha then explained, “I 
thought to myself, 'If I preach the Law to this man while he is suffering from the pangs of 
hunger, he will not be able to comprehend it'.”411 Although the Buddha had ascertained that the 
man was in a proper general condition to take in the Dhamma, his hungry state seems to have 
presented a current obstacle to his breakthrough to ‘stream entry’. 
Furthermore, in The Hindrances, the Buddha describes particular circumstances that are often 
specifically associated with poverty as hindrances to spiritual development. He teaches that if a 
monk is ill, if there is a famine or it is otherwise difficult to get food, or if there is danger such as 
from robbers then this is a “wrong time for striving,” meaning specifically the supreme endeavor 
of striving for liberation, or nirvana.
412
 This passage identifies certain material conditions that are 
necessary for spiritual progression, and explicitly names as hindrances those very conditions 
which are typically associated with poverty- illness, physical danger, and difficulty in attaining 
the necessities of life. As a hindrance to spiritual progression and full inclusion in the activities 
of the faith community—those very things that the Buddhist community promotes as the highest 
                                                             
410
  DTK 15.5 (Burlingame, 1921b: 74-76). 
411
  DTK 15.5 (Burlingame, 1921b: 76). 
412
  AN 5: 54 (Hare, 1934: 54-55). 
 M o n s o n  P a g e  | 182 
 
values—poverty stands as a lack of capabilities and substantial freedoms; it prevents individuals 
and communities from pursuing the very things they have reason to value. 
Perhaps the single most important passages concerning poverty in the Pāli Canon are found in 
the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta which identifies poverty both as a cause of immoral behavior of 
individuals and of a wider range of social ills and decay.
413
 In this sutta the Buddha tells a tale of 
a line of righteous monarchs, each of whom performed their duties correctly, ruling in 
righteousness, honoring the Dhamma, protecting their subjects, preventing all crime in the 
kingdom, and preventing widespread poverty by giving property to the needy.
414
 Later, however, 
one of the rulers did not follow the final prescribed counsel of giving property to the needy and it 
led to tragic results. The effects of withholding property from the needy are elaborately 
delineated, portraying the gradual and eventual destruction of any form of civilization or 
humanity in the kingdom. Poverty steadily increased in the kingdom until it became rampant. As 
a result of this poverty, one poor man was compelled by his utter lack to steal from another man 
and was arrested and taken before the king. As he was originally counseled to do, the king gave 
the poor man enough property to operate a business for the support of his mother, father, wife 
and children, and to give gifts to monks for his own spiritual welfare.
415
 Another man was later 
arrested for stealing, and was also given property in this manner by the king. As a consequence 
of the king’s fear that word might spread throughout the kingdom that the king was essentially 
rewarding theft by allotting property to those who were arrested for stealing, and that this might 
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then encourage others to steal, the king decided instead to punish as harshly as possible the next 
thief with decapitation. 
When word spread throughout the kingdom of the king's severe punishment of the thief, the 
reaction of the people was wholly unpredicted. Undeterred by the threat of such a harsh 
punishment, the people instead thought:  
Now let us get sharp swords made for us, and then we can take from anybody what is not 
given [which is called theft], we will make an end of them, finish them off once for all 
and cut off their heads.”416 
Accordingly, they then armed themselves and began murderous assaults and plunder on other 
villages, decapitating their victims even as the king had done to the thieves as punishment for 
their crimes. The Buddha then gives an important and revealing commentary, relating all of the 
resultant social deterioration and dehumanizing behavior back to the king’s initial failure to 
provide for the poor: 
Thus, from the not giving of property to the needy, poverty became rife, from the growth 
of poverty, the taking of what was not given increased, from the increase of theft, the use 
of weapons increased, from the increased use of weapons, the taking of life increased – 
and from the taking of life, people’s lifespan decreased, their beauty decreased. . . .”417 
Fenn argues that the particular usage in the text of the phrase ‘from this... this’ in the chain of 
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events is meant to make a clear connection from each event to the next; from the withholding of 
property from the poor as the cause to the eventual complete degeneration and destruction of 
society and essentially the complete loss of any sense of humanity.
418
 In so doing, the narrative 
serves to indicate the wide-ranging effects of poverty. Firstly, poverty often leads individuals to 
commit crime, such as theft and murder; it not only leads to more immoral behavior, but also to 
more severe types of immoral behavior. As we have seen earlier in the discussion of Buddhist 
ethics, in Buddhist thought, individuals and the karma that their thoughts and actions generate 
can more broadly affect society as a whole. Secondly, as poverty advances from an individual 
problem to a systemic one, its effects are far more severe, precluding not only the impoverished 
individual, but all members of the community from spiritual advancement. The Cakkavatti-
Sīhanāda Sutta indicates that once it advances to the systemic stage, poverty becomes the cause 
of spiritual decay and the utter destruction of any sense of humanity. As Fenn notes: 
In Buddhist psychology consciousness must always be consciousness of something…. 
The consciousness that perceives others as beasts is itself bestial. The ultimate 
consequence of poverty, then, is to remove an individual from the human realm, the only 
realm within which [nirvana] may be realized.
419
 
In this sense, poverty is seen not merely as a deprivation of material goods, but as a form of 
social exclusion and an obstacle to the very spiritual fulfillment that makes existence meaningful. 
The poor are excluded from the social behaviors and actions that generate merit and ensure their 
progress towards eventual liberation, such as, for example, dāna or donations to the saṅgha. 
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Furthermore, as moral decay advances, people essentially come to behave in a more bestial than 
human way, and are thus no longer capable of generating the type of karma or merit that will 
ensure them a good rebirth. Indeed, their behavior will more likely guarantee eventual rebirth in 
a lower realm. Furthermore, as poverty becomes systemic and the process of degeneration 
continues, the laity can no longer provide support for the saṅgha, the saṅgha then is no longer 
capable of striving for the release of nirvana, and are thereby excluded from that community 
which facilitates their enlightenment. Thus, “the material deprivation of some individuals causes 
the moral impoverishment of all”.420 Again, we see an emphasis on the inter-relatedness 
comprising society and on the collective suffering that necessarily results from the process of 
impoverishment. 
4.2.2.  Notions of Poverty Compared 
Returning now to the key categories of conceptions of poverty, the Pāli Canon often describes 
material poverty in terms of absolute poverty, representing a monetary perspective on poverty. 
For example, as I have noted above, a person defined as one who is destitute is said to be in need 
of the four basic commodities: food, clothing, shelter, and medicine.
421
 Thus, one most basic 
way to understand poverty in the Pāli Canon is as the lack of these basic necessities required to 
sustain life. 
On the other hand, there are also more complex portrayals of poverty as a cause of social 
exclusion in which the poor are deprived of the opportunity to participate in normal social 
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functions like donating to the saṅgha— the exclusion from which in fact may present an obstacle 
to an individual’s advancement toward liberation; such portrayals are indicative of a capabilities 
approach to poverty. Personal mental and spiritual development in the pursuit of liberation as an 
ideal goal is certainly in keeping with an approach to poverty that places optimal value on 
personal fulfilment and freedoms. As noted in the previous chapter, in this psychological 
dimension to poverty and human development, Buddhism shares some affinity with Self-
Actualization and Humanistic psychology, such as that promoted by Maslow, as well as the 
contemporary positive psychology movement and its focus on happiness and well-being.
422
   
UNDP has also incorporated some of the features of a happiness approach and Humanist 
psychology in the relatively recent turn towards human development and human security in their 
capabilities approach to poverty. Although, not as clearly defined or as developed as these 
models in assessing poverty with their advanced assessment mechanisms, the Buddhist approach 
to poverty bears some similarities on key points. Early Buddhist texts, such as the 
Dhammapadaţţhakathā narrative noted above, similarly assert the overriding need for basic 
material necessities as a prerequisite for the ultimate preeminent goal of mental and spiritual 
advancement toward enlightenment. In accordance with the capabilities approach, the focus here 
is on optimal well-being, happiness, or satisfaction, rather than merely on the basic requirements 
for survival. I have also indicated further that the early Buddhist tradition includes central 
teachings on interdependent social relationships among the rulers, the laity, and the saṅgha, 
which relationships are instrumental, if not in fact essential, to one’s enlightenment, making the 
exclusion from full participation in them detrimental. Furthermore, these central teachings entail 
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a strong emphasis on communities supporting individuals in undertaking voluntary forms of 
poverty and, thus, in promoting social and spiritual values over material goods. In the 
capabilities approach terms, participation in community, family, friendship, and mental and 
physical health can all be functionings that humans have reason to value and that contribute to a 
high level of life satisfaction. Similarly, the very notion of simplicity may be explained very well 
in the economic terms of Subjective Well-Being. The ideal of simplicity, in this sense, requires a 
transformation or a shift in values that result in a lower value placed on income and other purely 
materialistic goals, with a corresponding higher level of life-satisfaction resulting from high 
levels of satisfaction in other domains of human existence—broader well-being and health, 
participation in a community, and so forth. In this way, the monastic saṅgha and faithful lay-
followers may find themselves contented and non-attached in a low-income or income poverty 
experience category, while also maintaining a high life-satisfaction level that precludes them 
from the broader poverty experience category. 
Interestingly, the notion of relative poverty appears to be foreign to Buddhist thought. While the 
enormous wealth of some individuals is noted, and even praised, as in the popular example of 
Anathāpiňđika, the idea that some people are considered poor because they do not have the same 
level of wealth as others in the community does not seem to occur in Buddhist texts. This is 
likely because the very nature of this notion seems at odds with ideal of simplicity and the 
Middle Way approach which values having the basics needed for optimal well-being and doing 
without excess. While individual wealth is certainly praised, lacking wealth beyond one’s needs 
is not presented as a deficiency, but rather more as a virtue. 
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4.2.3. Causes of Poverty 
Having just addressed the general notions of poverty found in the Pāli Canon, I will now turn to 
the causes of poverty identified in the Pāli Canon. Although karma is often assumed to be the 
primary cause, if not the sole cause, for one's poor condition, in early texts it is not always so; 
socio-political causes and individual actions in the current life are also noted. 
4.2.3.1. Karma 
A common assumption concerning Buddhist approaches to poverty is that impoverishment is 
caused by karma, and should therefore simply be accepted as one’s lot in life. In actuality, the 
Buddhist view on the role of karma as the cause of impoverishment is somewhat ambiguous. In 
the Pāli Canon, karma is often pointed to as the cause of impoverishment or, alternatively, 
prosperity. In the Khadiraģgāra-Jatāka, for example, the wealthy lay donor Anāthapiňđika loses 
his wealth by giving donations to the Buddha and ceasing any further business undertakings. But, 
after only a brief period of impoverishment, his wealth is miraculously restored to him. The 
Buddha teaches that this is the karmic fruit of his generosity and goodness.
423
 Similarly, in the 
Siri Jātaka, due to jealousy of Anāthapiňđika's fortune in regaining wealth after his 
impoverishment, a brahmin recognizes that this results from karma and tries to steal 
Anāthapiňđika's good fortune by stealing the items in which it is said to temporarily reside so 
that he may also become wealthy.
424
 The Buddha teaches that it cannot be stolen, but that the 
merit of past lives enables people to obtain all types of “treasure in places where there is no 
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mine,” both physical and spiritual.425 These passages clearly point to karma as the reason for 
wealth or poverty. 
The Cūĺakammavibhanga Sutta, a very significant sūtra for a discussion of poverty and karma, 
reaches a similar conclusion. Here a brahmin student asks the Buddha why some human beings 
appear to have obtained superior states compared to others, or in other words, why some have 
short lives while others have long lives; some are sickly while others are healthy; some are 
wealthy, some poor, some beautiful and some ugly, and so forth.
426
 The Buddha explains to him 
that these differences are based on their previous actions. The text explicitly states that rebirth in 
poor circumstances results from a variety of karmically harmful behaviors. For example, a 
murderous or violent person, if reborn in a human state and not in a hell or some other lowly 
destination, will live a short life. Of particular importance is the Buddha’s teaching that not 
giving “food, drink, clothing, carriages, garlands, scents, unguents, beds, dwelling, and lamps to 
recluses or brahmins” leads specifically to rebirth into a state of poverty.427 Here the Buddha 
himself directly addresses impoverishment and names individual karmic demerit as the cause. 
Elsewhere, the Buddha taught the devatā Anāthapiňđika that individual merit is the cause of 
one's condition in life by saying that “action, knowledge, righteousness, virtue, and excellent 
life” are what purifies one, and not one’s clan or wealth.428 In the sutta directly following this, 
the Macchari Sutta, or the Discourse on Stinginess, the Buddha teaches another devatā that 
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stingy or miserly people in this world are generally born into a hell or suffer a ghost or an animal 
rebirth. If they are fortunate enough to be reborn in a human state, “they are born in a poor 
family where clothes, food, pleasures, and sport are obtained only with difficulty.” Those who 
are generous and faithful, on the other hand, are reborn into a heaven or into a rich family.
429
 
However, while these passages seem to clearly state that impoverishment or wealth are the 
results of previous karma, one important point to keep in mind concerning karma is noted in the 
Pāli Canon: a poor state of rebirth resulting from the law of karma is not permanent and can be 
improved upon by the same law. Thus, even if poverty was to result directly and solely from 
karmic demerit, the impoverished state would not simply need to be blindly accepted as one’s lot 
in life, but could in fact be changed. The Maccalāvagga and other suttas refer expressly to 
people who are born into a poor state as a karmic consequence and yet have the ability to raise 
themselves out of this state by their own efforts. The Buddha contrasts this with those who are 
born wealthy and yet, as a result of their behavior, are “bound for darkness” or a lower state in 
the next life.
430
 The Mahānāradakassapa Jātaka also contains a discourse on merit and karma, 
teaching that those born into miserable and poor circumstances can improve their lot in future 
lives through karma.
431
 A young slave in the tale serves to demonstrate that if the laws of karma 
are rejected, there is no longer hope for the future because this would remove the very possibility 
that one’s actions could positively change anyone’s future situation.432 
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Because karma is seen as the cause of numerous and diverse conditions, including the realm or 
form of rebirth, general character, key good or bad occurrences, and the general experience of 
life, it lends itself to fatalistic misinterpretations.
433
 It should be noted, however, that the Buddha 
seems to have entirely rejected any such fatalistic interpretation of the law of karma. A number 
of passages in the Pāli Canon, for example, question the caste-system accepted at the time of 
early Buddhism, which asserted that one’s caste was solely determined by birth as the result of 
karma.
434
 These passages indicate that one’s caste is not dependent on birth, and thus, by 
implication, cannot be dependent solely on karma from a previous life. The Buddha also warned 
against the belief that everything that occurs or every condition in life is the inevitable result of 
karma from previous lives, thereby denouncing those who believe that every pleasure or pain 
they experience results from previous actions.
435
 In the Girimānanda Sutta, the Buddha indicates 
numerous conditions, most notably hunger and thirst, that are not the result of karma, but rather 
the result of circumstance. 
Herein a monk who has gone to the forest . . . thus contemplates: This body has many ills, 
many disadvantages. Thus, in this body arise divers diseases, such as: disease of eyesight 
and hearing, of nose, tongue, trunk, head, ear, mouth, teeth; there is cough, asthma, 
catarrh, fever, decrepitude, belly-ache, swooning, dysentery, griping, cholera, leprosy, 
imposthume, eczema, phthisis, epilepsy; skin-disease, itch, scab, tetter, scabies; bile-in-
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the-blood (jaundice), diabetes, piles, boils, ulcers; diseases arising from bile, from 
phlegm, from wind, from the union of bodily humours, from changes of the seasons, from 
stress of circumstances, or from the ripeness of one’s karma; also cold and heat, hunger 




As Harvey notes, while karma can be understood as a basic law of cause and effect, this does not 
imply that every event or condition in life is necessarily the direct result solely of one’s own 
previous actions; nor does karma interfere with one’s freedom to choose or imply that the act of 
choosing is itself predetermined by previous acts.
437
 Such teachings would clearly undermine the 
Buddha’s entire message. Furthermore, the Buddha declared that some conditions are the result 
of causes beyond one’s control, such as another’s actions, accident, or natural causes.438  
Some of the difficulty in recognizing karmic results is because they do not necessarily manifest 
in the current life, or even the next, but may take many lifetimes to come to fruition. Thus, 
ethical or moral behavior will certainly lead to a good rebirth, although it may not necessarily be 
the next rebirth.
439
 Furthermore, the specific karma generated from any thought or act is 
dependent on a number of variables, including the intention of the doer, the overall character of 
the doer, and any ensuing feelings of regret or repentance.
440
 The Buddha makes this strikingly 
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clear in the Lonaphala sutta.
441
 Referring to the obvious disparity between the way that the rich 
and the poor are treated, he teaches that karmic results of actions vary among agents depending 
on their spiritual attainment or character.  The lot of the rich and poor is compared in order to 
explain how the same action can lead to different consequences for different people. The Buddha 
asks the monks questions concerning the sort of person who would be punished more harshly 
with time in prison, or beatings, or death. In all cases, the monks respond that it is the poor 
person who is dealt with more harshly, and the rich who are often excused. The Buddha 
concludes, comparing the materially poor in these cases with the spiritually poor—those who are 
insignificant and miserable, with restricted souls and lives, careless in the discipline of body, 
habits and thoughts, and who have not developed insight. These, he says, are they who are taken 
to a hell as the karmic results of even a small action, while the suffering of those who are 
wealthy in the opposite attributes seems insignificant.
442
 In this example the karmic results of a 
given action are dependent upon the overall character or spiritual attainment of the agent, and not 
solely upon the particular action or intention. 
Thus, we see that although the generation of karma may influence and cause certain conditions 
of rebirth, it is not seen as the sole cause of one’s present condition. Indeed, karma from a 
previous act, even from a life eons prior, may or may not be the cause of any particular 
condition, and, therefore, speculation about such direct karmic causation is discouraged. 
Notwithstanding the seemingly overwhelming number of texts designating karma as the cause of 
poverty, in the end the case is not entirely clear. Indeed, the doctrine of karma itself seems 
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unclear and at times inconsistent in the Pāli Canon.443 What is clear is that the Pāli Canon does 
refer to poverty as a karmic result of one’s greed. However, this message should not be 
overshadowed by the other clear message that poverty can also alternatively arise from other 
causes. Fenn contends that while karma is repeatedly mentioned as a cause of poverty, in the 
texts that explicitly deal at length with the particular question of poverty, karma is noticeably 
absent as its cause.
444
 In the popular Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta described above, for example, 
the causes of poverty are specified in detail, but they are purely socio-political.  
Because of this complexity and the difficulty in identifying whether karma is the cause of any 
particular condition, the Buddha discouraged such endeavors, even going so far as to say that 
they would result in madness.
445
 In short, although the realm into which one is reborn is said to 
be determined by previously generated karma, not all other aspects of that rebirth, including 
poverty or wealth, are necessarily the results of karma.   
4.2.3.2.  Socio-political Causes 
Among the cause of poverty identified in the Pāli Canon, a number of key passages refer to 
socio-political causes, such as poverty which is caused by the actions of rulers. A clear lesson 
from the previously mentioned Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta is that when a King neglects to rule 
according to the Dhamma, and particularly by ignoring duties pertaining to taking care of the 
poor, the prosperity of the country declines and eventually poverty becomes rampant and 
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 Similarly, in the Kurudhamma-Jātaka the king is required to live virtuously in order 
to bring an end to the famine, pestilence, and destitution in his kingdom.
447
 In both of these 
suttas, poverty results from the behavior of the rulers. Furthermore, it is noted that a king might 
impoverish his subjects by exorbitantly taxing them. For this precise reason kings are included in 
a list of dire circumstances that obliterate wealth, such as fires, floods, and thieves.
448
 
It is also noteworthy that class distinctions, and the resulting distribution of goods that such 
distinctions cause, are portrayed as the seemingly inevitable outcome of social corruption. Again, 
in the Aggañña Sutta, the Buddha teaches the beginnings of humankind as a series of corruptions 
which led the primordial beings into human form and activities.
449
 The creation of the natural 
world and social ordering are portrayed as a long history of degeneration as beings become 
lustful and greedy, leading to more and more differentiation and stratification within society. It is 
noted that the storing or hoarding of excess goods leads to stealing, lying, and abuse and a lower 
quality of life for all, and eventually separating society into classes.
450
 Again, as in the 
Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta, society begins to progress to a more peaceful and spiritually 
enlightened state only when a group withdraws from the depraved social structure and its 
distinctions to undertake meditative practices—representing the influence of the monastic 
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saṅgha on the morality of the broader society. 
4.2.3.3. Individual Choice 
Karmic merit from previous lives and socio-political conditions do not wholly account for all 
impoverishment, however. Clearly, one's own actions in this life may also lead to poverty. As I 
indicated in the previous chapter on Buddhist economics, in the Sigālaka Sutta, the Buddha 
teaches the laity specific principles that would lead one to prosperity. Included in these teachings 
is the notion that some forms of poverty are the direct result of individual misbehavior. Addiction 
to alcohol, drugs, or gambling, for instance, leads directly to a loss of wealth and poverty.
451
 
Additionally, laziness and living beyond one’s financial means are also pointed to as causes of 
the loss of wealth.
452
  
This focus on individual behavior is more often the message of the Buddha’s approach to karma 
and the path to enlightenment. The Buddha taught that social distinctions based on the caste that 
one is born into are not legitimate. One is not noble because of birth or caste, but because one 
behaves in a noble manner. One’s thoughts, words, and deeds make one noble or ignoble.  
I do not say, brahmin, that one is better because one is from an aristocratic family, nor do 
I say that one is worse because one is from an aristocratic family. I do not say that one is 
better because one is of great beauty, nor do I say that one is worse because one is of 
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great beauty. I do not say that one is better because one is of great wealth, nor do I say 
that one is worse because one is of great wealth…. 
"Here, brahmin, one of great beauty ... one of great wealth may kill living beings ... and 
hold wrong view. Therefore I do not say that one is better because one is of great beauty 
... of great wealth. But also, brahmin, one of great beauty ... of great wealth may abstain 
from killing living beings ... and hold right view. Therefore I do not say that one is worse 
because one is of great beauty ... of great wealth. 
453
 
4.3. Buddhist Analyses of Poverty 
Having outlined the key passages related to poverty, we can now consider the academic 
approaches to the issue in the writings of Mavis Fenn, David Loy, and Peter Hershock. Mavis 
Fenn wrote the most comprehensive analysis of the early Buddhist approach to poverty to date in 
her dissertation on the notions of poverty in the Pāli Canon. Fenn bases her analysis of the 
notions of poverty on the Agañña Sutta and the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta in the Pāli Canon 
discussed above.
454
 These suttas are two of the most important Buddhist texts concerning poverty 
and moral obligations related to it. Fenn illustrates the most fundamental beginning point to 
understanding Buddhist conceptions of poverty—that two notions of poverty are apparent in the 
Pāli texts: simplicity and deprivation.455 While the religious elites are encouraged to enter the 
saṅgha and take on a voluntary form of poverty or simplicity, material deprivation is nonetheless 
                                                             
453
  MN 96: 7-8 (Ñaňamoli, 1995: 787-788). 
454
  DN 27 (Walshe, 1995: 407-415); DN 26 (Walshe, 1995: 395-405). 
455
  Fenn, 1994 and 1996.  
 M o n s o n  P a g e  | 198 
 
distinguished from these and designated as detrimental to personal and collective well-being and 
spiritual development.  
Fenn offers an impressive analysis of voluntary poverty in the form of simplicity and its role in 
the saṅgha and traditional Buddhist societies. She employs the concepts of structure and anti-
structure, or communitas, as defined by the anthropologist Victor Turner, to illustrate the role of 
the saṅgha.456 By decrying the predominant values which prize personal property and 
relationships that are based on worldly power, the saṅgha models an alternative set of values to 
the rulers and the laity; the monastic community acts as a living critique of the dominant 
structure and values and, thereby, fill a role as a sort of conscience for the broader society.
457
 
Here Fenn refers to communitas as a “feeling of a common human bond with others that arises in 
luminal situations where structure, characterized by differentiation and hierarchy, is absent or 
minimal.”458 In Turner’s view, society is a dialectic process involving a tension between 
communitas, “the undifferentiated community of equal individuals,” and structure, “the 
differentiated and often hierarchical system of social positions.”459 In this process, the political 
rulers and Brāhmaňas are said to represent the structural ideals of family, wealth, status and 
power; the monastic saṅgha, on the other hand is said to represent the ideals of communitas, 
which exemplify an alternative and antipodal set of values that celebrate social and economic 
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equality, celibacy, and a simple life of non-attachment and voluntary poverty.
460
 Simplicity, 
therefore, not only plays an important role in personal spiritual progression toward 
enlightenment, as is often associated with the monastic saṅgha, but it is also significant in social 
and collective well-being as a counterbalance to the dominant and often ego-driven hierarchical 
structure in society. 
Involuntary poverty, or material deprivation, on the other hand, “prevents an individual from 
participating fully in community life, results in dehumanization that severely restricts, if not 
destroys, the possibility of spiritual progress.”461 In essence, impoverishment excludes 
individuals from the very social behaviors and practices that facilitate enlightenment, and traps 
them instead in a bestial form of existence in which further degeneration and suffering is the 
most likely outcome. Furthermore, when poverty becomes widespread it in like manner destroys 
collective well-being, and leads to the moral degeneration and degradation of the broader 
community.
462
 Fenn’s notion of poverty as deprivation as portrayed in the Pāli Canon is not 
solely one of material want, but also shares much in common with the capabilities approach to 
poverty I have outlined, including most notably, the notion of social exclusion, particularly by 
holding the freedom to pursue one’s own material, personal and spiritual development as the 
ultimate goal—a goal which is severely impeded by poverty.  
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Fenn argues that the saṅgha embodies the Buddhist values that stand at odds against the social 
structure. By embodying the alternative set of values and practices, the saṅgha represents a 
critique of society and its structures. Fenn notes that some texts, such as the Raţţhapāla Sutta, 
Sonaka Jātaka, and Kuddāla-Jātaka seem to reject the social order entirely.463 The well-known 
and popular Aggañña Sutta, on the other hand, illustrates the social criticism offered by the 
saṅgha, seemingly portraying a transformation of society rather than a rejection of it. The 
Aggañña Sutta tells of two young men who forsake their Brāhmaňa background and lay lives to 
follow the Buddha as homeless monks.
464
 In order to refute the criticisms from the young men’s 
families and friends, the Buddha tells a well-known and influential creation story, referred to 
above, in which the ancestors of humans descended from a sort of primordial mind-form state. 
These beings gradually become differentiated from one another as they become greedy and 
lustful. They eventually become humans, living on earth in family units– all of which is 
identified as the result of a degeneration from their previous superior forms. The beings live by 
collecting food each day, but eventually become lazy, begin to hoard food supplies as property 
rights and a social structure are caused to develop. The formation of society is thus portrayed as a 
further step toward degeneration. This process of degeneration is halted, however, only when the 
humans elect a king to protect them and their property from theft and to punish those who break 
the newly established laws. And, the process only begins to reverse when some of the humans 
take to meditation and live by collecting offerings from others, which undoubtedly represents the 
Śramaňa movement generally, and the saṅgha in particular. Others, who represent the 
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competitors to the saṅgha, the Brāhmaňas, are portrayed as ineffectual at meditation and decide 
instead to compose books, presumably Brāhmaňic scripture.   
In her analysis of the Aggañña Sutta, Fenn indicates some important features relating to the 
saṅgha and the concept of poverty.465 Not only does the text portray wealth and family, and other 
social distinctions, as forms of degeneration from an ideal state from which humankind 
originates, but it also implies that the Brāhmaňa and Śramaňa groups both emerge quite 
naturally as parts of society, and that kingship or government also plays an important role—
namely, in establishing a stable society that allows the renouncers to not only survive, but to 
thrive. Thus, Fenn argues that the text affirms a tension between the values of the dominant 
social structure and the community of renouncers, revealing the renouncer’s radical social 
criticism as an alternative set of values and counter-cultural ethic within the structure as opposed 
to a complete rejection of it. Indeed, as I noted above, the saṅgha relies on a safe, stable, and 
prosperous society to continue their ascetic practices. Voluntary poverty or simplicity, then, is a 
natural component of a healthy and ideal society. 
David Loy presents a Buddhist perspective on the problem of world poverty with an insightful 
critique of Western notions of development.
466
 In The Great Awakening, Loy uses Buddhist 
concepts to analyze the nature of poverty and poverty relief. He notes that material poverty is 
conceived in early Buddhism as lacking the basic needs of survival; as a source of suffering, 
material deprivation becomes a concern of the Buddhist teachings.
467
 However, because the 
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Buddhist notion of well-being is a more comprehensive notion that includes eliminating all 
forms of suffering through moral and mental development, overcoming this form of suffering is 
not simply a matter of accumulating more goods, as poverty relief is often conceived.
468
 Loy 
addresses Western notions of ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’, pointing out deficiencies 
in common economic measures that project foreign Western notions onto other cultures.
 In Loy’s 
view, the Western mind is severely entrapped by a wealth/poverty dualism; preoccupation with 
development and poverty relief results directly from a preoccupation with economic growth.
469
 
The conception of development principally as economic growth, Loy suggests, may in fact have 
exacerbated the problem of world poverty.
470
 Loy argues that the problem of poverty is 
inseparable from the problem of wealth; any accurate analysis of poverty, therefore, must include 
a critique of the drive for wealth and its effects.
471
 This is perhaps one of the most profound 
insights into poverty that Buddhism contributes to the broader discussion of poverty relief and 
international development studies today. Increasing accumulation and consumption is likely to 
correspondingly increase craving and greed—the major sources of suffering in a Buddhist 
analysis. Loy’s view is perfectly in line with Buddhist analyses of the sources of suffering in 
stating that the final goal of true development, correctly conceived, can only occur through 
transforming greed into generosity; ill-will or hatred into compassion; and, delusion or ignorance 
into wisdom.
472
 In this view, poverty is not primarily the natural or inevitable result of economic 
failure, but rather of a moral failure. Overconsumption of goods and resources among wealthy 
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nations is just as much a part of the problem as is deprivation in the poorer nations. A narrow 
focus on production and consumption as the goals of development falls prey to increases in 
income and wealth inequalities that may push many people further into poverty even while 
raising some few out of it. 
Rejecting what he sees as having been the broad goal of common economic policies in poverty 
relief projects over the last several decades, as being primarily to integrate the poor to a greater 
degree into the established global economy, Loy instead defines the appropriate goal as re-
embedding the broader economy in social relationships and local cultural values.
473
 By doing so, 
it seems, material accumulation and growth will not dominate the focus, overshadowing local 
values and understandings of well-being. In place of imposing alien notions of wealth and 
poverty on local communities, such a project of re-embedding would allow individuals and 
communities to determine for themselves the meaning of well-being and wealth, based on their 
own cultural values, while remaining focused on the healthy social relationships that form the 
foundation of a healthy society and economy. Loy notes that the characteristic Buddhist response 
to poverty is the key Buddhist virtue of dāna; generosity is a virtue that promotes fundamental 
social relationships essential to a thriving community or economy. Echoing the views of Singer 
and Pogge, Loy adds that there are already enough resources available to provide for the world’s 
poor, if only there also existed the collective will to do so.
474
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Peter Hershock has also made some important contributions to the undertaking of analyzing 
poverty in light of Buddhist insights. He addressed the questions of what a Buddhist conception 
of poverty and what a genuinely Buddhist approach to poverty relief might look like, relying 
largely on the well-known Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta as well as the extremely popular 
Mahāyāna Lotus Sūtra.475 Hershock’s conception of poverty is a primarily relational one; this 
view relies on the Buddhist teachings of non-self and interdependent co-arising.
476
 That is to say 
that his model rejects the notion that poverty can be defined on an individual basis, but rather 
that poverty must be understood in terms of the entire complex system or processes that 
contribute to impoverishment.  
As Hershock expresses it: 
Insofar as poverty, like all things–our own selves included– arises as a particular 
complexion of always dynamic and ultimately horizonless relationships, poverty cannot 
arise without our being implicated in it. Poverty does not consist of a particular state of 
affairs into which we as individuals or groups can, on tragic occasion, find ourselves to 
have fallen. Rather, poverty is an eventuality that expresses a particular inflection (or 
perhaps, distortion) of an abiding pattern of relationships. It marks a persisting confluence 
of conditions conducive to a distinctive, and at times locally quite intense, quality and 
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Most generally stated, poverty marks the persistence of an increasingly constraining 
relational pattern – a relational dynamic that is qualitatively stagnant or degrading. 
Poverty is not something occurring in a given situation, afflicting only some specific 
person or people. It signals a distinctive meaning or heading of a situation– a heading that 
is not spatial, but qualitative. Poverty means a persistent situational depreciation 
eventuating in all present becoming less and less valuably situated, but also less and less 




Hershock notes that, in addition to other cultures and traditions, this notion of interdependence 
and inter-relatedness is evident in Buddhist thought.
479
 Indeed, it is central to a Buddhist 
perspective, and is particularly insightful in portraying a clear Buddhist conception of the 
phenomena of poverty, but it is not a uniquely Buddhist idea and the analysis he presents of 
poverty is a useful one for the larger development community.  
Hershock exemplifies the strength of a Buddhist analysis of poverty: poverty is not merely a 
problem for one socio-economic group within a society—the poor—but for all of the society as 
whole, all of which has not only contributed in some way to the generation of the phenomenon of 
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impoverishment, but also suffers in some way because of it. While some elite minority group 
may seem to benefit from increasing and even extravagant wealth, there is good evidence to 
suggest that the wider the income and wealth gap becomes in a given society, the worse off 
everyone—even the wealthy— become in terms of overall health and well-being. Richard 
Wilkinson, for example, has compiled evidence from governmental and development 
organizations around the world over a thirty year period that suggest that societies that are more 
equal in terms of a smaller gap between the wealthiest and the poorest also exhibit better 
outcomes in a wide variety of measures, including satisfying community and social relationships, 
mental health and substance abuse, physical health and fitness, life expectancy, teenage births, 
violence and imprisonment, and social mobility.
480
 These lower outcomes and lower levels of 
overall satisfaction are not only a problem for the socioeconomic groups at the lowest end of the 
income and wealth scale, although they likely experience it the most intensely, but are 
experienced by virtually all members of society to some degree. So, in the end, the notion here is 
less about shifting focus away from individual well-being to a broader notion of societal well-
being, but rather recognizing an expanded notion of well-being which recognizes that individual 
well-being is in fact intimately tied to and conditioned by societal well-being through a vast 
complex of relationships. 
Hershock identifies the Buddhist concern with non-dualistic modes of thought as a genuinely 
Buddhist contribution to poverty relief which undermines the dualism of the notions that often 
muddle the discussion, such as ‘poverty’ and ‘wealth’, ‘rich’ and ‘poor’, ‘developed’ or 
‘undeveloped’, or ‘us’ and ‘them’. Cultivating this wisdom allows for a clearer conception of the 
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complex issues related to poverty as well as a greater compassion and generosity to enlarge 
within individuals and society at large, leading to a more committed engagement with the 
sources of suffering that cause material deprivation. 
While Fenn, Loy, and Hershock base their analyses of poverty on canonical texts, they also 
expand their analyses by including certain key Buddhist doctrines that developed over many 
years after the Pāli Canon was comprised, and applied the teachings directly to the issue rather 
than primarily searching for texts that deal directly with poverty; all of these present clear 
analyses that contribute significant advances toward an understanding of a Buddhist analysis of 
poverty. All of these approaches are grounded firmly in Buddhist thought and can be found in 
some form in Buddhist scripture and texts.  
4.4. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to address Buddhist conceptions of poverty, focusing 
primarily on the Pāli Canon, the most complete extant collection of early Buddhist texts, and 
expanding the scope to include Mahāyāna sources as well as contemporary academic 
approaches. I began with a general discussion of the categories often employed in poverty 
studies in order to present a systematic approach and provide a theoretical structure with which 
we might better understand the Buddhist conceptions of poverty. I indicated that while the 
descriptions of poverty often fit within the framework of the absolute approach to poverty 
outlined by Beaudoin, the notion of poverty as relational, interdependent, and as playing a role in 
both individual and collective well-being, also significantly overlaps with contemporary 
capabilities approaches, including the Subjective Well-Being approach to poverty and the notion 
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of social exclusion.  
I presented the teachings on poverty that form the foundation of a Buddhist approach to 
conceptions of poverty found in the Pāli Canon. I also expanded on these passages and on Fenn’s 
approach by including more Pāli suttas as well as various later Mahāyāna sūtras, thereby 
showing a broader consensus among the major schools of Buddhism. These passages of scripture 
identify the earliest known and most common Buddhist notions of poverty and wealth, including 
their various causes and effects, and outline duties for dealing with poverty. 
The key previous academic writings on poverty and significant passages from Buddhist scripture 
related to poverty demonstrate that poverty is portrayed as both a virtue and a vice. As the ideal 
of non-attachment, simplicity, it is described as a step in the path to liberation; but, as 
deprivation, it is also a source of profound suffering on an individual and collective level, a 
possible hindrance to spiritual development, and when it advances to a systemic level, it becomes 
a cause of moral decay in society. By undertaking this form of voluntary poverty, the saṅgha 
embodies a counter-cultural ethic, serving as moral exemplars by embodying and modeling an 
alternative set of values that place a higher value on spiritual development than on material 
goods. The saṅgha comes to stand in direct opposition to the more typical power values of class, 
wealth, and political standing, giving priority instead to spiritual attainment—namely in 
overcoming attachment, hatred and delusion.  
The notion of poverty that emerges is inter-relational and interdependent, as a dynamic process 
that includes not only those who are impoverished, but also the entire system of processes that 
have broken down to create impoverishment, as indicated by Hershock; individuals and society 
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at large influence one another in their economic, spiritual, social and moral pursuits. Poverty is 
also defined in a qualitative fashion here. Presumably there will always be those who have less 
than others, as a result of a diversity of causes, but the point of concern is how little they have 
and how they suffer as a result of it. Hershock’s approach stands as a strong critique of the entire 
globalized system that has a part in creating this phenomenon of extreme poverty. The enormous 
gap in income and wealth between the richest and the poorest, and the plain fact that tens of 
thousands of small children die daily of starvation, or related and preventable illnesses, present a 
clear indictment of a systemic failure of the entire process—one that correspondingly creates 
enormous wealth and overconsumption at one extreme and brutal poverty and starvation at the 
other. As a relational process, the notions of poverty outlined in the Pāli Canon denote a diversity 
of inter-related causes, including karmic, socio-political or structural, and behavioral causes. 
While karma is identified as a cause of poverty, it is not a fatalistic view; in the end, those who 
find themselves in poverty are encouraged to escape from it, and not merely to accept it as their 
lot in life.  
Having outlined a Buddhist approach to poverty, in the chapter that follows, I will address 
Buddhist conceptions of poverty relief. This will include a survey of Pāli Canonical passages that 
indicate the duties to relieve poverty, as well as some important Mahāyāna developments 
concerning both the centrality of the obligation to relieve poverty and descriptions of the manner 
in which it ought to be done. This will provide a theoretical framework that might be used in 
formulating a genuinely Buddhist approach to poverty relief, which I will then explore through 
examination of certain poverty alleviation projects in the history of the Buddhist tradition and in 
the contemporary Socially Engaged Buddhist movement. 
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5.  Poverty Relief 
The previous chapters have established the general role of ethics in the Buddhist path to 
enlightenment, and the conceptions of poverty and wealth in Buddhist thought. This chapter will 
now directly address the moral demand for poverty relief in Buddhist social ethics by first 
detailing the duties of the major social groups to relieve poverty as outlined in the Pāli Canon. I 
will then describe the duty to relieve poverty and the conception of poverty relief that emerges 
from certain well-known Mahāyāna sūtras that are representative of the tradition, as well as how 
these characteristically Buddhist notions of poverty relief have been exemplified in Buddhist 
history and in contemporary Socially Engaged Buddhist poverty relief projects.   
5.1. Social Duties to Relieve Poverty 
The duty to relieve poverty in Buddhist social ethics is grounded in two main notions that I 
outlined above: first, material deprivation is a significant source of dire suffering; and, second, 
generosity and compassion toward the poor constitute key virtuous behaviors that can be 
cultivated as one advances on the path toward enlightenment. I introduced the topic of this 
dissertation by making reference to two leading ethicists who have proclaimed the moral 
responsibility to alleviate the suffering caused by extreme poverty—Thomas Pogge and Peter 
Singer. While they both agree that humankind has a moral responsibility to the world’s poor, 
their approaches are grounded in different concerns. Pogge, for example approaches the moral 
responsibility to the poor in terms of human rights. Turning more common discussions of welfare 
and foreign aid on their head, Pogge asks what right the wealthy have to take possession of such 
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a disproportionately large portion of the earth’s resources.481 In Pogge’s view, the poor have a 
legitimate claim to the goods and resources required for their survival, and extreme poverty is 
then presented as a denial of this most basic of human rights. Peter Singer, on the other hand, 
grounds his approach to the moral responsibility to the poor in a Utilitarian ethic. If we can 
prevent the severe suffering and death of the world’s poor by sacrificing some good without 
causing ourselves or others to suffer equally, then we are morally bound to do so.
482
 In the 
complex mathematics of suffering, simply giving up the satisfaction or pleasure we might 
receive from some unnecessary or luxury goods can reduce the collective and individual 
suffering and death, and we are, therefore, morally bound to do so. Briefly considering these 
approaches of Pogge and Singer helps us clarify the Buddhist approach as it bears some 
similarities with both of these approaches.  
From a Buddhist perspective, the notion of human rights is problematic. While the Buddhist 
tradition is not opposed to human rights, and it certainly opposes persecution and discrimination 
on principle, the Western notion of human rights is somewhat foreign to the tradition.
483
 Perhaps 
most significantly this is due to the fact that the Buddhist non-self teaching complicates the task 
of locating the source of any such rights. However, Pogge’s notion of poverty as a denial of a 
basic human right is very much in line with the notion of material poverty as a form of social 
exclusion and a deprivation of the most basic requirements for progression toward 
enlightenment, even if the language of rights may seem foreign. If it is the case that the basic 
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requirements for a simple but relatively comfortable existence are essential for one to be 
prepared to even hear the Buddha’s message, then causing or even allowing others to lack those 
necessary basic requirements constitutes a deprivation of the most vital necessities for living a 
meaningful life.  
Singer’s utilitarian approach of weighing the heavy costs of suffering against the relatively minor 
and fleeting pleasures of comfort and luxury, does resonate with the Buddhist Middle Path and 
the foundation of Buddhist economic ethics. Material wealth can only provide so much pleasure 
in removing unnecessary suffering; at some point it no longer contributes to the same increases 
in genuine happiness and well-being, but may in fact detract from it, causing some level of 
suffering to oneself and others. There is something fundamentally utilitarian in this approach.  
As I have noted, the main concern of the Buddhist tradition is the overcoming of all forms of 
suffering; extreme poverty is, therefore, a concern because it represents a specific, and 
particularly severe form of suffering, a form that also substantially prevents one from advancing 
on the path to enlightenment. If the ultimate goal in Buddhism is the transcendence of all forms 
of suffering, then Buddhists necessarily must be concerned with the suffering of the poor. Keown 
has argued that while it also bears some similarities with other Western ethical theories, Buddhist 
ethics can be best understood as a form of virtue ethics.
484
 It should be clear at this point that the 
virtues of generosity and compassion form the foundation of a Buddhist social ethic of poverty 
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relief. Cultivating these virtues, as well as perfecting the other key virtues, constitutes the path to 
liberation. In short, one should reduce or eliminate the suffering of the poor because this is 
simply what an enlightened being does. Cultivating these virtues not only eliminates the sources 
of one’s own suffering, but also requires one to act to eliminate the suffering of others as well. 
Such compassionate and generous behaviors move one closer toward Buddhahood or arahatship. 
Harvey has noted that, while Buddhist ethics are not duty-based in the Kantian sense, we can 
nevertheless refer to duties in the sense that there are certain things that individuals ought to do 
in order to promote the satisfaction and happiness of oneself and others.
485
 In what follows, I will 
outline such key duties in regards to poverty relief. 
A helpful way to conceptualize the ethics of poverty relief in the Buddhist tradition is to examine 
the social roles as they relate to poverty relief. The Pāli Canon and various Mahāyāna sūtras 
contain numerous references to poverty relief efforts among the key social groups I outlined 
above in reference to social theory. Some of these passages are descriptive, indicating the manner 
in which some early Buddhist followers applied the Buddhist message in a social context, while 
more importantly, other passages are prescriptive or normative, indicating the ideal or proper 
roles or duties of the major social groups in this regard. These passages reveal that poverty is not 
only described as a clear social evil, but one that everyone has some part in removing; the 
political rulers, the saṅgha, and the laity all have clear duties regarding the alleviation of poverty.  
The chapter begins with a focus on passages in the Pāli Canon, which demonstrate a clear 
distinction between the social roles and corresponding duties among these social groupings. The 
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Mahāyāna texts are addressed later, not because they indicate a lower priority among the social 
roles related to poverty– indeed the opposite is arguably the case– but because they tend to blur 
these distinctions between the social groupings as a result of the development of the bodhisattva 
ideal, thereby making a duty to directly relieve the material suffering of the poor and needy more 
clearly incumbent upon all who strive for enlightenment.  
5.1.1.  The Role of Kings/Government 
As we have seen previously in the outline of Buddhist social ethics, the primary duties of the 
king outlined in Buddhist scriptures include the provision of a safe society and stable economy. 
Part of these duties is expressly identified as a concern for the poor and the relief of poverty. The 
ideal ruler is explicitly charged, for example, with distribution of wealth specifically to the aid of 
the poor.
486
 In the Kūţadanta Sutta, the king is instructed to fulfill his duty to provide a safe 
society, free from crime and other social ills, as a prerequisite to receiving any benefits from 
offering sacrifice, and is further encouraged to do this by practicing the Buddhist virtue of 
giving. The relief of poverty is connected to the very activities best known for generating karmic 
merit—the practice of giving or dāna. Here we see that giving to the poor and the saṅgha is 
specified as the supreme offering by the king.
487
 Through a story of how, in a past rebirth, he had 
advised a king, the Buddha teaches the king that only the act of giving to his subjects could 
successfully remove the plague of thievery besetting the kingdom. More specifically, he tells 
how in the past life he had instructed the king to give grain and fodder, capital, and proper living 
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wages to subjects in his kingdom. Once the king had taken these efforts to establish economic 
justice and prosperity, the narrative concludes, the plague of thieves was removed. 
Buddhist scripture and canonical texts consistently assert this concern for the poor and the 
provision of material goods and property for their welfare as primarily the duty of the king, 
although we shall soon see that the lay followers are also encouraged to give to the poor, and 
even the saṅgha contributes to the poor despite their own individual possessionlessness. 
Returning once again to one of the most important passages concerning poverty in the Pāli 
Canon, the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta also identifies poverty as a cause of immoral behavior of 
individuals, to a wider range of social ills, and also directly relates the behavior of the king to the 
spread of poverty and other social ills.
488
 As I indicated in the previous chapter, the Buddha 
relates all of the resultant social deterioration and dehumanizing behavior back to the king’s 
initial failure to provide for the poor: 
Thus, from the not giving of property to the needy, poverty became rife, from the growth 
of poverty, the taking of what was not given increased, from the increase of theft, the use 
of weapons increased, from the increased use of weapons, the taking of life increased – 
and from the taking of life, people’s lifespan decreased, their beauty decreased. . . .” 
Within the social structure outlined in the Pāli Canon, a king’s primary duty above all else is to 
provide a safe and stable society conducive to the pursuit of enlightenment. The message of the 
sutta could not be made clearer and cannot be overemphasized here. One of the principle ways 
that a king fulfills this fundamental duty is through giving to the poor in order to prevent poverty 
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from reaching the systemic levels of impoverishment and the resulting moral decay. The duty to 
relieve poverty as outlined in the Pāli Canon falls first and foremost to the rulers. They are to 
lead efforts to relieve poverty by establishing a prosperous society and by implementing targeted 
welfare or charity to individuals in need. Again, this role is complicated in the contemporary 
world in which citizens often have a significant influence over the policies that their 
governments pursue, particularly in democratic societies, and in a global economy in which 
multinational corporations also exert significant influence on international and local policies; this 
duty of rulers, then ought to be broadly construed to include all those who have an influence over 
ruling bodies. 
Moreover, as the king is the chief and most influential lay person in the land, it is incumbent on 
him to live up to the Buddhist ideal and be one who sets the example for the laity to follow. This 
requirement to set a virtuous example expressly relates to conditions of poverty. In the 
Kurudhamma Jātaka, for example, the king is required to live virtuously precisely in order to 
bring an end to the famine, pestilence, and destitution in his kingdom.
489
 The Gaňđatindu Jātaka 
similarly proclaims the king’s duty to his subjects to rule righteously and draws a connection 
between the virtue of the king and the kingdom’s prosperity.490  King Pañcāla ruled his kingdom 
unrighteously, at least part of which meant oppressing his subjects with heavy taxation, and as a 
result they fled to live in the woods where they were attacked by thieves. The king is then 
instructed to begin to rule righteously. In the king’s defense, his priest says that the king cannot 
be held responsible for the wellbeing of each and every individual in his kingdom, but the priest 
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is swiftly rebuked by a bodhisattva for this incorrect teaching.
491
 Clearly, the king is held 
responsible for the wellbeing of everyone within his kingdom, and just as clearly, the king is to 
accomplish this, at least in part, by exemplifying generosity through the act of giving to the poor. 
An additional message of this sutta is that the rulers should consider the needs of the poor when 
formulating tax policies. 
The Pāli Canon is replete with examples of generosity directed toward the poor in the form of 
material goods given by the king, and these examples are often normative instructions to the 
rulers.  The Mahānāradakassapa Jātaka contains instructions to a wicked king that he should 
provide food and drink, garments, and jewels to those in need if he is to escape hell and be 
reborn into a heaven.
492
 In the Mahāsudassana Sutta the Buddha describes one of his previous 
lives in which he had been a Cakkavatti ruler, or ideal monarch, in a gloriously prosperous and 
wealthy city, exemplifying righteous ruling.
493
 As king he provided food and drink, clothing, 
transportation, dwellings, wives, and gold for those who were in need.
494
 When his subjects 
brought great wealth to present to the king, he returned it to them with more besides.
495
 He is 
said to have gained a good rebirth as a result of having so exemplified Buddhist teachings. In 
another similar passage, the deva Serī describes a past life as a generous king, donor, and 
philanthropist who spoke often in praise of giving, and facilitated the act of giving by all those in 
his household and kingdom. He gave half of his revenue to monks and brahmins, paupers and 
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cripples, wayfarers and beggars. Serī rejoices to the Buddha in the merit he gained from these 
actions that resulted in his rebirth in heaven.
496
 
In addition to providing direct material support, rulers have also been instructed to protect the 
poor by ensuring that taxes are not too burdensome.
497
 In the Rājaparikathā-ratnamālā, for 
example, the prominent Mahāyāna philosopher Nāgārjuna advised the king Udayi to give 
priority to the poor and otherwise needy:  
Cause the blind, the sick, the lowly,  
The protectorless, the wretched  
And the crippled equally to attain  
Food and drink without interruption. 
Provide all types of support 
For practitioners who do not seek it 
And even for those living 




Provide extensive care  
For the persecuted, the victims [of disasters],  
The stricken and diseased,  
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And for the worldly beings in conquered areas.
499
 
He also advocates providing:  
stricken farmers  
With seeds and sustenance,  
Eliminate high taxes  
By reducing their rate.   
Protect [the poor] from the pain of wanting [your wealth],  
Set up no [new] tolls and reduce those [that are heavy],  
Free them from the suffering [that follows when  
The tax collector] is waiting at the door.
500
 
In summary, the kings or rulers have clearly outlined duties regarding the poor. They are 
primarily charged with preventing poverty and the social ills it brings. They are to set an example 
of generosity toward the poor through a comprehensive targeted approach; they are to give due 
consideration to the poor in formulating policies, such as regarding taxation; and, they are to give 
material goods necessary for the sustenance of the poor, as well as to promote business ventures 
that will provide future financial stability to the poor and their families. 
5.1.2.  The Role of the Laity 
As I demonstrated in the previous chapter on Buddhist economics, the instructions to the lay 
followers found in the Pāli Canon include remarkably detailed instructions concerning the 
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manner in which income is to be earned and distributed, both of which have direct bearing on 
issues of poverty and poverty relief. The lay followers are primarily to eliminate poverty by 
industriously engaging themselves in earning an income through ethical, lawful and wise means, 
and to use the wealth they earn to benefit themselves, their families and friends, and others in 
society. Such pursuits allow them to avoid or to bring themselves out of poverty, and to 
undertake activities which help to relieve the suffering of others and improve the overall quality 
of life in their community as well. 
However, in addition to supporting their own families, the laity also has a duty to help others out 
of poverty. A part of earning an income in a virtuous manner is avoiding activities which take 
advantage of, or otherwise oppress others. In the aforementioned Sigālaka Sutta, the Buddha 
teaches that employers should have a general concern for the welfare of their employees, their 
health and happiness, and that they should be sure to at least pay what we might today call a 
living wage. In essence, employees should be able to provide for their own needs and the needs 
of their families through their labor.
501
 While the Pāli texts seem to place the greatest burden for 
preventing and reliving poverty, in the modern world, the duties of the lay-followers are 
expanded in democratic states where the rulers or government officials are more obligated to 
fulfill the will of the people. In such states, the lay-followers are in a position of far greater 
authority and have greater responsibility to ensure that others are not exploited or left to suffer in 
their impoverished conditions when government policies or programs could more effectively 
help. Furthermore, lay business leaders have far greater influence on policies that directly affect 
laborers at a global level than has typically been the case in the past.  
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Individual industry and entrepreneurial spirit are also repeatedly praised in the Pāli Canon, 
particularly as a path to freedom from poverty. In the Cullaka-Seţţhi Jātaka, the Buddha teaches 
a group of monks that he has helped a disciple rise to “great things in the Faith” as he had 
likewise previously helped him rise to great wealth in a past life.
502
 A clear message of this tale 
is that poor people have the ability to raise themselves out of impoverished circumstances and 
the Buddha offers praise for such efforts. Economic circumstances or class are not unchangeable 
nor are they simply fate. The Jātaka relates a narrative in which a young man overhears the king's 
treasurer make a passing comment about how a dead mouse on the street could be enough for 
someone to start a business which would support a small family. In an example of the modern 
spirit of micro-enterprise, the poor young man sells the dead mouse as food for a cat, continually 
using any proceeds for additional and greater entrepreneurial endeavors which provide needed 
services for others in exchange for more money, goods, or other favors. Through his blend of 
wisdom, generosity, and hard work, this poor young man quickly becomes very wealthy, raises a 
family, and eventually becomes the king's treasurer.
503
 Such industry, ingenuity, and 
entrepreneurial skills are consistently praised in Buddhist scriptures and are key examples of an 
ideal based on the principle that the poor often may still have the capacity to raise themselves out 
of poverty. Coupled with the efforts of the king to establish a prosperous society in which one 
has the opportunities and basic requirements to encourage or allow wealth creation among the 
different social groupings, this entrepreneurial spirit and industriousness can both prevent and 
bring an end to individual impoverishment. The notion that Buddhist thought is at odds with an 
entrepreneurial drive or industriousness, appears incongruous with these texts. 
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The Buddha also taught that generosity and giving are fundamental to the ideal lay life. While it 
is often noted that the lay followers are primarily to give to the saṅgha, they are also encouraged 
to cultivate generosity through giving to others. He taught the householder Anāthapiňđika that 
the perfection of generosity, or having a heart free of stinginess and delighting in giving 
charitable gifts, leads one to obtaining certain desirable conditions which includes wealth for 
oneself and one's family and friends. One is said to seize opportunities and turn them to merit 
when wealth is used to make family and friends secure and happy, and offerings are given to 
relatives, guests, deceased relatives, kings and gods.
504
 This provides a clear motivation to the 
laity to make charitable contributions, not only to the saṅgha, but also to others in need. In the 
Ghaţīkāra Sutta, Ghaţīkāra the potter receives a great benefit by generously giving his wares 
away for free.  In return he was supported by the king and his neighbors.
505
 Ghaţīkāra is praised 
for his generosity and for looking after his blind parents and also attending upon Kassapa 
Buddha with complete reverence.  
However, it should be noted that the duty to give to the poor is taught with some ambivalence; 
the lay followers are taught in the Pāli Canon that they will gain more merit by giving to the 
saṅgha because they are more worthy of charity than the poor lay followers. For example, the 
Āditta Jātaka draws a distinction between the types of poor people who receive charity in the 
story of the virtuous king Bharata who gave great gifts to the poor, wayfarers, beggars, and the 
like. The king became displeased that his alms-house was full of greedy people who were 
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devouring his alms and sought out the more virtuous paccekabhuddhas instead to receive his 
offerings without greed. The implication here is that it is better to give charity to those who are 
virtuous, namely the religious mendicants, than to give charity to the destitute who are still 
thought to likely be caught up in greed. Nevertheless, as I have noted, there are passages that also 
clearly indicate that one should give to the poor in addition to the saṅgha. But, this notion that 
the poor are not as worthy recipients as is the saṅgha is not universally held.  
In addition to giving to needy individuals, the lay followers are also encouraged to engage 
themselves in activities that improve their community and society at large in order to support 
family, friends, the saṅgha and the poor. This implies that rather than solely being concerned 
with needy individuals that one may know personally, relieving poverty at a systemic level 
should also be a priority. The well-known Kulāvaka Jātaka clearly illustrates this through the 
tale of a young man named Magha, who exemplified a pious Buddhist layman.
506
 Recognizing 
that his efforts to improve the community would bring happiness, merit, and that he in fact had a 
duty to make such labor, Magha began building improvements in a town, which led to a social 
development program based on cooperation in his community. Seeing his example, more and 
more others joined with Magha in the improvements. They undertook projects to improve the 
quality of life in their community, such as building a community house, constructing roads, and 
irrigation systems, and supporting the needy. Magha is described as having such moral or 
spiritual power that when corrupt and scheming leaders tried to have Magha put to death on false 
charges, the order could not be carried out. The elephants which were ordered to trample and 
crush Magha refused to do so. Eventually Magha was taken before the king and was able to teach 
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the king to follow the Buddhist precepts; the king eventually joined with him to engage in 
additional social improvement projects. Similarly, in the Planter of Groves sutta, the Buddha also 
taught that those who engage in public works such as building parks, groves, bridges, places to 
drink and wells, and who give residences are established in Dhamma, endowed with virtue, and 
will always increase in merit, and go to a heaven.
507
 The sorts of improvement projects praised in 
these texts are all undertaken without order or other prompting, simply for the good of others in 
society. 
Thus, the duties of the lay followers concerning poverty are: first of all, to remain industrious 
and wise in business in order to keep oneself and one's family out of debt and poverty; second, 
they are to use the income they have earned in a lawful and virtuous manner for the benefit of 
family and community and exert their influence to ensure that others are treated in an ethical 
manner in the public sphere. This includes donations to the saṅgha and generous giving to others 
in need, as well as cooperative community and social improvement programs that address 
poverty on both systemic and individual levels. 
5.1.3. The Role of the Saṅgha 
I have noted that the duties of the saṅgha concerning poverty that are outlined in the Pāli Canon 
include setting an example of the appropriate moral values by undertaking vows of poverty, in 
the form of simplicity and homelessness for themselves, receiving charitable donations from the 
laity and the rulers in order to allow them to benefit from the karmic merit and develop 
generosity, and instructing the laity and rulers in the living according to the Dhamma so that 
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individuals and society can prosper and develop spiritually. However, although the highest and 
most valuable offering of the saṅgha is understood to be the instruction in the Dhamma, this 
does not preclude the additional giving of material goods as well, which seems to have often 
occurred in Buddhist communities since the earliest times.  
Much as the king is to set an example for the laity, the saṅgha also is to teach by example, 
instructing in living the Dhamma principles—particularly in promoting the virtue of generosity. 
Examples from the Pāli Canon of the centrality of an ascetic or homeless life to one's spiritual 
development or liberation have been presented above, as have examples which indicated the role 
that monks play in instructing the kings in how they might rule righteously. In virtually all cases 
noted above, the kings who remove plagues, famines, and other social ills from their kingdoms 
do so by following the advice of a monk or ascetic counterpart. It is first and foremost by 
teaching the rulers and laity to live according to the moral demands of the Dhamma that monks 
contribute to the establishment of justice and prosperity in society. 
In addition to contributing to the prosperity and spiritual development of individuals and society 
by acting as exemplars and a conscience of society by living the Dhamma and modeling 
alternative values, the saṅgha act as fields of merit in receiving gifts from the laity. The saṅgha 
are specifically instructed to target poor communities primarily in order to allow the poor the 
benefits of giving as a means of removing themselves from poverty either in this life or a future 
life. The poor lay followers generate no less karmic merit by giving whatever small gift they can 
to the saṅgha than do the wealthy who give large gifts. An example of the karmic merit 
generated from charitable giving to the saṅgha as a way of eliminating poverty is found in the 
Kuňđaka Kucchi Sindhava Jātaka. The Elder monk Sāriputta rescues a woman from poverty by 
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accepting an invitation to dine at her door.
508
 The poor elderly woman asked the clerk to send a 
monk to her home so she might offer dinner, but all the monks except for Sāriputta had already 
been assigned to other homes for dinner. When word spread that the well-known and honored 
Sāriputta would be dining with the poor woman, the king and other impressed neighbors send 
money to her home to buy food, clothing, and entertainment. So much money is sent to her on 
that day that she becomes wealthy.  Her reward is said to be both physical and spiritual as she is 
edified and converted by the kindness and gratitude of Sāriputta. The message seems to be that 
giving to the saṅgha at least indirectly helps the poor, and even the poor can benefit from their 
own generosity toward the saṅgha.  
But the members of the saṅgha may also make direct contributions to the poor as well. A 
noteworthy passage concerning charitable giving of a monk to the poor is found in the Sāma 
Jātaka which tells of parents who are thrust from wealth into extreme poverty because their son 
enters the saṅgha.509 Upon hearing that this has happened to his beloved parents, the monk 
considers leaving the saṅgha to become a householder and provide for his parents. Instead, he 
determines to use the alms that he receives to support them, thereby remaining faithful to his 
vow of entering the saṅgha. The significant point here, though, is that giving away alms food is 
customarily considered prohibited. After some time, another monk finds that he has been giving 
his alms to his parents who are lay followers. He explains that it is unlawful to waste the alms of 
the faithful by giving them to lay followers, and he reports it to the Buddha. The young monk is 
thereby made to feel ashamed of what he has done. But, rather than reprimand him, the Buddha 
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instead repeatedly praises him for his actions. In fact, the Buddha tells him that he had also 
provided for his parents in a like manner by making rounds asking for alms in a previous life.
510
  
An implication here is that, although it is widely recognized that monks remove themselves from 
conventional society upon joining the saṅgha, they do not necessarily wholly remove themselves 
from all societal and familial obligations and they appear to still receive some spiritual benefit 
from taking care of others in society. The common assumption that initiates to the saṅgha 
relinquish social obligations to family and others is challenged by this narrative. While we may 
not be able to make the strong claim that monks have the obligation to provide for the material 
needs of others from the alms they receive, this narrative at least supports a weaker claim that 
such behavior is praiseworthy and even encouraged—and in at least some instances, such actions 
were both praised and said to have been performed by the Buddha himself. What is absolutely 
clear is that they are to exemplify dāna by giving to others and encouraging others to give; we 
shall also see more clearly in the development of the Mahāyāna approach that they have also 
acted as providers for the poor. 
5.2.  Poverty Relief in the Mahāyāna 
The duty of rulers, monks, and lay followers in Mahāyāna texts bears numerous similarities to 
those outlined in the Pāli Canon. A significant divergence occurs, however, as a result of the 
development of the bodhisattva ideal. Rulers, for example, receive similar counsel relating to 
providing for the poor in their kingdoms as appears in the Pāli Canon, and yet these duties are 
enriched and amplified when the ruler takes on bodhisattva vows to end the suffering of all 
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sentient beings. Furthermore, because the line blurs between monks and laity, the responsibilities 
outlined in the Pāli Canon regarding rulers, monks, and laity blurs and becomes more 
homogenous in the Mahāyāna as well. Thus, directives such as ‘people should give half of their 




Diverging from the Theravādin goal of arahatship, Mahāyāna Buddhism focuses on the 
bodhisattva, a being on the path to perfect Buddhahood. The bodhisattva path begins with 
developing the supreme altruistic motivation, bodhicitta, the Mind of Enlightenment or 
Awakening Mind, which arises from deep compassion for the suffering of others.
512
 Śāntideva 
expresses this as: 
This mind to benefit living beings,  
Which does not arise in others even for their own sakes, 
Is an extraordinary jewel of a mind, 
Whose birth is an unprecedented wonder.”513 
Bodhicitta is expressed as a commitment to pursue enlightenment for the sake of all other beings.  
According to the Aşţasāhasrikā Prajñapāramitā Sūtra, being filled with great compassion for the 
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countless other beings he sees, the bodhisattva swears. “I shall become a savior to all those 
beings, I shall release them from all their sufferings!”514  
The path continues with the pursuit of six pāramitās, or perfections, which bear similarities to 
the Noble Eightfold Path: dāna (giving), śīla (morality/ethics), vīrya (energy), kşānti (patience), 
samādhi (meditation), and prajñā (wisdom).515 Because dāna is such a central virtue in the 
bodhisattva path, as well as in a discussion of poverty relief, it is discussed in greater detail 
below. The practice of the first five perfections culminates in the Perfection of Wisdom in which 
the bodhisattva realizes that every part of reality is empty of inherent existence; ultimately, there 
is no genuine difference between self and other, or between nirvana and saņsāra. These 
teachings have direct implications on poverty relief. 
5.2.1. The Bodhisattva Ideal 
The line between laity and the saṅgha blurs in the Mahāyāna inasmuch as a lay follower may 
undertake the bodhisattva vows without entering the saṅgha. Thus, bodhisattvas are referred to 
as either home-dwelling (gŗhastha) or home-departed (pravrajita),516 and may fill one of a wide 
range of social roles, be it monk, farmer, head of household, or ruler. Because of this 
development, the responsibility of the bodhisattva to relieve the suffering of the poor is equally 
binding upon all of these social groups—monks, lay followers, and rulers alike.   
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5.2.2.  Generosity and Compassion 
Two virtues closely associated with the Buddhist concept of poverty relief that receive a 
heightened emphasis in the Mahāyāna are dāna, which as we have seen means generosity or 
giving, and karuňā, which means compassion. These virtues are particularly important because 
of their centrality in the Mahāyāna tradition, but they are also of special interest here because of 
their direct connection to the concepts of poverty relief or poverty alleviation.   
5.2.2.1.  Dāna  
As I have demonstrated above, Dāna is the most basic and central virtue in both the Theravāda 
and Mahāyāna traditions for effecting karmically fruitful actions. The Mahāyāna Upāsakaśila 
Sūtra indicates that even the poor are to give whatever miniscule amount possible—even if it be 
retaining a generous spirit through giving small leftover morsels or crumbs of food to insects, the 
dirty water after washing dishes, or a piece of cloth small enough to make a candle wick.
517
 The 
discourse goes on to say that if the poor have literally nothing to give, they are still to do what 
they can to help others give, or at the very least, they are to rejoice in the giving done by others. 
And, even if giving away the last handful of food would mean certain death, a wise person 
should still give it away.
518
 The perfection of dāna is an essential step on the bodhisattva path 
and is directly related to the relief of the suffering of the poor through means of material 
offerings as well as through spiritual teachings and guidance.   
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5.2.2.2.  Karuňā 
Combined with wisdom, karuňā, or compassion, is the essential virtue in the Mahāyāna tradition. 
As I have noted it is so central to the bodhisattva path, that the bodhicaryāvatāra indicates that 
“actions that are otherwise proscribed” are permitted if done in compassion for the benefit of 
another.
519
 And, Śāntideva’s Śikşā-Samuccaya and Bodhicaryāvatāra, both argue that 
bodhisattvas should constantly identify with other beings since there is no genuine difference 
between others and self, and one should act to prevent the suffering of any being because there is 
no genuine difference between one’s own suffering and that of another—there is only 
suffering.
520
 This is significant to our discussion precisely because it includes the material 
suffering that causes the body pain, suffering which is a defining aspect of impoverishment. This 
disolution of the distinction between one’s own suffering and the suffering of others is central to 
the conception of poverty and is also a key principle in a uniquely Buddhist approach to poverty 
relief. 
5.2.3.  Material Suffering in the Mahāyāna 
In the Saķdhinirmocana Sūtra, the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara asks the Buddha an important 
question concerning compassion and the existence of poverty and suffering in the world. “If the 
bodhisattvas are endowed with inexhaustible riches, and if they are most compassionate, then 
how can there be poor sentient beings in this world?”521 This problem of evil or suffering 
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elucidated in Mahāyāna texts speaks directly to the Mahāyāna preoccupation with material 
suffering, and the Mahāyāna perspective on poverty relief and the causes of poverty. Asaģga 
raises the same question in the Mahāyānasaņgraha: 
If there really are such bodhisattvas who are encountered in the world, who, having 
accumulated merit through their trainings in discipline, concentration, and wisdom, have 
reached the ten masteries and attained unequalled and preeminent capabilities to benefit 
others, then why do we still see sentient beings encountering severe penury and suffering 
in the world?”522 
Again in Bodhicaryāvatāra, Śāntideva asks a similar question, but this time concerning the 
generosity of bodhisattvas in poverty relief: 
If completing the perfection of giving 
Were eliminating the poverty of living beings, 
Since hungry beings still exist, 
How could the previous Buddhas have completed that perfection?”523   
The Mahāyāna concepts of cosmic or supramundane Buddhas and bodhisattvas raise the issue of 
the problem of evil or suffering. Why does impoverishment and suffering exist if these cosmic 
beings have the ability and the compassion to prevent it? In the Saķdhinirmocana Sūtra the 
Buddha responds, “It is because the very actions of sentient beings are sinful… [There would be 
no poverty] if sentient beings did not set up obstacles by their own actions. The bodies of hungry 
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ghosts are oppressed by a great thirst, but even if they encounter the waters of the great sea, still 
they remain parched.  This is not the fault of that great sea. It is the fault of the actions of those 
hungry ghosts themselves!”524 Thus, poverty is said to exist in the world because sentient beings 
set up obstacles that cause suffering or prevent the relief of suffering. However, the text does not 
specify whose actions cause these obstacles—whether one causes his or her own suffering and 
prevents its relief, or whether some beings create obstacles that also cause others to suffer. It is 
certainly in line with Buddhist thought to acknowledge that one’s actions can cause or alleviate 
the suffering of oneself as well as others. The implication is that, despite the ability to give 
‘inexhaustible treasures of the bodhisattvas’, those who are suffering are either unwilling or 
unable, due to the actions of others, to receive the relief that the bodhisattvas willingly give. 
The Mahāyānasaņgraha offers an alternative explanation for the existence of poverty and 
suffering in spite of the bodhisattva’s ability to prevent it: 
This is because bodhisattvas see that, if they were to bestow riches, the actions of sentient 
beings in their consequent stage of wealth would constitute obstacles that would result in 
suffering and that this would hinder the good that they [otherwise] might engender.  It is 
because bodhisattvas see that if they lack riches, they will be able to realize detestation of 
evil transmigration. It is because bodhisattvas see that if they were to bestow riches on 
them, then they would nurture the causes for all manner of evil states. It is because 
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bodhisattvas see that if they were to bestow riches on them, this would be cause for them 
to oppress an untold number of other sentient beings.”525 
Asaṅga explains that the bodhisattvas withhold the riches for the benefit of the poor. The 
bodhisattvas recognize that wealth can lead to greater suffering, can prevent one from non-
attachment to the saņsāric world, and causes all manner of evil states. It is noteworthy that 
wealth is spoken of in this passage as the cause of evil states, and it particularly mentions that 
wealth leads one to oppress others. It is out of compassion for the poor in fostering their spiritual 
development that bodhisattvas choose to allow poverty and suffering to exist in spite of their 
abilities to prevent them. This is easily understandable in light of the approach to voluntary 
poverty I have outlined above. Considering the role of voluntary poverty in the Buddhist path, it 
seems that some amount of material suffering might be a part of the ideal circumstances for 
enlightenment. But, the passage here only refers to riches or what we might call overabundance. 
What of providing the poor with the basic requirements of life, up to a point of simplicity but not 
overabundance? While riches may be corrupting, poverty also has a certain corrupting influence, 
leading to suffering and preventing the cultivation of virtues. In the end, poverty and wealth are 
neither necessarily good nor evil in themselves. Each carries the possibility of corruption as well 
as enlightenment.  
Vimalakīrti also endorses the idea that the ideal place for spiritual development includes poverty 
and suffering because it allows one to practice the essential virtues in a rapid manner that would 
not be possible in what might otherwise be considered a more perfected or idyllic world, such as: 
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to win the poor by generosity; to win the immoral by morality; to win the hateful by 
means of tolerance; to win the lazy by means of effort; to win the mentally troubled by 
means of concentration; to win the falsely wise by means of true wisdom; to show those 
suffering from the eight adversities how to rise above them…526 
Śāntideva, on the other hand, gives a different and in some ways more satisfying response to the 
question of the existence of poverty and suffering, explaining that it is not possible to actually 
relieve the summation of all suffering of innumerable sentient beings:  
The completion of the perfection of giving is said to be 
The thought wishing to give everything to all living beings, 
Together with the merit that results from that giving; 
Therefore it depends only on mind. 
(…) 
It is not possible to subdue unruly beings  
Who are as extensive as space; 
But simply destroying the mind of anger 
Is the same as overcoming all these foes. 
Where is there enough leather 
To cover the surface of the earth? 
But just having leather on the soles of one’s feet 
Is the same as covering the whole Earth. 
                                                             
526
 Vn Chapter 10 (Thurman, 1976: 82-83). 
 M o n s o n  P a g e  | 236 
 
In the same way, it is not possible 
To control all external events; 
But if I simply control my mind, 
What need is there to control other things”527   
Here, the phenomena of suffering cannot be restrained externally because there are unending 
numbers of suffering beings, and yet the intention of removing poverty is exalted nonetheless. 
Note, however, that this does not preclude action to remove the suffering of others; it merely 
provides a reason why it has not fully been completed yet. 
Additionally, the Saķdhinirmocana Sūtra offers a perspective that complements the 
Mahāyānasaņgraha sūtra, asserting that it is inappropriate to only provide material goods, and 
that doing so can never ultimately release one from suffering: 
Good son, if bodhisattvas, in benefiting sentient beings through their perfections, were to 
rely only upon material goods to bring [sentient beings] benefit and render them happy, 
and would not bother to lead them away from evil or establish them in good, that would 
be unskillful method. Why is that, good son?  It is because it is not true that the one who 
does such things is really benefiting sentient beings.… Because sentient beings suffer 
because of their actions, and because their nature is suffering, it is impossible to lead 
them to happiness simply by the method of providing them with fleeting images of 
material things.  The best benefit would be to establish them in good.”528 
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Again we see the notion that simply providing material goods to the needy might not ultimately 
lead them to do good. While providing material goods is a common behavior of bodhisattvas, 
this is only a part of the relief of suffering that they provide; mental and spiritual development 
are also part and parcel in the relief of suffering. 
5.2.4. Compassionate Intentions or Compassionate Acts? 
An important question arises here concerning compassion and poverty relief in Buddhist thought:  
Is the compassion referred to in Buddhist texts merely intentional, aiming only at generating the 
desire to end the suffering of other beings, or does it in fact refer to concrete actions that are to 
be taken to actually alleviate suffering? 
Stephen Jenkins has argues that Buddhist texts that describe karuňā, tend to define it as an action 
or work.
529
 Jenkins relies on Buddhaghosa’s philological analysis of karuňā found in 
Visuddhimagga to show that Buddhaghosa, a central authority in Theravāda Buddhism for 
interpretation of the Pāli Canon, understood the call for compassion as meaning aggressive 
action for the relief of the suffering of others.
530
 Jenkins points out that this view is also 
supported in the philological analysis of karuňā found in the influential early Mahāyāna 
Akşayamatirnirdeśa Sūtra.531 
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References to compassion then, simply by the term employed, imply a sort of concrete action 
rather than a mere feeling or emotion. The same is also clearly true of generosity. The 
Upāsakaśīla sūtra contends that the practice of giving is not merely intentional either: 
Good son, it is said that the practice of giving is just thought because thought is the root 
of giving. This is not true. And why is it not true? The practice of giving involves the five 
aggregates, because it involves the actions of body speech, and mind. If giving is to 
benefit oneself and others, it should involve the five aggregates.”532 
This is not to say, however, that Buddhist texts do not advocate compassion or generosity as an 
intention or a meditative goal. Indeed, Jenkins points out that the pre-Mahāyāna Sarvāstivāda 
School’s Abhidarmakośa maintains that the meditation on compassion generates merit, even if 
there is no actual beneficiary of compassionate action, but that “material offerings gain more 
merit than mere intentions, just as acting on a bad intention produces more demerit.”533 Thus, 
although the intention of compassion or generosity does in itself generate merit, most references 
to compassion or generosity denote a concrete action, which will generate more merit and benefit 
for both parties involved than will mere intention. 
5.3.  The Duty to Relieve Poverty in the Mahāyāna 
The basic duty of rulers to provide material goods and property to the poor in their kingdom as 
outlined in the Pāli Canon also appears in Mahāyāna sources. In the widely cited early 
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Mahāyāna sūtra, Ārya-satyaka-parivarta, Satyavādin instructs rulers to protect the poor from 
harm caused by crop failure or famine, “robbers and thieves, armies from other states, and from 
each other.”534 Here again we see that the rulers are indeed held responsible for the material 
well-being of their subjects.  
However, rulers described in Mahāyāna texts often assume additional personal duties as a 
bodhisattva to provide for the poor, above and beyond those duties outlined in the Pāli Canon. 
One example of such a ruler committed to relieving poverty in their kingdom comes from the 
important Mahāyāna sūtra The Sūtra of Queen Śrīmālā of the Lion’s Roar. When undertaking the 
bodhisattva vows, the Indian Queen Śrīmālā vowed to use all the property she would receive as 
queen for the benefit of the poor in her kingdom: 
I will not accumulate property for my own benefit. Whatever I receive will be used to 
assist living beings who are poor and suffering . . . When I see living beings who are 
lonely, imprisoned, ill, and afflicted by various misfortunes and hardships, I will never 
forsake them … Through my good deeds I will bring them benefits and liberate them 
from their pain.”535 
The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom also provides an example: 
There are Bodhisattvas who, coursing in the six perfections, have become Universal 
Monarchs. Having taken the perfection of giving for their guide they will provide all 
beings with everything that brings ease—food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty. They 
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will provide … ointments, medicinal powders, incense, beds, seats, asylum, homes, 
money, grain, … and the means of life—until, having established beings in the ten ways 




Although we have seen that Pāli canonical texts also describe the material relief of poverty as an 
activity and duty of the laity and monks, it takes on a more central focus in the Mahāyāna sūtras.  
The Flower Ornament Scripture, for example, explains that bodhisattvas fulfill their duty to 
protect all sentient beings by “providing what they require.”537 This may be clarified in Entry 
Into the Realm of Reality, which describes the duty of bodhisattvas to “put an end to poverty for 
all sentient beings, satisfy all sentient beings with gifts of food and drink, satisfy all beggars by 
giving away all goods.”538 Śāntideva also includes reference to this in the bodhisattva vows: 
May a rain of food and drink descend 
To dispel the miseries of hunger and thirst;  
And during the great aeon of famine, 
May I become their food and drink 
May I become an inexhaustible treasury 
For the poor and destitute. 
May I be everything they might need, 
Placed freely at their disposal. 
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From this moment on, without sense of loss, 
I shall give away my body and likewise my wealth, 
And my virtues amassed throughout the three times 
To help all living beings, my mothers.”539 
Similarly, in the Śikşā-Samuccaya: 
When any are hungry he gives them the best food.  When any are frightened he gives 
them protection. When any are ill he exerts himself for their complete cure. The poor he 
rejoices with plenty . . . He goes share for share with those afflicted with poverty. He 
carries the burdens of the weary and exhausted.”540 
The Upāsakaśīla sūtra identifies three general types of giving by bodhisattvas: the giving of the 
Dhamma; the giving of fearlessness, which specifically refers to the fear of rulers, wild animals, 
natural disasters, or robbers; and, the giving of wealth, which refers to all manner of material 
goods and possessions.
541
 In all of these passages the giving that is instructed is giving of 
material goods to relieve the suffering of those in need. 
5.4.  Material and Spiritual Needs 
Perhaps, it might be argued, the references to providing aid or support to the poor merely 
concerns the giving of spiritual teachings and are not to be taken literally in the sense of giving 
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material goods. While this is a clear possibility, it is not supported by the texts, which 
demonstrate a clear distinction between spiritual and material gifts and benefits. The distinction 
between giving material offerings and giving spiritual teachings noted in the Pāli Canon is also 
found in Mahāyāna sūtras. The Mahāyāna sources also indicate that the spiritual gifts or 
teachings are ultimately more valuable than material gifts. For example, The Large sūtra on 
Perfect Wisdom makes this distinction, asserting that spiritual teachings are a superior gift to 
material gifts.
542
 The Saķdhinirmocana Sūtra, quoted above, asserts that it is inappropriate to 
only provide material goods, and that doing so can never ultimately release one from 
suffering.
543
 Nevertheless, as I have demonstrated, numerous Mahāyāna references affirm the 
importance of providing material goods in addition to the spiritual goods or teachings of the 
Dhamma.   
This focus on the duty of bodhisattvas to provide both material and spiritual needs relates closely 
to the implication in the Pāli Canon that beings must have their basic material needs met before 
they are able to undertake spiritual development. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra teaches of 
bodhisattvas: 
During the short aeons of famine,  
They become food and drink.   
Having first alleviated thirst and hunger,  
They teach the Dharma to living beings. 
(…) 
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For the sake of the poor,  
They become inexhaustible treasures, 
Causing those to whom they give their gifts 
To conceive the spirit of enlightenment.”544   
Here, then, the ideal bodhisattva is one who relieves the material suffering of the poor in order to 
prepare them for the ultimate end of suffering that the bodhisattva can then teach them in the 
Dhamma. In the Dānapāramitāsamāsaų, Ārya-Śūra also describes this spiritual benefit for the 
receiver of material goods: 
The wise man offers the gift of food not in order to gain heaven or good fortune [but] 
with the thought, ‘By this means I will cause the ripening among mankind of long life, 
eloquence, power, and other attributes of a Buddha, and because of me sentient beings, 
attracted by material objects, will also become fit vessels of mine for the illustrious 
dharma.’ Acting for the benefit of the world, he also gives beverages to soothe the 
defiling thirst (kleśatŗş) of the world.”545 
5.5. Giving and Merit 
There is an important point of variance between the merit gained by giving to the poor and merit 
gained by giving to the saṅgha in the Mahāyāna sūtras and Pāli Canonical texts. The 
Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra addresses the issue in the same way as we saw in the Pāli Canon. 
However, the conclusion it reaches concerning who is more worthy of offerings is exactly the 
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opposite of the Pāli Canonical or Theravādin view. The passages previously noted in the Pāli 
Canon assert that the saṅgha is more worthy of alms or offerings than the destitute are because 
the latter are more likely to be greedy in desiring and acquiring gifts. In the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa 
Sūtra, on the other hand, praise is bestowed upon the giver who gives “without any 
discrimination, impartially, with no expectation of reward, and with great love” to “the lowliest 
poor of the city, considering them as worthy of offering as the Tathāgata himself.”546 The 
worthiness of the giver and receiver are customarily said to be factors that determine the amount 
of merit generated by an act. In this instance, the lowliest of the poor are placed on the same 
level of worthiness in receiving the gift as the monastic community, and even as the Buddha 
himself. Although the virtue of generosity or giving is still central, instead of the laity generating 
merit by giving to the saṅgha who are the most worthy of offerings, bodhisattvas are now said to 
make merit by giving to the lowliest poor, who are now seen as also worthy of offerings.   
5.6.  A Buddhist Approach to Poverty Relief 
Given the Buddhist concept of the comprehensive nature of material poverty outlined in the 
previous chapter, and the duties to relieve poverty defined in Buddhist scriptures outlined here, 
how might genuinely Buddhist approaches to poverty relief appear? In the previous chapter I 
addressed the similarities between the capabilities approach to poverty and the Buddhist 
concepts of poverty. Similarly, a Buddhist approach to poverty relief will likely bear numerous 
similarities with such comprehensive approaches to poverty relief that include increasing 
income, basic health, education, and include generating social capital among the interdependent 
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relationships. A genuinely Buddhist approach to poverty relief should be as robust and nuanced 
as its concepts of poverty. 
5.6.1.  Skillful Means in Poverty Relief 
One particularly striking example of poverty relief is taught in the Lotus Sūtra, one of the most 
popular of Mahāyāna texts.547 It includes a prodigal son narrative in which the father becomes 
wealthy while the son is away, and when the son returns, he does not recognize his father and 
fears him. The son flees his true home in fear, believing that he will more easily sustain himself 
by living a simple life of poverty than by laboring with his father’s workers. His father skillfully 
leads his son out of poverty by dressing in an impoverished manner so that he can approach and 
speak to his son, and by gradually showing him greater responsibility and possibilities leading to 
wealth. Eventually the son returns to his station of responsibility over numerous other workers 
and inherits his father’s wealth. This well-known narrative is often used to illustrate the 
Buddha’s skill in presenting the Dhamma to each individual in the best way possible for each 
particular individual. Peter Hershock reads this parable as a metaphor for poverty relief efforts 
correctly conceived: 
The solution to poverty given metaphorically in the Lotus Sutra has two major 
dimensions: first, discontinuing ignorance of the poor and making a place for them within 
the overlapping and integrated contributory networks of the local socio-economic and 
natural ecosystems; and secondly, providing the poor with clear venues for mounting 
contributions to those ecosystems. An important element in the Lotus Sutra narrative is 
                                                             
547
  LS CH. IV (Reeves, 2008: 141-158). 
 M o n s o n  P a g e  | 246 
 
that alleviating and eventually eliminating poverty involves drawing the poor into 
increasingly responsible positions that allow them to make an ever more significant 
difference for others, but also for themselves.
548
  
Hershock relies on this highly influential sūtra to demonstrate that in Buddhist thought poverty 
relief is not conceived of as simply a matter of ‘throwing money at the problem’, but rather of 
skillfully leading the poor out of their impoverished circumstances through engaging with them 
on an equal level, through instruction or education, and ultimately through establishing the 
confidence and social relationships necessary to provide for oneself and for others and transform 
the processes resulting in poverty. We see here clear similarities with the notions of poverty as 
social exclusion and the solution as requiring a building up of social capital through 
relationships. While providing material goods for the needy is important, as we have seen, it is 
not the sole or ultimate goal.  
5.6.2. A Comprehensive Approach 
We have seen examples of teachings advocating a focus on poverty relief from all sectors, 
including targeted and direct government programs, private and charitable programs, and even 
small-scale entrepreneurial microenterprises—a broad comprehensive approach that addresses 
poverty on the systemic as well as individual levels. The understanding of the goal of poverty 
relief is equally broad. Because the comprehensive understanding of poverty in the Buddhist 
conception includes far more than mere material lack, the objective of poverty relief, from a 
Buddhist perspective, cannot be simply to increase income. Providing basic needs such as by 
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increasing one’s income and ensuring essential health care can only be part of this process, 
which must also include factors related to the development of the whole individual and his or her 
relationships, such as education, strengthened social relationships, security, and empowerment to 
address additional new problems and conflicts as they arise. In the previous chapter, I referred to 
David Loy’s notion that true poverty relief, or true development, can only occur through 
transforming greed into generosity; ill-will or hatred into compassion; and, delusion or ignorance 
into wisdom.
549
 Poverty relief, when correctly conceived, provides the basic material needs for 
sustenance—as this is essential to prepare one for enlightenment—but, beyond this, it also 
strengthens the social relationships that support the poor, as well as cultivates the virtues that 
lead to enlightenment, and ultimately dissolves the social distinctions that create the discrete 
categories of the wealthy and the poor. The goal of true development then is not merely to 
increase the income of the poor until it rises above an established poverty marker, and not even 
to move beyond this by helping to transport those suffering from poverty to a state in which they 
become the givers of their own overabundance, but rather to transform the entire process that 
gives rise to the phenomena of impoverishment into one which removes all forms of suffering, 
ultimately ending with individual and collective enlightenment. 
 5.6.3. The Non-Self Teaching 
Another distinctive teaching at the core of Buddhism which could form the foundation of a 
uniquely Buddhist approach to poverty relief is the non-self teaching. While this teaching 
reaches its height of development in Mahāyāna teachings on emptiness, it is central to 
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Theravādin thought as well. As I have noted, in Buddhist thought, one of the major sources of 
suffering is the mistaken belief in a self as an independent and permanent entity or phenomenon. 
Buddhist teachings hold that what we think of as a permanent self is really a constantly changing 
flow of thoughts, feelings, intentions, physical particles, and so forth, all of which are 
interdependent and inter-related. When we take any of these to be a permanent self, we suffer. 
Applying this to the realm of poverty— just as there is no independent or permanent 'I' that is an 
angry person, there is not one that is either wealthy or poor, nor ‘developed’ or 
‘underdeveloped’. While poverty and wealth have a generational dimension that is often tied to 
individual and familial identity, they are merely some of the many conditions that can be 
changed and should not be seen as significant or fundamental distinctions between individuals, 
but rather as the result of processes and relations making up a given system that creates and 
upholds the wealth/poverty distinctions. The application of this non-self teaching to poverty 
relief is exemplified by Socially Engaged Buddhist Roshi Glassman in New York City, whose 
organization aims to dissolve the conceptual framework that differentiates oneself from any other 
who is suffering, as well as the dissolution of the concepts of giver, receiver and gift. The giver, 
the receiver, and the gift are not to be seen as independent, separated phenomena. This is a direct 
application of the teaching found in the Perfection of Giving section of The Six Perfections in a 
Mahāyāna Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra known as the Pañcaviņśatisāhasrikā Sūtra.550 Here 
bodhisattvas are said to think the following when pondering the virtue of giving: 
“I practise the perfection of giving. I, having made this gift into the common property 
of all beings, dedicate it to supreme enlightenment, and that without apprehending 
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anything. By means of this gift, and its fruit may all beings in this very life be at their 
ease, and may they one day enter Nirvana!” Tied by three ties he gives a gift. Which 
three? A perception of self, a perception of others, a perception of the gift. The 
supramundane perfection of giving, on the other hand, consists in the threefold purity. 
What is the threefold purity? Here a Bodhisattva gives a gift, and he does not 
apprehend a self, nor a recipient, nor a gift; also no reward of his giving. He surrenders 
that gift to all beings, but he apprehends neither beings nor self. He dedicates that gift 
to supreme enlightenment, but he does not apprehend any enlightenment. This is called 
the supramundane perfection of giving. 
This sūtra defines the ‘supramundane perfection of giving’ as the nondualistic conception, or the 
dissolution of the concepts of giver, gift, and receiver. I will return to Glassman’s practical 
efforts to realize this conception of others and the suffering of others as one’s own among the 
participants in his project. 
 
5.7.  Buddhist Poverty Relief Efforts  
I have noted above that Buddhist texts supply examples of the various social groups providing 
for the poor, and undertaking social improvement projects. In addition to these noted examples 
of poverty relief, there are also historical examples, and contemporary Buddhists engaged in 
poverty relief efforts also exemplify poverty relief projects based on Buddhist principles as well. 
I will briefly outline some of these examples of how the above principles can be, and have been, 
applied in actual poverty relief efforts. 
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5.7.1.  Historical Examples 
In addition to the above examples of poverty relief taken from Buddhist scriptures, there are 
other well-known historical examples. King Asoka is perhaps the best-known king in the 
Buddhist tradition and is widely consider the supreme example of the ideal ruler.
551
 King Asoka 
was a great emperor, ruling much of the Indian subcontinent from 269 BCE to 232 BCE, but he 
is often revered in the Buddhist tradition for his compassionate works. Asoka is said to have 
undertaken public works projects to provide for those in need in his own kingdom in India as 
well as to aid those in other neighboring kingdoms as well.
552
 Many other rulers who similarly 
strived to provide for the needy and poor, such as by building alms houses and hospitals 
followed his example in doing so.
553
 This has remained an ideal for Buddhist rulers throughout 
the long history of the tradition. 
There are also historical examples of the monastic saṅgha taking part in poverty relief efforts 
that stand as exemplary models. In the previous chapter on Buddhist economics, I pointed out 
that early records of Buddhism in China indicate that monasteries expanded their role to include 
lending money and other goods. This transformation may have taken place as a result of 
adaptation to Chinese culture, or it may have originated in India and carried over into China; a 
dearth of records of Indian monasteries leaves the question unanswered. Nevertheless, at some 
point early in the historical records, the Buddhist monasteries began to function in part as a 
center for economic activities, providing among other things services and material goods to the 
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needy. Monasteries today will also often provide food, clothing, and education to the needy in 
their communities; the provision of such goods and services to the needy has long been a 
function of monasteries in the Buddhist tradition.
554
 
A prime example of both the ways which the monastic saṅgha can engage directly in poverty 
relief efforts as well as the ways that rulers or the state can cooperate with the monastic saṅgha in 
such efforts is the monk-led development program in modern Thailand. As Thailand passed 
through a period of modernization in the middle of the 20
th
 century, the government undertook 
partnerships with the monastic saṅgha in community development projects in poor areas of 
Thailand, such as building roads, bridges, medical clinics and wells, as well as teaching health 
and nutrition, first aid, sanitation, environmental conservation, and organizing types of credit 
unions.
555
 During this period, the role of the local monks in development projects expanded from 
simply providing information about the community and informal support to development 
workers and their projects to formally training monks to take part in or even lead projects and to 
encourage community members in their sermons to take part in the projects as a productive 
social activity that generates karmic merit. The support of the saṅgha was intended to motivate 
greater support among local communities as well as to ensure that the material progress 
promoted in the communities did not also lead to moral and religious decline; it was feared that 
such decline would lead to public disorder and an increase in support for Communism.
556
 While 
many of these community development projects were initiated and led by local monks, many 
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others were more formally undertaken as government projects initiated by government 
officials.
557
 Harvey notes that these programs have been criticized by some because they 
compromise the role of the saṅgha as examples to the community as spiritual elites when they 
undertake such secular affairs and open themselves to exploitation for political purposes.
558
 
Supporters of social activism among the saṅgha, on the other hand, argue that the development 
projects have often been very successful at improving communities materially while also 
reasserting the traditional roles of the monks as community leaders.
559
 Due to its role in the 
community, the saṅgha must necessarily respond to political, social, and economic changes in 
the world around them, many of which can happen rapidly; I have indicated that such activities 
can be traced back to early Buddhism in India, and examples like the monk-led development 
programs in Thailand indicate that the saṅgha must seek some balance between spiritual and 
social pursuits in the modern world as well. 
5.7.2.  Socially Engaged Buddhism 
Since it began at the end of the 20
th
 century, no discussion of Buddhist social ethics would be 
complete without discussing the contemporary movement within the Buddhist tradition known as 
Socially Engaged Buddhism. Because of its clear focus on social and political activism, Socially 
Engaged Buddhism is the most fertile area within the entire history of the Buddhist tradition for 
examples of Buddhist approaches to poverty alleviation. I will here briefly introduce the Socially 
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Engaged Buddhist movement and some of its major figures, before describing key examples of 
such poverty alleviation efforts.   
Socially Engaged Buddhism is best understood as a reaction among various Buddhist groups or 
practitioners to particular situations confronting the modern world, such as war, poverty, and 
modernization.
560
 As such, it largely developed as a response to contemporary ethical issues, 
such as economic injustice, environmental destruction, and human rights. Perhaps because it is a 
response to these modern issues that often require innovative solutions, the continuity of Socially 
Engaged Buddhist teachings and ethics with the long history of the Buddhist tradition has been 
debated. Some scholars have described Engaged Buddhism as differing qualitatively from 
Buddhist ethics in their approaches, even so much so as to constitute a new school of Buddhism, 
or a fourth yāna.561 Yet, other scholars and virtually all Socially Engaged Buddhists claim that 
their teachings on social and political activism are consistent with those that have always existed 
in the Buddhist tradition.
562
 
5.7.2.1.  Background 
In 2000, scholars at a conference on Socially Engaged Buddhism proposed a definition stating 
that it is characterized by: 
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a reorientation of Buddhist soteriology and ethics to identify and address sources of 
human suffering outside of the cravings and ignorance of the sufferer – such as social, 
political, and economic injustice, warfare, violence, and environmental degradation.
563
 
Christopher Queen suggested an alternate definition, defining it as “the dharma of social service 
and activism, premised on the belief that suffering is not only the result of individual karma, and 
that its remediation requires collective effort.”564 Dr. A.T. Ariyaratne, the founder of the Sri 
Lankan Sarvōdaya Śramadāna movement, exemplifies still another perspective, holding that the 
Buddhist teachings of selflessness and interconnection mean that individual liberation cannot be 
separated from the liberation of society.
565
 These definitions point to the focus on social or 
political action as somehow central to the path to an entwined collective and individual liberation 
characterized by Socially Engaged Buddhism.  
The birth of the movement is often attributed to the Zen monk and activist, Thich Nhat Hanh, in 
war-torn Vietnam in the 1960s who coined the phrase Socially Engaged Buddhism when 
referring to Buddhists engaged in social action.
566
 Nhat Hanh has since declared the term a 
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misnomer because, as he says, all Buddhists necessarily engage with their societies.
567
 Many 
Socially Engaged Buddhist leaders in various countries and from varying schools of Buddhism 
have looked to Nhat Hanh as an inspiration in their own formulations of social and political 
activism in their Buddhist practice.   
As a clear explication of what have become foundational principles of Socially Engaged 
Buddhism, Nhat Hanh’s Tiep Hien Order holds a commitment to engaging with suffering in 
society as a basic precept. For example, the order’s fourth precept states:  
Do not avoid contact with suffering or close your eyes before suffering. Do not lose 
awareness of the existence of suffering in the life of the world. Find ways to be with 
those who are suffering by all means, including personal contact and visits, images, and 
sound. By such means awaken yourself and others to the reality of suffering in the 
world.”568 
And, the fifth precept: 
Do not accumulate wealth while millions are hungry. Do not take as the aim of your life 
fame, profit, wealth, or sensual pleasure. Live simply and share time, energy, and 
material resources with those who are in need.”569 
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Although Socially Engaged Buddhist leaders are found addressing a range of political and socio-
economic conditions in different communities, they generally share a common focus on 
nonviolent social and political activism as a means to reducing or eliminating material suffering 
similar to the framework espoused by Nhat Hanh.  
One cannot clearly address the historical background of Engaged Buddhism without addressing 
the scholarly debate surrounding it. Is Engaged Buddhism simply the result of a syncretism of 
classical Buddhism and modern Western teachings on social justice such as is found in the 
Abrahamic faiths?
570
 Or, have Buddhists in fact always been ‘engaged’ with society throughout 
their history? The key question that this debate seems to hinge on is this: Do the Engaged 
Buddhists teachings on social or political action arise from within their tradition, or have they 
been imported into it from some other source? And, if they arise through the influence from 
another source, does it then mean the movement is no longer authentically Buddhist?  
There is some merit to the claim that traditionally Buddhists have not sought to change society, 
but rather to escape from it, as is evident in the example set by the saṅgha; some Buddhists do 
indeed retreat from society to engage in meditative practices. These ‘forest-dwelling monks’ may 
do so in the belief that the suffering of saņsāra is an inherent part of society and social 
relationships, and therefore they seek to escape from it by removing themselves from it. There is, 
however, another trend in the ‘village-dwelling monks’ and virtually all of the lay followers 
which emphasizes that the suffering inherent in saņsāra is conditioned by mental states, which 
are overcome by following the teachings of the Buddha concerning ethical or moral behavior in 
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relation to other beings in society as well as mental training. Considering that the greatest 
number of Buddhists, both monks and lay followers, have followed the ‘village-dwelling’ 
approach historically, it is both odd and inaccurate to suppose that the necessary ideal among all 
Buddhists is to withdraw from society. 
But, at the heart of this criticism is a deeper issue that also merits some attention. James Dietrick 
has argued that Engaged Buddhist ethics are not consistent with the most basic Buddhist 
teachings on dukkha, or suffering, found in the Four Noble Truths. According to Dietrick, in 
Buddhist thought  
suffering is a psychological state brought on by individual’s attachments. It is not the 
direct and necessary result of external conditions, but rather the result of the manner in 
which those conditions are responded to.
571
   
Furthermore,  
suffering for Buddhism is not typically equated with physical pain or societal oppression, 
at least not in the deepest sense of dukkha.  Rather, it is the sense of unsatisfactoriness 
that comes with the perverse tendency to cling to the self and other ostensibly illusory 
objects in an ever-changing world.”572   
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This dissatisfaction “cannot be eradicated by eliminating the causes of oppression,” and 
therefore, “work toward creation of a good society ... holds no intrinsic value in Buddhism.”573 
To Dietrick, then, Engaged Buddhism is inconsistent with the most basic doctrine of the 
Buddhist tradition insofar as it teaches that suffering is overcome through changes to external 
conditions rather than internal states. 
However, this myopic view of suffering ignores the full sense of the term dukkha that I have 
outlined above. Although some of the most common forms of suffering may indeed be called 
psychological states, it would be incorrect to assert that dukkha does not also refer to the forms 
of suffering that may result from external conditions. Dietrick is correct, in one sense, that the 
Buddhist term dukkha may refer to psychological suffering and that it is transcended by 
removing attachments. However, this is only one form of dukkha described in Buddhist texts, 
and one must not ignore the other forms, even if they are not considered the deepest sense of 
dukkha. As noted earlier, the various notions of dukkha can be divided into three different types: 
dukkha-dukkhatā, vipariňāma-dukkhatā, and saṅkhāra-dukkhatā.574 Dukkha-dukkhatā includes 
the physical and mental pain or discomfort that is generally associated with the term suffering. 
Vipariňāma-dukkhatā is suffering that arises from impermanence, and includes the fear of death 
and other fears and dissatisfactions that are associated with the fleeting or impermanent nature of 
things. Saṅkhāra-dukkhatā refers to suffering caused by conditioned states. Particularly 
important to Buddhist thought is this type of dukkha, resulting from grasping at the kandhas and 
taking them as a permanent self. Although this last form of dukkha is said to be optional, the first 
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two forms are inevitable. In fact, elsewhere the Buddha described dukkha as one of the 
fundamental characteristics of this saņsāric world that one is only ultimately liberated from once 
it is left behind when one enters nirvana.
575
 This would imply that some forms of dukkha are 
only finally transcended when one leaves this world of saņsāra. If this is the case, then there are 
types of suffering, such as physical pain or illness, which are indeed the direct result of external 
conditions. There appears, therefore, to be nothing inconsistent with the Buddhist tradition in the 
Engaged Buddhist’s goal of reducing or eliminating any physical or emotional forms of suffering 
of other beings whenever possible—indeed have presented here already ample passages in 
Buddhist scriptural texts that promote such objectives. The problem would arise if Engaged 
Buddhists were to make the further claim that all forms of suffering may be overcome by 
properly altering social or political systems. It is likely closer to the truth to say that a Socially 
Engaged Buddhist view on these material and physical forms of suffering is that the other forms 
are conditioned by them; that is to say that the more psychological forms of suffering and 
attachment are brought about by the inequalities and human rights violations. Reducing or 
removing the causes of these material forms of suffering will likely also reduce the other forms 
of suffering present in our globalized world. 
Another common criticism of Engaged Buddhism is that the shift of focus onto establishing just 
social or political structures is inconsistent with the characteristic Buddhist focus on 
enlightenment.  Bardwell Smith, rightly points out that: 
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The primary goal of Buddhism is not a stable order or just society but the discovery of 
genuine freedom (or awakening) by each person. It has never been asserted that the 
conditions of society are unimportant or unrelated to this more important goal, but it is 
critical to stress the distinction between what is primary and what is not. For Buddhists to 
lose this distinction is to transform their tradition into something discontinuous with its 
original and historic essence.
576
 
Some critics claim that Engaged Buddhists have taken that step of losing the distinction between 
what is primary and what is not, and have become discontinuous with the original and historic 
essence of Buddhism.  
However, the relieving of material sufferings of the poor does not necessarily entail a change of 
final goals or primary objectives. As indicated in the narrative found in the Dhammapada 
commentary of the poor traveller who had to be fed before receiving the Dhamma, the relief of 
material suffering may be done precisely so that the sufferer will then be in a position to accept 
the Dhamma and ultimately reach an end of all suffering; this is entirely consistent with both 
Theravādin and Mahāyāna teachings.577 In such instances, relief of suffering is then merely a 
means to that ultimate goal of enlightenment or liberation. The distinction here, if there is a 
substantial one, is merely between immediate and long-term objectives. One might ask then, 
what exactly is the substantial difference between the two, if awakening or ultimate liberation is 
the long-term or final goal in both Engaged Buddhism and the broader Buddhist tradition? 
Again, an immediate goal of removing the conditions resulting in material human suffering 
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through establishing a just society is not in itself inconsistent with the characteristic Buddhist 
goal of relieving suffering, and is particularly in line with bodhisattva goals to relieve all forms 
of suffering of all beings. 
An important criticism of the view that Engaged Buddhism is discontinuous with the tradition is 
that it falls prey to charges of orientalism. As I noted at the beginning of this dissertation, it is not 
entirely clear exactly what the original and historic essence of Buddhism would be, and many 
scholars now take the position that Buddhism has never been one clear homogenous body of 
doctrines or views.
578
 Accepting this historical actuality, in the end the fact that Engaged 
Buddhists have interpreted the Dhamma, and applied it to the modern world, places them firmly 
within the tradition of other Buddhists before them who have gone through the same process in 
their own times and places. Susan Darlington notes that since the earliest time of the Buddha, 
Buddhists “have always adapted their interpretations and practices of the religion to fit a 
changing socio-political and natural environment.”579 Loy argues that this ability to blend with 
other cultures and beliefs is precisely one of the great strengths of Buddhism evident throughout 
its history.
580
 The ability to both influence and be influenced by other beliefs and practices has 
helped to make it a major world religion, and this evolution or hybridization is found throughout 
the entire history of Buddhism. Similarly, Loy argues, Engaged Buddhism is a fruit of the 
mixture of Buddhism with the Abrahamic religion’s prophetic dimension concerned with social 
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 If the history of the Buddhist tradition has been one of constant mixing and evolution, 
it seems inconsistent to criticize that process as it happens today. As King points out, if leaders 
had not emerged to directly confront the ethical dilemmas imposed by the conditions afflicting 
Buddhists of the day, Buddhism would have become irrelevant to entire nations and 
generations.
582
 The Buddha is said to have used ‘skillful means’ in his teaching, by tailoring the 
content of his message to his audience, making it ultimately applicable to all of his listeners 
regardless of their particular stage of moral or spiritual development. The Socially Engaged 
Buddhist movement can be seen as another transformation, or another application of the 
Buddhist message to the modern world. 
What, then, of the claim that a focus on social and political activism has always been a part of 
the history of the Buddhist tradition? Although compassion and altruism in the relief of material 
sufferings is evident since the beginnings of the Buddhist tradition, particularly so in the 
bodhisattva ideal, Engaged Buddhists may indeed have developed those ideas into a new 
understanding of the role of these teachings in spiritual practice.
583
 As I have noted previously, 
there is some evidence that Buddhist monasteries in China and Japan often served as centers for 
road and bridge building, public works projects, social revolution, military defense, orphanages, 
travel hostels, medical education, hospital building, free medical care, the stockpiling of 
medicines, conflict intervention, moderation of penal codes, programs to assist the elderly and 
poor including stockpiles of resources for hunger and hardship, famine and epidemic relief, and 
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 Scarcity of records from India makes it uncertain as to whether or not such 
activities took place there as well. However, until the development of Engaged Buddhism, social 
or political activism does not seem to have taken on the role of a central activity or step in the 
path to liberation.
585
   
Sallie King presents what seems to be the most balanced perspective on Engaged Buddhism, 
arguing that, although they also show some influence of Western analysis, Engaged Buddhists 
base their approaches on the central Buddhist teachings of karma, dukkha and the Four Noble 
Truths, causality and dependent origination, non-self, and interdependence, in addition to the 
characteristic Buddhist ethics and virtues concerning non-violence, dāna, compassion and 
loving-kindness.
586
 Engaged Buddhists simply apply these key principles to what may be new 
situations and ethical dilemmas, resulting in what appears to some to be new principles or at least 
new interpretations of them. 
Queen notes that to some Engaged Buddhist leaders, such as the Dalai Lama, Thich Nhat Hanh, 
and Maha Ghosananada, personal spirituality is the drive for, and the shaping force of, their 
activism.
 587
  It is because of the level of spirituality that they have developed that they see a need 
for social action, and it is then complimentary to their spirituality. Others, such as Dalit or 
Ambedkarite Buddhists, make activism more foundational to their practice, shifting the focus 
almost entirely onto activism, believing that activism in struggling against class oppression is 
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itself the spirituality that must be practiced. These Buddhist converts from the Untouchable caste 
in India often choose to forego the more familiar and typical Buddhist meditative practices 
making up the Samādhi grouping of the eightfold path precisely because they instill feelings of 
equanimity, tolerance, and peace which may conflict with a necessary resolve in their struggle. 
Socially Engaged Buddhism did not originate in one particular location or with one leader or 
personality, but rather it began as various Buddhist leaders emerged throughout Asia in response 
to the conditions confronting their particular communities. Sallie King attributes this 
phenomenon to the numerous radical changes and events occurring in Asia in modern history: 
The multiple crises that hit Asia in the twentieth century were devastating to much of 
Buddhist Asia. Large parts of World War II, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War/war in 
Southeast Asia were fought there, directly affecting Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and much of 
the rest of Southeast Asia and resulting in millions of deaths. There has been genocide in 
Cambodia and foreign invasion and cultural genocide in Tibet, again resulting in millions 
of deaths in both countries. Countries such as Sri Lanka have been impoverished and 
politically uprooted by colonial occupiers. Buddhist Asia has generated some extremely 
repressive governments—for example, Burma/Myanmar. Ecological crisis has become 
quite acute in some areas, such as Thailand, where deforestation has devastated some of 
the fishing and agricultural foundations of the economy.
588
  
Additionally, King continues: 
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Buddhist Asia has also seen some long-term social ills come to a head in the twentieth 
century, owing in part to the encounter with Western cultures—notably the extreme 
social inequality, bigotry, and poverty suffered by the ex-untouchables in India and the 
repressed and inferior status of women in much of Buddhist Asia. Finally, in the latter 
half of the twentieth century, Buddhist Asia was subjected to the powerful and related 
forces of rapid modernization, Westernization, and globalization, transforming 
foundational cultural patterns that have existed for centuries and even millennia.
589
 
King points out that many prominent Engaged Buddhist leaders have been significantly 
influenced by the West.
590
 Thich Nhat Hanh, for example, was educated in the West. 
Nevertheless, she argues that Engaged Buddhists base their approaches on genuinely Buddhist 
teachings. 
5.7.2.2.  Sarvōdaya Śramadāna 
Socially Engaged Buddhist poverty relief projects provide contemporary examples of 
comprehensive social improvement programs based on Buddhist principles. Rather than 
searching the texts for examples, as we have done so far, we can instead take a closer look at 
how such programs work on the ground in our own time. Sarvōdaya Śramadāna is an excellent 
example of a Buddhist community development organization. Sarvōdaya Śramadāna movement 
means the 'sharing effort for the enlightenment of all' movement. It has been described by Ken 
Jones as “arguably the largest and most comprehensive example of socially Engaged Buddhism 
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in the world today.”591 Sarvōdaya relies on some of the key early Buddhist texts I have outlined 
above and sees itself as recovering the social ethic of early Buddhism.
592
 Those key texts include 
the Kūtadanta Sutta, which points to poverty as a cause of moral degeneration and social decay; 
the Sigālovāda Sutta, which deals with duties to others in society; and the narrative in the 
Dhammapadaţţhakathā of the lay-follower Magha and the social improvement programs he 




King describes the Sarvōdaya Śramadāna method as community-based and community-led. A 
village invites a Sarvōdaya Śramadāna worker to visit it, where he or she consults with the local 
leaders and introduces the idea of ‘village awakening’, and suggests that the villagers organize a 
local village Śramadāna, which can gradually grow to collectively tackle any problems the 
community might be facing, from clean water and basic healthcare to education to microcredit 
and village-banking projects, and from there they then help it spread to other villages.
594
 The 
village Śramadāna becomes a center for community members to interact regularly and positively 
as they discuss needs within their community. Ariyaratne exemplifies a comprehensive approach 
to relieving a comprehensive notion of poverty, by aiming to build a society in which all needs 
are met—not only the economic, but social, cultural, psychological, political, and spiritual needs 
as well. Sarvōdaya Śramadāna’s idea of poverty and development are much broader than most 
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development organizations because it is trying to achieve development, not only in the economic 
sense of increasing income, producing goods, and lowering unemployment, but in the sense of 
total human development or what it calls awakening.  
Sarvōdaya employs a model that considers the process of poverty alleviation incomplete until the 
poor are transformed to not only value generosity toward others, but to have the capability or 
substantial freedom to also be able to give of their abundance to others, to spread their realm of 
capabilities and responsibilities into neighboring villages; the poor in effect are thereby 
transformed from the receivers of aid to givers. Sarvōdaya’s goal is to help impoverished or 
otherwise underprivileged people assert their value as humans and share the material and non-
material resources in society on an equal basis with others.
595
 Here we can see a focus on social 
inclusion or full participation in society; part of poverty relief becomes the reintegration of the 
impoverished into the community. Harvey describes this broader goal of development as 
“arousing villagers from their passivity and getting them involved in choosing and working on 
projects, such as building a road to their village or organizing a marketing co-operative. It draws 
on Buddhist ideals such as generosity and loving kindness, and seeks to get all sections of the 
community to participate and work together so as to experience their individual and communal 
potential for changing their economic, social, natural and spiritual environments.”596 The inter-
relatedness and interdependence in society is recognized here as monks also take part in this lay-
led program, demonstrating a society-wide movement endeavoring to include all sectors of 
society. 
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5.7.2.3.  Roshi Bernie Glassman 
Another fitting example of an Engaged Buddhist poverty alleviation project is led by the 
American Zen Roshi Bernie Glassman, founder of the Zen Peacemaker Order.
597
 Glassman 
started a number of poverty-related programs, including ‘street retreats’ in which the affluent 
spend time living on the streets like the homeless populations; pilgrimages to Auschwitz-
Birkenau, where participants bear witness to the atrocities of Holocaust and sit with open minds 
and hearts seeking insight and transformation; The Greyston Mandala, a network of nonprofit 
economic development organizations that provide housing, employment, and other services to 




 Echoing Ariyaratne’s participatory approach to an extent, Glassman began by asking the poor in 
New York directly what they needed. Recognizing much broader needs among the poor than 
simply a job, Glassman organized the Greyston Mandala, a network of for-profit businesses and 
not-for-profit agencies focused on serving the poor. The Mandala is made up of a bakery, 
affordable housing, including housing and health services for those with HIV/AIDS, and 
programs to provide training, counseling, child care, after-school programs, and community 
gardens.  
In Glassman’s ‘street retreats’ in New York City, his students undertake a period of 
homelessness, living on the streets with the homeless of New York in order to break down the 
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conceptual distinctions between themselves and others. Glassman sees this as a step toward 
helping those in need, exemplifying the Mahāyāna Buddhist understanding of the non-self 
teaching—as seen in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra discussed above which describes complete 
generosity in which the concepts of giver, receiver, and gift are dissolved or transcended.
599
  
Sallie King explains,  
these scriptures build on the earlier teachings of interdependence and no-self to teach 
śūnyatā, or emptiness….all things are utterly interdependent and mutually constructive, 
to the extent that (what might provisionally have been thought of as) the constituent parts 
of things are recognized as being so interdependent with other things that they are not 
really separate things at all. … In this sense, all things are “empty” of “own-being,” the 
ability to “own” their own being, to be themselves by themselves. Therefore, not only are 
humans lacking in selfhood—an inner, constant core constituting the essence of our 
identity—but all things and all elements whatsoever are also lacking in such a core. The 
“perfection of wisdom” that most of the Mahayana takes as a basic spiritual goal is to 
realize this emptiness experientially and to let go of all conscious and subconscious 
mental constructing of fixed beings and entities where there are none.
600
  
While this degree of emptiness seems extremely abstract, if not incomprehensible, the goal of 
Glassman’s ‘street retreats’ are intended to be practices in taking some of the preliminary steps 
toward a more profound level of openness and non-judgmental attitude toward others. These 
                                                             
599
  PSS 263-264 (Conze, 2006:136-137); see also, DS Chapter 4, 11 (Hua, 1974: 91-94, 
128-134); King, 2009: 45-47. 
600
   King, 2009: 45-46. 
 M o n s o n  P a g e  | 270 
 
practices encourage students to remove any obstacles they might naturally tend to use to separate 
themselves from others, to stop seeing others as fundamentally different, and to enter into a 
spontaneous and open relationship in the moment with another person. It is Glassman’s belief 
that his students will gain as much from the homeless they interact with as the homeless will by 
having such nonjudgmental and engaged friendships with his students.
601
 By spending this time 
living on the streets, meandering without any possessions or money, Glassman's students 




Here, the problem of poverty is addressed in a comprehensive manner as a process, much like 
Hershock outlined above, in which poverty becomes not a problem with the ‘other’ that needs to 
be fixed by transferring goods, but the root problem becomes one for all humanity; it is a shared 
suffering that is as much a problem or failing among the wealthy as it is the poor, requiring a 
solution for one no less than for the other. This approach causes those in more ‘developed’ 
nations to confront the questions, what is wrong with this global system that us as wealthy 
nations, or as wealthy individuals, allow to continue and even contribute to causing and 
maintaining such poverty? How or why do we justify the view that the suffering of the poor is 
theirs alone to end and not also ours? We might follow the Bodhicaryāvatāra in asking “why 
should I not conceive my fellow’s body as my own self?”603 And, proclaim, “I must destroy the 
pain of another as though it were my own, because it is a pain,” for there is no genuine difference 
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between one’s own suffering and that of another—there is only suffering.604Greed and 
overconsumption, hatred and imbalances of power, and ignorance and short-sightedness 
inevitably result in suffering; and, in the final analysis, the suffering of anyone is of no less value 
or concern than my own suffering, or the suffering of my friends and family. Rather than arguing 
over issues of justice and rights, as is a natural tendency to do, the Buddhist approach 
exemplified by Glassman is to be more concerned with the actual experience of suffering and 
how to prevent or eliminate it. And yet, ironically, following this course would likely only 
reduce social and economic injustice, and ensure basic rights such as access to essential material 
needs, thereby establishing justice.  
5.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the most significant passages related to the duty of poverty relief found 
in the Pāli Canon and select Mahāyāna sūtras. We have seen in the Pāli Canon that each social 
group is given duties concerning poverty from kings to lay followers and monks, while the 
distinctions between the duties blur in the Mahāyāna texts. In the Mahāyāna tradition relieving 
the physical suffering of poverty becomes a more central focus as a part of the bodhisattva ideal. 
Because of this most essential doctrine, the virtues of generosity and compassion receive more 
emphasis, and the relief of the material suffering of others shifts to a position closer to the center 
of Buddhist thought than it had ever been previously. Damien Keown describes Mahāyāna ethics 
as a recalibration of the Theravāda Buddhist value-structure, which includes a new emphasis on 
“the function of moral virtue as a dynamic other-regarding quality, rather than primarily 
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concerned with personal development and self-control.”605 This other-regarding quality is 
nowhere more evident in the Mahāyāna than in the bodhisattva ideal. The compassion of the 
bodhisattva is a key Mahāyāna teaching, and one related specifically to poverty and poverty 
relief.  
As Buddhism has spread to new regions, such as China and Tibet, it often opened to 
reinterpretation in order to fit with the new culture and be applicable to the new populations. 
Similarly, with the process of globalization, Buddhism has again moved into a new area. 
Although geographical expansion has not forced this transformation, we can see it as an 
expansion to a global community—one which wrestles on an existential level with new issues or 
timeless issues in a new way. I have outlined here some contemporary Buddhist responses to the 
issues related to this process of globalization, by focusing particularly on the issue of poverty. I 
have tried to show that there are Buddhists responding to these issues in genuinely Buddhist 
ways, and that these approaches may be fruitful to enter into a dialogue with as we attempt to 
analyze and respond to these difficult issues we are facing in the world today. 
Sarvōdaya Śramadāna and Zen Roshi Bernie Glassman’s projects stand out as helpful Engaged 
Buddhist examples of uniquely or characteristically Buddhist thought applied to issues of 
poverty and poverty relief. These organizations base their efforts on Buddhist principles, both 
showing broad comprehensive and multidimensional approaches to poverty and development. 
The organizational goals go far beyond the narrow view of increasing income to transforming 
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6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this dissertation is to introduce the reader to Buddhist engagement with the issue 
of global poverty. I have outlined the key Buddhist teachings that form the foundation of a 
Buddhist analysis of this important issue. My focus has been on the authoritative scriptures and 
texts that represent the tradition and historical perspectives, broadly through both Theravāda and 
Mahāyāna schools; I have also made reference to examples of poverty alleviation projects in 
Buddhist history as well as within the contemporary Socially Engaged Buddhist movement. 
These passages outline a remarkably nuanced notion of poverty, as well as clear duties to relieve 
the suffering of the poor that are associated with the main social groupings. While there is some 
ambivalence in some of these teachings, there is a line of thought reaching back to the earliest of 
Buddhist history that comprises a social and economic ethic that aims at fully removing the 
material suffering of the poor. Moreover, beyond providing a theological justification for modern 
Buddhist poverty relief projects, these teachings can make significant contributions to the current 
discussion of poverty and poverty relief among the broader development community. If a 
poverty relief effort that is expansive enough to confront poverty on a global scale is to be 
conceived and implemented, it must of necessity speak to the real experiences of the world’s 
poor. If this is so, then translating the concepts into models that cross common cultural 
boundaries is essential to the endeavor. In this sense, an understanding of the Buddhist 
conceptions of poverty and poverty relief is highly valuable—and even more so when it bears the 
promise that current leading conceptions, like the capabilities approach, can be presented in 
language that can resonate with hundreds of millions of Buddhists throughout the world.  
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If the main obstacle to eliminating extreme poverty in our time is developing the motivation and 
political will to do so, then projects like this one become invaluable. Buddhist ethics can 
contribute a formal structure for conceptualizing poverty that provides support for current 
leading theories and that contributes to the project of conceiving of these efforts in notions and 
values that cross cultural boundaries; moreover, it provides a strong motivation to the hundreds 
of millions of Buddhists in the world to help alleviate the suffering of extreme poverty, while 
also contributing parables and teachings that will likely also resonate with many more non-
Buddhists. Additionally, applying Buddhist principles to conceptions of poverty and poverty 
relief, such as the non-self teaching, interdependent co-origination, and skilful means, can yield 
fruitful discussions in the development field that advance studies of the nature of poverty and 
practical approaches to alleviating it. 
6.1. Buddhist Social Theory 
Although many Western scholars have ignored the social aspects of the Buddhist tradition in the 
past, contemporary scholars widely agree that teachings on social, economic, and political 
matters are evident since its earliest history. Indeed, the Buddha’s teachings include numerous 
teachings on business matters, political advice, and detailed duties and roles of the major social 
groupings. If there is any doubt about centrality of these teachings, one need only consider the 
fact that Right Livelihood, the core ethical teachings regarding economic behavior, holds so 
central a part in the path toward enlightenment as to be listed alongside the more familiar factors 
of meditation and mental cultivation in the Eightfold Path. Alternatively, one might consider the 
bodhisattva vow to end the suffering of all sentient beings, which is to many Buddhists a 
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necessary component of enlightenment. These key teachings alone provide sufficient reason to 
presume that Buddhist ethics is deeply concerned with how one relates to others in society. 
In point of fact, as Payutto and Hu have argued, the teachings within the Pāli Canon concerning 
the interdependence and inter-relatedness of individuals within society constitute a social ethic 
that clearly identifies duties among the key social groupings of rulers, laity, and saṅgha.606 All 
are dependent upon one another for their own existence, survival and liberation. They all rely on 
one another to legitimate and justify their own roles within society, but at a broader level, it is 
unavoidably within the context of social relationships that one must strive for enlightenment. The 
ideal conditions identified in the Pāli Canon for an individual to attain enlightenment include a 
prosperous, safe, and stable society and economy. For the Mahāyāna schools, the bodhisattvas 
also generally require a social context in which to work toward the enlightenment of themselves 
and others. In the bodhisattva ideal it is perhaps the most clear that material well-being 





In addition to the general political and social teachings that make up Buddhist social ethics, the 
Buddha taught numerous economic principles that can serve as a foundation for economic ethics 
as well. The most fundamental of these is Right Livelihood, included in the Eightfold Noble 
Path. Buddhist economic principles outlined in the Pāli Canon include ethics in income 
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generation, wealth distribution, labor relations, and work ethics. In brief, the pursuit of wealth is 
identified as noble and praiseworthy, at least insofar as it is done in an ethical manner and for the 
purpose of increasing the well-being of oneself and others. Hoarding riches is universally 
disparaged, while the wealthy who exemplify the virtues of generosity, contentment and 
equanimity are held as the ideal. 
The Buddha taught that craving and attachment lay at the core of all human suffering. Only by 
overcoming our greed, hatred and delusion can we completely free ourselves from the desire for, 
and attachment to, those things that lead to our suffering. While Buddhist economics largely 
developed as a critique of the dominant Western economic models, the two nonetheless share 
some similarities. Classical economics and the Buddhist tradition both assert that desire is 
unlimited, but Buddhist economics holds that rather than trying to satisfy desire through 
consumption, one must overcome the desire for those things that ultimately result in suffering. 
Moderation is therefore promoted as a key principle, as a means of counteracting unhealthy 
consumption. While Buddhist economics does not appear to likely replace the dominant 
economic systems, it does offer helpful critiques of too narrow understandings of human nature 
and activity. 
6.3. Buddhist Concepts of Poverty 
An initial distinction to understand about the Buddhist approach to poverty is that some level of 
voluntary poverty or simplicity is promoted as a beneficial if not necessary step along the path to 
enlightenment. For this reason, those who enter the saṅgha take vows of homelessness and 
possessionlessness as a means to overcoming greed and cultivating a sense of contentment. 
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Having taken these vows, the saṅgha becomes the ideal recipient of meritorious gifts or alms as 
well as a conscience of society by modelling alternative values based on Buddhist virtues that 
counterbalance the dominant hierarchical structure in society that is based on wealth and social 
or political standing.  
The Pāli Canon and various Mahāyāna sūtras describe poverty-as-deprivation as a source of 
suffering, and as such as an obstacle to ultimate liberation. Poverty is an evil first and foremost 
because it prevents the sufferer from being open to the enlightening message of the Dhamma. 
Furthermore, poverty excludes the sufferers from the social relationships and behaviors that are 
most often associated with generating karmic merit—for example, donations to the saṅgha and 
oftentimes the opportunity to join the saṅgha, which is forbidden to debtors. And, the problem of 
poverty is even more severe. Due to the interdependent nature of social relationships, when 
poverty reaches systemic levels it leads all within the society down a spiral towards a more 
bestial character in which enlightenment eventually becomes virtually impossible in the present 
life. 
6.3.1. The Capabilities Approach  
While the notions of poverty conveyed in Buddhist scripture most often fit within the category of 
absolute material poverty, certain key passages that deal with issues of poverty also convey 
notions of poverty very much in line with the capabilities approach, similar to what is promoted 
currently by UNDP, and the Subjective Well-Being Approach. This comprehensive and 
multidimensional view of poverty focuses not merely on material goods or income, but also on 
social relationships and practices, as well as ultimately on mental cultivation and spiritual 
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development toward final liberation. Sarvōdaya Śramadāna exemplifies this approach to poverty 
relief by moving the goal beyond material sufficiency or prosperity to cultivating the virtue of 
dāna- generosity or giving—when they help neighboring villages to prosper. Poverty then 
includes spiritual or moral poverty as well; this promotes an active generosity and compassion 
toward others in need as final objectives. 
6.3.2. Non-Self teaching 
A key teaching at the core of Buddhism that has major implications to notions of poverty and 
poverty relief is the non-self teaching. This is one of the most important of the contributions that 
a Buddhist analysis can make to discussions of poverty and poverty relief. One of the major 
sources of suffering is the mistaken belief in a self that is an independent and permanent entity or 
phenomenon. Buddhists hold that what we think of as one’s permanent self is really a constantly 
changing flow of thoughts, feelings, physical particles, etc. When we take any or all of those as a 
permanent self, we suffer. Again, just as there is no independent or permanent 'I' that is an angry 
person, neither is there one that is poor. Similarly, poverty is not a permanent or independent 
thing, but rather is a process. Impoverishment is merely one of many conditions that can be 
changed, even changed permanently. The non-self teaching is also applied to removing the 
conceptual framework that differentiates my ‘self’ from another who is suffering, as exemplified 
by Glassman's street retreat and the dissolution of the giver, receiver and gift model. 
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6.4. Poverty Relief in Buddhist History 
Throughout its history, Buddhists have confronted poverty and promoted compassion and 
altruism in addressing the social and political conditions that result in poverty. The prevention 
and elimination of systemic or widespread poverty is primarily the responsibility of kings or 
governments. They are told to give material goods directly to the poor, and to invest in the 
economy and otherwise contribute to a prosperous, safe, and stable economy. A key example of 
the Buddhist ideal regarding kingship is Ashoka, who is said to have given food, shelter and 
clothing to the poor, as well as to have undertaken construction projects to provide for the poor 
and the travellers. 
The saṅgha have also instructed the kings and laity in poverty relief, and have also themselves 
engaged in public works and social improvement projects. Throughout China and Japan 
monasteries often played a central role in such projects, including providing education, medical 
supplies and services, loans, and other material goods to those in need. Additionally, monk-led 
development programs have been implemented in Thailand in modern times. 
6.4.1. Engaged Buddhism 
The contemporary engaged Buddhist movement offers the best examples from the Buddhist 
tradition of Buddhist approaches to poverty relief. As a result of globalization, poverty around 
the world, not only in one’s own community, has become a major concern for everyone. 
Engaged Buddhists draw on the teachings of their own tradition for tools for analyzing poverty 
and developing approaches to relieving poverty. Sarvōdaya Śramadāna and Bernie Glassman’s 
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Greyston Mandala exemplify Socially Engaged Buddhists approach to put these key Buddhist 
virtues to work in alleviating poverty. 
6.5. Further Research 
The purpose of this dissertation has been to shed light on Buddhist teachings relating to poverty 
and poverty relief in hopes of indicating initial suggestions of what Buddhist social and 
economic ethics can contribute to contemporary discussions of this supremely important global 
issue. If a global ethic of poverty and poverty relief is to develop, it must not only account for 
one particular perspective, but must also agree with the perspectives and experiences of the 
various cultures around the world. While the Buddhist tradition has historically had little to do 
with discussions in the West of how to conceive of poverty and poverty relief or economic 
development, the tradition offers insights and principles for analysis that contribute to a rich and 
comprehensive understanding of poverty and poverty relief, and for at least this reason, it 
deserves a place in dialogue concerning these issues. My hope is that these pages have 
sufficiently uncovered the key teachings and principles that outline a Buddhist approach to 
poverty and will help move a Buddhist analysis more fully into dialogue with the global 
community as much as also help to move the pressing concerns of world poverty more fully into 
discussions of Buddhist ethics. I have noted that the non-self teaching and the teaching on 
emptiness offer significant contributions to analyses of poverty and wealth and the processes that 
bring about impoverishment and development. This is an area that is ripe for future research. 
This has been a preliminary attempt at a comprehensive glimpse at the Buddhist texts related to 
the issue that can serve as a foundation to a Buddhist analysis of poverty; there is far more that 
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can be gathered concerning historical examples and as texts continue to be translated, my hope is 
that more attention will be paid to how they might improve our understanding of how they deal 
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